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An archival study was conducted to determine the influence of stall warning system
performance on aircrew decision-making outcomes during airborne icing encounters. A
Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model was developed to explain the historical
variability in aircrew performance in the face of airframe icing. The model combined
Bayes’ Theorem with Signal Detection Theory (SDT) concepts to yield testable
predictions that were evaluated using a Binary Logistic Regression (BLR) multivariate
technique applied to two archives: the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
incident database, and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident
databases, both covering the period January 1, 1988 to October 2, 2015.
The CIRB model predicted that aircrew would experience more incorrect
response outcomes in the face of missed stall warnings than with stall warning False
Alarms. These predicted outcomes were observed at high significance levels in the final
sample of 132 NASA/NTSB cases. The CIRB model had high sensitivity and specificity,
and explained 71.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance of aircrew decision-making
outcomes during the icing encounters. The reliability and validity metrics derived from
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this study suggest indicate that the findings are generalizable to the population of U.S.
registered turbine-powered aircraft.
These findings suggest that icing-related stall events could be reduced if the
incidence of stall warning Misses could be minimized. Observed stall warning Misses
stemmed from three principal causes: aerodynamic icing effects, which reduced the stall
angle-of-attack (AoA) to below the stall warning calibration threshold; tail stalls, which
are not monitored by contemporary protection systems; and icing-induced system issues
(such as frozen pitot tubes), which compromised stall warning system effectiveness and
airframe envelope protections. Each of these sources of missed stall warnings could be
addressed by Aerodynamic Performance Monitoring (APM) systems that directly
measure the boundary layer airflow adjacent to the affected aerodynamic surfaces,
independent of other aircraft stall protection, air data, and AoA systems. In addition to
investigating APM systems, measures should also be taken to include the CIRB
phenomenon in aircrew training to better prepare crews to cope with airborne icing
encounters. The SDT/BLR technique would allow the forecast gains from these
improved systems and training processes to be evaluated objectively and quantitatively.
The SDT/BLR model developed for this study has broad application outside the
realm of airborne icing. The SDT technique has been extensively validated by prior
research, and the BLR is a very robust multivariate technique. Combined, they could be
applied to evaluate high order constructs (such as stall awareness for this study), in
complex and dynamic environments. The union of SDT and BLR reduces the modeling
complexities for each variable into the four binary SDT categories of Hit, Miss, False
Alarm, and Correct Rejection, which is the optimum format for the BLR. Despite this
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reductionist approach to complex situations, the method has demonstrated very high
statistical and practical significance, as well as excellent predictive power, when applied
to the airborne icing scenario.
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Chapter I

Introduction

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Airframe icing has caused severe difficulties for aviators since the dawn of human
flight. Aircraft are still lost to icing almost a century after Alcock and Brown’s recordsetting first trans-Atlantic crossing was nearly thwarted by airframe and engine icing (S.
Green, Bettcher, Brachen, & Erickson, 1996). Almost 90 years later, and despite
enormous advances in aircraft systems, meteorology, and pilot training, icing continues to
cause accidents and loss of life. As a result, the issue remained on the National
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Most Wanted List of safety improvements for 14
years (NTSB, 2012).
This study addresses the development and testing of a new theoretical
Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model for evaluating the effect of stall
warning system performance on aircrew decision-making outcomes during icing
encounters, based on a Signal Detection Theory (SDT) framework. The model was
tested via an exploratory archival analysis of NTSB and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) archives. A nonlinear Binary Logistic Regression (BLR) multivariate technique was used to perform the
analysis and the related hypothesis tests.
The topic treatment begins with an overview of airframe icing and stall warning
systems and the relationship between them. This introduction is followed by a historical
review of airframe research, case studies, and regulatory considerations, which provide
the operational context for the subsequent theoretical material. The theory sections begin
with a review of the basic SDT concepts, vigilance tasks, and Bayes’ Theorem. These
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collectively form the foundation of the CIRB hypothesis, which is introduced and
developed in the next section. The CIRB discussion is followed by an overview of the
BLR technique and its application to the evaluation of the CIRB hypothesis using the
NTSB and ASRS databases. Chapter I concludes with a review of the delimitations,
limitations, and assumptions inherent in the research. The literature review (Chapter II)
and methodology section (Chapter III) follow the same general format and sequence as
the first chapter. Results and Conclusions are presented in Chapters IV and V,
respectively. As airframe icing is the catalyst for every aspect of this proposal, the
discussion necessarily begins with a review of icing and its effect on airfoils and the
aircraft to which they are attached.

Airframe Icing
Airframe icing adds weight, affects controllability, and, most seriously, can
severely compromise an airfoil’s ability to create lift “by an unknown amount”
(Zeppetelli & Habashi, 2012, p. 612). Innocuous-seeming icing accretions, similar to a
thin strip of coarse sandpaper on the critical leading-edge of an airfoil, can result in a
30% loss of lift and a 40% drag increase (Bergrun, 1995). Worse, such icing can cause a
stall, which represents a significant degradation of airfoil performance, before the
aircraft’s stall protection systems can alert the crew. The lack of warning arises because
current stall warning systems cannot quantify the influence of ice accretions, and the
regulations for artificial stall warning systems simply impose fixed, and possibly
inadequate, safety margins for flights in icing conditions (FAA, 2011b). Under certain
icing conditions, these pre-set margins have proven inadequate, resulting in a spate of
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aircraft accidents and Loss of Control (LOC) incidents. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has struggled to address the problem by issuing more than 200
airworthiness directives (AD) and four regulatory amendments (FAA, 2010e), yet LOC
incidents and accidents still occur as a result of airborne icing. An analysis of NTSB,
FAA, and NASA ASRS data between 1991 and 2010 revealed that LOC was the leading
cause of fatalities in the large commercial jet and business jet sectors, accounting for
4,717 lives lost and 44% of all U.S. business aircraft accidents during the period
(Veillette, 2012). The same data also showed that icing caused 29% of these fatal LOC
events. Weener (2011) noted a continuing safety threat posed by airborne icing, and the
icing issue remained on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of transportation safety
improvements for small and large aircraft from 1997 to 2011 (NTSB, 2012b).
Commuter airlines are even more susceptible to icing effects than the group
studied by Veillette because commuter carriers generally operate lower performance
aircraft, over shorter sectors, at lower altitudes than the major carriers. These factors
confine commuter operators to the atmospheric strata where icing is prevalent. The risk
is compounded because commuters are exposed to a greater number of takeoffs and
landings than long-range operators, when aircraft performance margins are at their lowest
and the stall probability is at its highest.
Airframe icing remains a continuing problem despite the best efforts of the FAA
and NTSB. Petty & Floyd (2004) explored NTSB data from 1982 to 2000 and noted that
icing accident rates for commuter aircraft operations had not declined during the period.
Using U.S. NTSB 2006 – 2010 online accident synopsis data, Appiah-Kubi, Martos,
Atuahene, & William (2013) recorded 228 accidents and 30 incidents across all aircraft
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categories related to aerodynamic events arising from icing encounters. More recently,
the FAA published its 112th icing-related AD, which barred known-icing operations by
approximately 4,200 small U.S. registered general aviation (GA) aircraft, based on the
ongoing losses caused by icing within this group through a period spanning 30 years
(FAA, 2014g; K. Lynch, 2014). Veillette (2012) conducted a study of business aviation
LOC accidents between 1991 and 2010. Citing Veillette’s results, the National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA) found “no cause was nearly as prevalent as aerodynamic
stalls.” The NBAA also noted that 9 of the 31 stall events (29%) were related to airspeed
management in icing conditions (NBAA, 2015). In a study conducted by Boeing of fatal
accidents to the worldwide commercial jet fleet, LOC accounted for twice the number of
fatalities (1,656) of the second leading cause, Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT),
which cost 803 lives (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2015, p. 22). It is reasonable to
assume that the relative incidence of icing accidents in the Boeing study mirrored the
29% observed by Veillette (2012).
In an effort to reverse this trend, there has been a constant evolution of the laws
pertaining to icing certification, but Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) note a number of
shortcomings in the icing certification regulations, including subjective and conflicting
icing terminology and problems with unrepresentative ice shapes used for certification
flight-testing. Furthermore, many of the icing issues cannot easily be addressed by
regulatory action alone because they are linked to limitations of Angle of Attack (AoA) based stall warning systems, to which the discussion now turns.

5
Stalls, Angle of Attack, and Airfoil Contamination
This section introduces a number of key aerodynamic concepts that have a direct
bearing on the icing topic. Figure 1 illustrates several important airfoil definitions used
throughout this work. Of particular significance is the geometric Angle of Attack (AoA
or α G ), which is the angle subtended between the undisturbed free-stream relative airflow
and the wing chord line that joins the leading and trailing edges of the airfoil (Figure 1).
The AoA can be positive, as shown in the figure, or negative, when the relative wind
impinges on the airfoil from above the chord line. Figure 1 also illustrates a number of
differing AoA definitions that have application in the fields of Computational Fluid
Design (CFD) and aircraft certification. The Absolute AoA (α abs ) is measured from the
datum at which the airfoil produces zero lift. For positively cambered airfoils, as
depicted in Figure 1, α zl occurs at a negative AoA, so:
α𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = αG + α𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧

(1)

The Induced Downwash angle (ε) is characteristic of all 3-dimensional airfoils

operating out of ground effect. This downwash is caused by wingtip vortices that reduce
the effective AoA (α ε ) experienced by the airfoil, which, in turn, is the root cause of
Induced Drag. The downwash and corresponding AoA decrement vary across the span of
the airfoil, as a function of the wing’s Aspect Ratio. This is relevant to the present study
because the changing effective AoA across the span can affect the location and type of
icing accumulation.
For commuter and transport category aircraft with an aft-mounted (i.e.,
conventional) horizontal stabilizer, the main wing almost invariably operates at a positive
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AoA, while the tail normally operates at a negative AoA, particularly during slow speed
operations with the main wing trailing-edge flaps extended. The relevance of this factor
is that icing often accumulates underneath the horizontal stabilizer where it cannot be
viewed or monitored by the crew. In addition, the extension of flaps can counterintuitively exacerbate the potential for a tail stall, even as the flaps increase the stall
margin on the main wing. The effect of these important distinctions between wing and
tail stalls is explicitly explored in the research design discussed in Chapter III. Figure 1
illustrates the typical location for airborne ice accretions on the leading edge of the airfoil
surface at positive angles of attack.

Figure 1. Airfoil definitions. The angle of attack is the angle between the relative wind
and the airfoil chord line. A positive AoA is shown in the figure. The icing location and
form factor are shown for illustrative purposes only. Actual icing can accrete in an
almost limitless number of shapes and coverage extent.
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For a given wing planform operating at a fixed Equivalent Airspeed (EAS), the
lift force is directly proportional to AoA up to a critical AoA, as shown in Figure 2. The
peak of the Lift Coefficient (C L ) vs. α curve, C Lmax , defines the stalling AoA of the
airfoil, which is characterized by significant separation of the airflow across the lowpressure side of the airfoil. Stalls result in a significant loss of lift and an increase in drag
that can lead to severe performance, stability, and control problems. This study only
examines wing and tail stalls and not engine compressor stalls, which are related
phenomena that affect the airfoils of the compressor stages of a turbine engine. This
distinction between airfoil stalls and engine stalls is not simply semantic; it had important
ramifications for the design of the sampling process, in order to avoid the inclusion of the
inapplicable engine-related events that would confound the analysis.

8

Figure 2. Lift Coefficient (C L ) vs. AoA (α). An airfoil in a clean state (i.e., without any
icing accumulation) can achieve a higher critical AoA and a greater corresponding lift
coefficient than an airfoil contaminated with leading-edge ice, as exemplified by the
Accident 1 trace (Zeppetelli & Habashi, 2012, p. 618). Reprinted with permission.

Stall Warning Systems
Aircraft stall warning systems are designed to alert the crew of an imminent stall
by issuing some combination of tactile, visual, or aural cues at a safe margin below the
critical AoA (i.e., at a speed margin above the stalling speed). Most contemporary stall
warning systems rely on AoA sensors because the critical AoA remains essentially
constant, regardless of the aircraft’s speed, weight, load-factor, attitude, or other
parameters (FAA, 2004, p. 4-3). Unfortunately, these AoA sensors are usually mounted
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on the fuselage sides near the nose of the aircraft, where they cannot directly sense the
local aerodynamic conditions experienced by the wing or tail surfaces. This is an
important shortcoming of AoA-based stall warning systems because even small amounts
of airfoil contamination can drastically and unpredictably reduce the stalling AoA from
the calibrated warning-threshold value. Current stall warning systems are also unable to
provide real-time indication of aircraft performance and controllability margins in icing
conditions. The accident record is replete with instances of aircraft control being lost due
to the effects of icing, before any warning was presented to the crew. For example, the
American Eagle 4184 Roselawn accident was a classic instance of an aircraft departing
controlled flight due to airframe icing, prior to the actuation of the stall warning system
(NTSB, 1996b). Occasionally, the safety margins built into AoA systems for icing
encounters can make the systems too sensitive, generating false stall warning alarms.
The Colgan Air 3407 accident sequence began with a 20-knot premature stall warning
indication, caused by the incorrect setting of the stall warning reference speed switch by
the crew in response to the icing conditions (NTSB, 2010a). This switch is used to
recalibrate the stall warning threshold speed to account for the higher approach speeds
used in icing conditions. Transport Category aircraft approach speeds are based on a
reference landing speed (Vref) (FAA, 2010a, §1.2), which is the minimum acceptable
calibrated approach airspeed that must be maintained to a point 50 feet above the landing
threshold. Vref must not be less than 1.23 times the stall speed for the selected landing
configuration in non-icing conditions (FAA, 2009c, §125). With the datum switch set to
the increase position, the stall warning system activates at a higher speed to
accommodate the greater required speed safety margin. Unfortunately, the Colgan crew
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used the standard approach speed, which was 13 knots slower than the stick shaker
activation threshold caused by the miss-set switch. This resulted in an unexpected stall
warning stick-shaker actuation – an SDT False Alarm (FA) – that startled the crew into a
response more suited to a tail stall than a main wing stall. The crew raised the flaps,
applied aggressive nose up control inputs, and failed to apply maximum power. These
inappropriate inputs started the chain of events that led to a main wing stall, loss of
control, and the destruction of the aircraft with the loss of all on board (NTSB, 2010a).
Although ice was not a direct contributing aerodynamic factor for the Colgan accident,
the FA generated by the stall warning system and the crew’s perception of the icing
severity were both clearly pivotal to the catastrophic outcome. The American Eagle and
Colgan Air case studies clearly illustrate why stall warning FAs and missed warnings in
icing conditions were important factors to be considered for the upcoming analysis.

Tail Stalls
Aircraft horizontal and vertical stabilizers (collectively called the empennage) are
airfoils, like the main wing, and are therefore capable of stalling. In particular, the
horizontal stabilizer is more susceptible to icing effects than the main wing because its
airfoil has a smaller leading-edge radius (i.e., a sharper leading-edge) than the wing,
which increases the stabilizer’s efficiency as an ice collector (F. T. Lynch & Khodadoust,
2001, p. 760; Manningham, 1997). As a result, the tail can collect significant ice while
the wing remains ice-free. This is a serious problem because the empennage is typically
outside the field of view of the aircrew so icing can accumulate undetected, particularly
on the horizontal stabilizer’s critical underside suction surface. As a complicating factor,
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there is no Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) certification requirement for tail stall
warning systems, and none are currently installed on 14 CFR Part 23 or 14 CFR Part 25
aircraft (FAA, 2014e). The lack of a tail stall warning system is important because the
initial symptoms of a tail stall can be subtle and hard to distinguish from the normal
buffeting and airframe vibrations felt during icing encounters. Unfortunately, tail stalls
may be triggered by pilot actions used to recover from wing stalls; wing stall recovery
generally entails the application of maximum power combined with a firm lowering of
the aircraft’s nose to reduce the wing’s AoA, but these actions may precipitate or
aggravate a tail stall (NASA, 1999; Ratvasky, Van Zante, & Riley, 1999). When faced
with stall warning indications or an incipient LOC during an icing encounter, the aircrew
must determine which type of stall is imminent while under intense time pressure. Bragg
(2002) notes that current stall warning systems fail to present aircrew with “processed
aircraft performance degradation information” that is vital for the resolution of the
wing/tail stall ambiguities during icing encounters. Such incomplete, and possibly
misleading, stall warning system information could be expected to influence the outcome
of icing encounters, but evaluating this premise required the development of a suitable
theoretical framework that could generate testable hypotheses. SDT provided exactly the
required framework.

Signal Detection Theory
SDT addresses an observer’s ability to discriminate an ambiguous signal from
background noise, using a simple binary criterion: The observer decides whether the
perceived stimulus indicates the presence or the absence of a target. One of the first
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practical applications of SDT related to the challenging task of discriminating real targets
(signals) from the ambient noise on early radar displays. There are four permutations of
target-state and observer decision states that SDT addresses, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1
SDT Decision Outcome Permutations

True Signal State
Signal present
No signal present

Observer’s Decision
Target Present
No Target Present
Hit

Miss

False Alarm (FA)

Correct Rejection (CR)

Note. Adapted from “Signal Detection Theory,” by H. Abdi (2009), in B. McGaw, P. L.
Peterson, & E. Baker (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Education (3rd ed.), pp. 1-10.

In addition to the literal interpretation of physical parameters such as radar target
returns, SDT also supports the processing of abstract or metaphorical signals (Abdi,
2009, p. 2). This broader interpretation applies to the ability of a stall warning system to
correctly identify an impending stall, based on whatever engineered inputs the system
receives. The decisions of the stall warning to activate, in relation to the true stall-state of
the aircraft, have the same four outcome permutations as described in Table 1 with stall
warning system substituted for observer. SDT can also be applied at an even higher
level, where the system comprises both the aircrew and the stall warning system. This
new system has an additional set of inputs that the stall warning alone does not possess:
These are the symptoms or indications of an imminent LOC or stall originating from the
aircraft, as perceived by the crew. These cues could include buffeting, control anomalies,
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performance losses, etc. The combined aircrew / stall warning system processes these
available inputs and produces an output, which was characterized for this study as either
a correct aircrew response to the aircraft’s true stall-state or an incorrect crew response.
The system boundaries and relationships for the hypothesized dual-SDT model are shown
in Figure 3. An important aspect of the figure is that the output measure for the
combined SDT system is a binary choice between a correct aircrew response and an
incorrect response (see the definition of terms section for the formal definition of these
terms for the purposes of this study). This binary crew response property led directly to
the selection of the BLR for the research design.

14

Figure 3. Hypothesized dual SDT system model boundaries. Dashed arrows indicate
that the information flow may be incomplete or inaccurate.
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The SDT framework includes the related concepts of system sensitivity, observer
response bias, the ideal (unbiased) observer, and the decision criterion, which are
discussed in detail in Chapter II. This decision criterion sets the observer’s minimum
threshold for categorizing a stimulus as a signal instead of noise, which directly affects
the Hit and FA percentages. SDT defines a hypothetical ideal observer as one who sets
the decision criterion to minimize the probability of a Miss or an FA. This occurs when
the decision criterion is set so that the Miss and FA probabilities are equal (if the signal
and noise distributions have identical distributions, as assumed here). If a real observer’s
decision criterion differs from the ideal observer’s, then the former is said to display a
conservative or liberal response bias. A conservative response bias is associated with a
high criterion, which results in fewer FAs at the expense of fewer Hits and more Misses.
Conversely, a liberal response bias results in increased Hits and fewer Misses but more
FAs. SDT performance is characterized by this unavoidable tradeoff between Hit and FA
rates associated with the setting of the decision criterion. The interplay between these
two factors is often shown schematically using families of Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves for differing decision criteria. (The ROC result for this
study is shown in Figure 10 in Chapter IV).
Using the SDT framework, aircrew are assumed to evaluate aircraft cues and stall
warning alerts that exceed the decision criterion as a stall condition. Stimuli that fall
below the threshold would be categorized as a no-stall condition, and any attendant stall
warnings would be judged as FAs. In order for such an analysis to provide useful
predictions, the processes that aircrew use to set their decision criterion must be
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understood. A brief exploration of Bayes’ Theorem and its relationship to vigilance tasks
provides an insight into the mechanisms that might be involved.

Vigilance Tasks and Bayes’ Theorem
Vigilance tasks may be characterized as those that require operators to monitor
systems for long periods while trying to identify phenomena that are infrequent,
unpredictable, and possibly insidious in their onset. The majority of icing-related LOC
events occur unexpectedly during cruise flight (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2013; Petty & Floyd,
2004), which is normally a low-workload period for the aircrew. Under normal
circumstances, the chance of encountering a stall in cruise flight is very small, so the stall
monitoring activity can be characterized as a vigilance task. In these circumstances, an
operator’s decision criterion is calibrated according to the low expected likelihood of the
event (e.g., the wing or tail stall). As already discussed, icing can increase the stall
probability substantially, which has important ramifications that are quantified by Bayes’
Theorem. The theorem is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, but in its simplest
formulation, it indicates that conditional probabilities are not commutative; instead, they
depend on the a-priori likelihood of the event, as indicated by the following example: Is
the probability of rain, given the occurrence of clouds, the same as the probability of
clouds, given the occurrence of rain? Clearly not. Even a cursory analysis reveals that
these probabilities could differ, possibly by orders of magnitude. For example, clouds are
almost always present when it is raining, so:
P (Clouds | Rain) = 1

(2)
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Where A | B indicates the conditional probability of A, given the actual
occurrence of B. Conversely:
0 ≤ P (Rain | Clouds) ≤ 1

(3)

The conditional probability of rain, given the occurrence of clouds, would be near
unity during the rainy season in the tropics and near zero for a dry desert region. The
conditional probability is therefore strongly determined by the a-priori probability of both
the rain and the cloud events, as indicated by Bayes’ Theorem:

𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 | 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) =

𝑃𝑃 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 | 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) 𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)
𝑃𝑃 (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)

(4)

As a result:
P (Clouds | Rain) ≠ P (Rain | Clouds)

(5)

Bayes’ formula is equally applicable to the relationship between stalls and stall
warnings:

𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊) =

𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑛𝑛𝑔𝑔)

(6)

This relationship is important because of its implications for the previously
discussed SDT decision criterion. During vigilance tasks, aircrew would establish their
stall-related decision criterion through years of flight experience, predominantly free of
severe icing encounters and their associated LOC situations. The resulting decision
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criterion should be near the SDT ideal observer’s value for non-icing conditions,
otherwise aircrew would experience a preponderance of Misses or FAs, and would finetune their criterion to eliminate the imbalance. The criterion would also remain relatively
stable because its validity would be reinforced on an almost daily basis.
Bayes’ Theorem shows that as the stall probability (Pstall) increases in icing, so
does the corresponding conditional probability P (Stall | Stall Warning), in direct
proportion. This shift would invalidate the aircrew’s pre-established decision criterion
unless the crew were to adjust the criterion for the new environment. In SDT terms, the
negative conditioning exhibited by a failure to shift the decision criterion would represent
a conservative crew response bias in icing conditions. Per SDT, the CIRB results in a
greater susceptibility to Missed stall detections, albeit with less susceptibility to FA
occurrences. A conservative decision-making bias should not be confused with
conservative behavior, as the former can actually be very risky if it results in a valid stall
warning being ignored. The conservative response bias shift predicted by Bayes’
Theorem and SDT in a vigilance task context is the last element required to produce a
verifiable model of the aircrew / stall warning interaction in icing conditions. The model
is appropriately called the Conservative Icing Response Bias model.

The Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) Model
The CIRB hypothesis combines a dual SDT framework with Bayes’ Theorem to
create a testable model of the combined aircrew / stall warning system behavior outcomes
during icing encounters. The CIRB hypothesis could explain a perplexing aspect of
several aviation icing accidents: Why did some aircrew apparently fail to appreciate the
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severity of their icing encounter (NTSB, 1996c) while others overreacted to benign
conditions (NTSB, 2010a)? Still others obviously grasped the severity of the problem yet
failed to take meaningful actions to save the aircraft (Taiwan Aviation Safety Council,
2005, p. ii). The literature gives few insights into the causes of these heterogeneous crew
responses, but the CIRB provides a framework for such an analysis. The model begins
by coding the stall warning system behavior and aircraft stall-state in SDT terms, as
shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Comparison of Stall Warning Outcomes and SDT Constructs
Stall Warning System Response
Tail-stall
Warning
(Dummy Variable)b
System FA
The tail stall warning
must be ignored.

Aircraft
Statea
Aircraft
not stalled

No
Stall Warning
System CR
No action is required.

Wing-stall
Warning Alert
System FA
The wing stall warning
must be ignored.

Incipient or
developed
wing stall

System Miss
The wing stall must be
identified by other
means, and an
appropriate recovery
executed.

System Hit
The wing stall warning
must be acted upon,
for a correct stall
recovery to be
executed.

System FA and Miss
The tail stall warning
must be ignored; the
wing stall must be
identified by other
means. An appropriate
wing stall recovery
must be executed.

Incipient or
developed
tail stall

System Miss
The tail stall must be
identified by other
means, and an
appropriate recovery
must be executed.

System FA and Miss
The wing stall warning
must be ignored; the
tail stall must be
identified by other
means, and appropriate
recovery must be
executed.

System Hit
The tail stall warning
must be acted upon,
and an appropriate tail
stall recovery must be
executed.

Note. aA simultaneous wing and tail stall is unlikely because a stalled horizontal
stabilizer is inherently unable to generate the required down-force to raise the main wing
to a stalling AoA. bThere are currently no 14 CFR Part 23 or 25 airworthiness
requirements for systems to provide an artificial warning of an impending tail stall, so the
provision of a tail stall warning alert is included as a dummy variable to support the
ensuing analysis.

As Table 2 illustrates, a stall warning system could detect (Hit) or fail to detect
(Miss) a wing stall. There are currently no stall warning systems that address tail stalls,
but these cases still had to be encoded for the STD analysis using a dummy tail stall
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warning variable. This is because SDT does not differentiate between Misses due to an
absent system and Misses associated with a less-than-perfect installed device; both
outcomes would be encoded as stall warning Misses, as shown in the table. In addition to
Hits and Misses, stall warning systems can produce FAs by issuing an alert when no stall
is imminent or CRs when they remain silent when no threat is present (the nominal
situation). Other combinations are less relevant. For example, simultaneously occurring
wing and tail stalls are unlikely because a stalled horizontal stabilizer is inherently unable
to generate the required down-force to achieve the main wing’s critical AoA, unless the
aircraft is in an inverted stall as described by Telford (1988). Nevertheless, this
combination is so atypical that it is not addressed in the table. The combination of a wing
stall warning during a tail stall is also improbable but could not be ruled out until the data
were examined, so this combination was retained in Table 2.
Table 2 also illustrates the complex decisions that the crew must make to
correctly respond to the numerous permutations of aircraft stall states and stall warning
system behaviors during icing encounters. Under these circumstances, an imminent stall
or LOC can occur with little or no notice, and the crew must very rapidly discriminate
between a wing or tail stall and apply the appropriate recovery techniques in the highly
stressful environment associated with an impending loss of control. The crew might
encounter severe aircraft buffeting and motions, unusual control forces and deflections,
and a multitude of cockpit alarms, all competing for the limited processing capacity of
the pilot’s working memory (Endsley & Jones, 2012, p. 2.5). All of these factors increase
the noise term in the SDT calculations, which should lead to an increase in both types of
decision-making errors (Misses and FAs), in the absence of the CIRB hypothesis. In
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contrast, CIRB predicts that the negative conditioning associated with vigilance tasks and
the resulting conservative decision criterion bias should lead to testable predictions of
increased susceptibility to system Misses and a reduced susceptibility to FAs.
In order for these predictions to be tested, SDT requires that the ROC curves be
established for a range of decision criteria. This is usually accomplished experimentally
by plotting the Hit vs. FA data for differing controlled decision criteria, in order to
determine the system’s sensitivity and response bias. This information is unfortunately
not accessible using archival data, as the decision criterion levels can neither be measured
nor systematically varied. This does not imply, however, that the crew response bias
effect in icing conditions does not exist. What is needed is a method of gauging the
correctness of the crew / stall warning system based on the SDT Hit, Miss, FA, and CR
factors. The binary logistic regression provides a mechanism for achieving this
integration, as described in the following section.

The Binary Logistic Regression
The BLR is a robust multivariate modeling technique for predicting and
explaining a binary categorical (Yes / No) outcome from a combination of metric or nonmetric independent variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010, p. 317). The
mechanics of the method are discussed more fully in Chapter III, but the BLR’s
importance to this study is that it can test the hypotheses made by the CIRB model. The
BLR is the final tool required for the application of SDT techniques to the problem of
aircrew interactions with their stall warning systems in icing conditions.

23
Summary
The literature shows that airframe icing is a longstanding and ongoing problem
for aircraft operations. The accident and incident records are replete with inexplicably
divergent crew responses to similar situations ranging from apparent nonchalance to
overreactions, with both extremes having led to the loss of aircraft. A dual SDT model
provides a promising framework for modeling aircrew decision-making performance
outcomes, as well as the performance of the stall warning system in icing. As a first step
in the model’s application, the stall warning system and crew behavioral outcomes are
mapped to the standard SDT categories: Hit, Miss, FA, and CR. For the stall warning
system, these classifications represent the permutations of the stall warning outputs in the
presence or absence of a real stall condition. Similarly, for the combined aircrew / stall
warning system, the four categories relate to successful or unsuccessful initial crew
decision-making outcomes in response to the perceived aircraft stall cues and / or stall
warning alerts.
SDT embodies the concept of a decision criterion that demarcates the threshold
above which a stimulus is viewed as a signal. An SDT ideal observer is unbiased and
sets the decision criterion in an optimum manner to minimize undesirable Misses and
FAs. Any deviation from the ideal threshold represents a conservative or liberal bias.
The final CIRB assumption is that aircrew subconsciously set and fine-tune their decision
criterion to approximate an ideal observer during routine non-icing operations. This lowintensity stall-monitoring activity during non-icing cruise flight can be characterized as a
vigilance task because the stall probabilities are very low and stall warnings are
infrequent. Aircrew may become negatively conditioned and therefore carry forward the
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same decision criterion to the icing case, where the stall probabilities are much higher.
Under these circumstances, Bayes’ Theorem predicts that the conditional probability of a
stall, subject to a stall warning, increases markedly in icing flight, which invalidates the
previously established decision criterion and introduces a conservative aircrew response
bias in icing, hence the CIRB nomenclature. CIRB predicts an increased susceptibility to
incorrect decision-making outcomes arising from Missed stall warning detections,
accompanied by a greater tolerance to FA occurrences during icing conditions, both in
relation to the stall warning Hit baseline rates.
Unfortunately, this bias shift hypothesis cannot be directly tested using archival
sources because SDT requires a range of decision criterion values and corresponding Hit
and FA rates to determine the system sensitivity and response bias parameters. The
problem can be solved by incorporating the SDT framework of Hits, Misses, FAs, and
CRs as factors in a Binary Logistic Regression, with the crew response outcome as the
binary dependent variable. The SDT classifications of the stall warning system behavior
and the aircraft wing / tail stall-state were therefore selected as the primary independent
variables for the basic CIRB model. The combination of the dual SDT framework,
Bayes’ Theorem, and the predicted response bias shift constitute the CIRB hypothesis.
The BLR allowed the model’s bias-shift predictions to be tested using NTSB accident
and NASA ASRS archival data.

Statement of the Problem
The literature shows that the majority of airborne icing accidents result from
aircraft stalls, yet there is no theoretical model that ties the success or failure of the crew
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decision-making in icing to the performance of the stall warning system (Green et al.,
1996, p. 2). This knowledge gap imposes reactionary and untargeted regulatory
responses that have failed to fully resolve the icing issue, despite decades of effort.

Significance of the Study
The novel application of SDT methodology and Bayes’ Theorem has resulted in
the CIRB model of the influence of stall warning system performance on crew decisionmaking outcomes during icing encounters. The CIRB model provides the missing
theoretical framework. CIRB builds upon Sarter & Schroeder’s (2001) simulator studies
of decision-making during high-workload icing encounters, but the model’s theoretical
basis provides testable predictions regarding the influence of stall warning system Misses
and False Alarms in icing. The CIRB hypothesis should be equally applicable to archival
research using different databases, and it should be a useful aid for future experimental
research designs. If validated by such future research, the underlying theory will provide
a new tool that will yield a better understanding of the interaction between the aircrew,
the icing environment, and the aircraft’s stall protection and warning systems. This
research should also yield generalizable system guidelines to aircraft manufacturers,
flight test personnel, and certification agencies, relating to the relative significance of
correct, misleading, and missing stall warning information for the main wing and
horizontal tail surfaces. Some of the processes used in the current research design, such
as the correct crew response decision criteria described in Chapter III, should also help
provide a standardized methodology for evaluating crew behavior outcomes in complex
and dynamic environments, using archival data. If validated, the CIRB hypothesis should
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lead to recommendations regarding required levels of stall warning system reliability,
selectivity (SDT Hit ratio), and specificity (SDT CR ratio). These recommendations
should lead to concrete and verifiable measures for reducing icing-related accidents and
for evaluating the relative benefits of installing new protection systems such as
Aerodynamic Performance Monitors and tail-stall warning systems. The ultimate and
overriding objective of the research is to save lives.

Purpose Statement
The purpose of the research was to evaluate the CIRB SDT model of aircrew
decision-making in icing conditions by means of an archival analysis of U.S. aircraft
icing incident and accident data. The model was used to determine the influence of stall
warning system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during hazardous
airborne icing encounters. For this purpose, correct aircrew performance was defined as:
1. Implementing appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall prevention and / or recovery
procedures subsequent to a stall warning alarm or other indications of a developing
stall condition, such as: controllability and performance issues, airframe buffeting,
and abnormal control forces and reactions.
2. Taking no stall prevention or recovery action under False Alarm conditions.

Hypotheses
The fundamental research question pertains to the influence of stall warning
system performance on aircrew behavior outcomes during hazardous airborne icing
encounters. Using a baseline of normal stall warning system performance (i.e., SDT
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Hits), the CIRB hypothesis predicts that aircrew would be more susceptible to making
incorrect responses when faced with stall warning system Misses and less likely to make
incorrect responses when faced with system False Alarms. The following hypotheses
were used to test these predictions. Although the stated hypotheses used two-sided tests
for significance, the BLR methodology allows the direction of the relationship to be
established:
1. H 0 1: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss.
2. H 0 2: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm.

Research Approach
A nomothetic exploratory archival analysis (Babbie, 2013, pp. 91-93; Vogt,
Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012, pp. 86 - 95) was conducted using NTSB accident data
(NTSB, 2012a) and NASA ASRS reports (NASA, 2014). Because of the relatively small
number of icing records, the methodology resembled formalized case study research,
which Zotov (2000) deemed the appropriate approach for determining the underlying
causes of aircraft accidents. A two-phase research design was employed. The first phase
addressed the data sampling, scrubbing, and verification activities, in preparation for the
second phase, which entailed the execution of the BLR analysis, along with the
associated hypothesis testing. Although the qualitative archival review was a prerequisite
for the subsequent quantitative analyses, the process was iterated to fine-tune the sample
for the best BLR outcome.
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The first phase sampling process began with an exploration of the accident and
incident archives to select a sampling frame that contained the airborne icing cases in
which the state of the stall warning system, aircraft icing state, aircraft wing / tail stall
status, and crew responses could be definitively ascertained. As part of this phase, a pretest was conducted using both of the target databases to establish the approximate number
of cases that would be encountered. The pre-test results indicated that the final number
of cases would be between approximately 100 and 500, which was sufficiently small for
the case processing and sample selection to be performed manually. In order to prescreen the ASRS and NTSB database, while ensuring that the required information would
be available for the analysis, the samples were constrained to turbine powered nonamateur built aircraft. This subset of the population is generally equipped with cockpit
voice recorders (CVR) and / or flight data recorders (FDR), which were essential in many
cases for retrieving the required data. The turbine-only constraint had the added benefit
of limiting the sample predominantly to the larger turboprop or turbojet aircraft that are
the focus of the study.
The case selection for the ASRS and NTSB databases relied on carefully crafted
Boolean keyword search queries. The literature contains several useful precedents for
searching the NTSB and ASRS databases for icing cases (Appiah-Kubi et al., 2013;
Aventin, Morency, & Nadeau, 2015; S. D. Green, 2006). The pre-tests also helped in the
refinement of the search terms to be used for the main study.
The sampling phase concluded with the encoding of the selected cases in SDT
terms to capture the correctness of the crew response, the stall warning system SDT
categorization (Hit, Miss, FA, and CR), and the aircraft stall-state (wing-stall, tail-stall,
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no stall). The data were also encoded to allow the individual or collective treatment of
the ASRS and NTSB archives. The encoded NTSB and ASRS sample datasets were
processed using Microsoft® Excel™ and Access™ software packages, which were used
for merging the two databases, data integrity verification, missing data identification, and
duplicate data checks. Few data duplications were anticipated or encountered, and the
relatively small number of records allowed these records to be identified and merged
manually. The scrubbed data and merged data samples were exported into IBM® SPSS™
and SAS® Enterprise Miner™ statistical software packages for the execution of the
Binary Logistic Regression in Phase 2. The data sampling and scrubbing processes are
described in greater detail in the Treatment of the Data section in Chapter III.
The BLR analysis (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 317-344) was conducted in Phase 2 to
determine the influence of stall warning system behavior on aircrew responses during
airborne icing encounters, to evaluate the CIRB coefficients, and to test the research
hypotheses. A single dichotomous dependent variable (DV), encoded as
correct_response, was used to record the efficacy of the crew’s initial reaction to the
perceived imminent stall or LOC event. The primary binary independent variables (IV)
for the basic CIRB model were the four SDT permutations related to the stall warning
system operation: Hit, Miss, FA, and CR. The wing stall and tail stall conditions were
introduced as secondary independent variables for a comprehensive CIRB model that
also included a new system_issue IV, the need for which was identified during the
qualitative analysis of the databases. Summary statistics were generated for the ASRS
and NTSB data individually and for the combined data ASRS / NTSB dataset. For
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reasons that are explained in Chapter IV, the BLR was only conducted on the combined
dataset.

Population and Sample
The population was comprised of the fleet of civilian U.S. (N-registered), nonamateur built (in NTSB database terminology), turbine-powered airplanes. The sample
contained the subset of accidents and incidents of U.S. registered, non-amateur built,
turbine-powered airplanes with icing-related NTSB Probable Cause entries and ASRS
reports between January 1, 1988, and October 2, 2015, for which the aircraft stall-state,
stall warning system performance, and crew performance could all be determined
unambiguously by two subject matter experts (SMEs).
The ASRS and NTSB samples were initially encoded independently by the author
and a second SME using a structured procedure, an unambiguous codebook, and a
formalized checklist, as described in Chapter III and shown in Appendix D. The two
SMEs manually selected records containing an imminent onset of an icing-induced wing
or tail stall, loss of control situation, or receipt of a stall warning. If the required stall
warning, aircraft stall status, and aircrew performance parameters could be definitively
determined, these records were encoded with these data and retained in the sample. If
one or more of the key data elements were missing, or if the SMEs disagreed on the
disposition of an individual record following mutual consultation, then the entire record
was deleted from the sample - a listwise deletion in IBM® SPSS™ terminology. The pretests results and literature review indicated that adequate samples could be obtained from
the ASRS and NTSB data to perform the BLR analysis (S. D. Green, 2006; Petty &
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Floyd, 2004). Nevertheless, there were a number of challenges associated with the
selection, categorization, and encoding of the data samples, as described in the next
section.

Delimitations
The research focus was on the subset of the population of U.S. registered aircraft
operations that have been recorded in either the NTSB accident database or NASA ASRS
databases because of icing encounters. This is an important limitation because the vast
majority of icing encounters are successfully negotiated; accordingly, the findings from
this study are only generalizable to icing events that lead to accidents or noteworthy
incidents, as characterized by their inclusion in the two target databases. The study
depended on the availability of first-hand narratives from surviving crewmembers or
usable data from installed CVR and / or FDR equipment. In simplified terms, 14 CFR §
91.609 requires flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders for U.S. civil registered,
multiengine, turbine-powered airplane with 10 or more passenger seats and for those with
six or more passenger seats for which two pilots are required (FAA, 2010c; FAA, 2010d).
The study was therefore limited to turbine aircraft, in order to ensure a reasonable
probability of having access to CVR or FDR data. This was particularly important for the
NTSB accident cases, where first-hand crew narratives were often unavailable in the
absence of a CVR, if the crew did not survive the event. The turbine requirement was
applied consistently across the ASRS and NTSB databases, with one relaxation: In some
cases, the ASRS database records were missing the explicit entry to the engine type.
These records were encoded as turbine events when significant indicators were available
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to support this assumption, such as: high cruise altitudes, mention of bleed air, aircraft
slats, etc., which predisposed toward a turbine classification. The SMEs did not
experience any difficulty or ambiguity in making these rare classification judgment calls.
Overall, the turbine-only limitation should not have a severe impact on the
generalizability of the proposed research because the large number of U.S. registered
aircraft and their varied operations should ensure sufficient randomization to produce
meaningful results. Furthermore, the aircraft classes and configurations that were
included in the sampling frame are the most relevant from an icing perspective, as
smaller Part 91 and homebuilt aircraft are generally operated in visual flight conditions
with far less exposure to icing.
Another delimitation of the study was its reliance on the NTSB probable cause
summaries for the initial case selection. The NTSB full narrative was only consulted
when the factors of interest were ambiguous in the probable cause statement. This could
have led to rare misclassifications in the unlikely event that the full narrative favored a
different crew performance outcome or stall warning system behavior than those derived
from the probable cause summaries. Within these constraints, the methodology, sample
size, and composition should be more than adequate for the hypotheses tests and study
outcomes to be reliable and generalizable.
The author, a flight operations and certification SME, performed two important
subjective assessments related to the processing of the archival data. This section
addresses these activities, as well as the author’s qualifications to make the required
assessments as an SME. These are important considerations because the validity and
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reliability of the study both depend to a large degree on the correct record selection and
variable encodings.
The first evaluation was the determination of whether sufficient data were present
in each individual NASA ASRS or NTSB record to allow its inclusion into the BLR
analysis sample. This required that the aircrew performance, stall warning system
operation, and aircraft wing / tail icing status to be determinable unambiguously. The
second evaluation was an assessment of the correctness of the crew’s initial response to
the icing encounter, which constituted the correct / incorrect binary dependent variable in
the BLR analysis. Of the two assessments, the first was relatively straightforward,
because the required data were either present or not, and there was little subjectivity
involved. The second assessment was more challenging because it involved a subjective
evaluation of crew performance from a limited archival record. Green succinctly
captured this challenge:
Quantitative analysis was possible in certain data fields; however, with
respect to the nature and characteristics of the event sequences, it was necessary
to add a carefully considered set of inferences to develop models of the accident
morphology. This was rather like reconstructing a number of clay pots from the
shards recovered at an archaeological dig. To obtain a sketch of the complete pot,
certain gaps must be inferred. An example of such inferences is the addition of a
“loss of control” element to a sequence that had concluded with an “uncontrolled
descent.” A more significant inference that was used extensively, was the
addition of a “stall” to the event sequence when a “loss of control” had been
identified. The premise used in this case was that a loss of control, if in fact due
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to ice accretion, only occurs when some degree of flow separation takes place. A
report, which suggested icing as a cause of an uncontrolled descent, would thus be
described in the database as a stall, leading to a loss of control, and concluding
with an uncontrolled descent. Analysis of this portion of the data were (sic)
therefore more qualitative. (Green, 2006, p. 3)
As an added complication, correct crew performance sometimes resulted in
accidents, for example in cases where the icing severity overwhelmed the aircraft and its
systems despite appropriate crew action. In other cases, aircraft survived unscathed,
despite less than optimal aircrew performance outcomes. For these reasons, a simple
successful / unsuccessful outcome categorization was an inadequate proxy for the desired
correct crew performance measure. A structured process, described in Chapter III, was
developed to minimize the subjective aspects of Green’s method. This process
incorporated objective checklist criteria for the sample selection and data encoding to
minimize subjectivity and bias. The procedure was evaluated during the pre-test of the
ASRS data and was found to properly address all the cases with no unresolved
ambiguities.
The validity of the proposed research strongly depends on the correct encoding of
the crew performance outcomes and stall warning system behavior for the BLR analysis.
Incorrect classification of these variables would compromise the internal validity of the
BLR, which would in turn severely impact the external validity of any conclusions drawn
from the analysis. The required classification rigor and consistency was achieved in two
ways: The primary safeguard was the rigorous classification schema, coupled with a
robust codebook (Appendix D) for the “exhaustive and mutually exclusive” coding of the
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variables of interest, which should ensure the reliability of the data encoding activity
(Babbie, 2013, p. 417). The use of a second SME added a level of quality assurance to
the author’s categorization of the crew performance outcomes and stall warning system
behavior factors, as encoded for the BLR. These aspects are discussed in greater depth in
Chapters II and III.

Limitations and Assumptions
Accident data were derived from the NTSB accident database from January 1,
1988, to October 2, 2015, inclusive. The former represents the first availability of full
NTSB docket data on-line and also corresponded to the start date selected by Green for
his (2006) comprehensive study of U.S. inflight icing accidents. The October 2, 2015
cutoff represents the selected end-date for the data extract used in the ASRS pre-test
discussed in Chapter III that resulted in 115 usable cases. For consistency, the same enddate was used for the NTSB accident data, which also ensured that probable cause
findings had been published for almost all of the NTSB records used in the analysis. The
NTSB accident database is comprehensive because of the legal obligation to report all
accidents and certain types of incidents (NTSB, 2010b). A pre-test of the NTSB accident
database using these parameters (cf. chapter III) retrieved 5,110 records before data
scrubbing. This ensured that a viable sample could be obtained for the BLR analysis.
The NTSB data were supplemented by the ASRS records to further populate the aircrew
performance outcome measure. Unlike the compulsory NTSB accident reporting,
participation in ASRS is voluntary and subject to self-reporting (response) bias, as well as
manual filtering by data entry personnel. As a result of these factors, a limitation of the
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ASRS data is that many incidents go unreported, and even the reported incidents are
subject to filtering before being selected for inclusion into the ASRS database. These
limitations are clearly outlined in the reference materials published by NASA Ames that
are included in Appendix B.
The ASRS selection bias effects were mitigated in a number of ways. First, the
combined databases are very large; Green found 9,299 relevant icing events using similar
databases and search criteria, albeit using an additional FAA Accidents / Incidents Data
System (AIDS) (2006). A second mitigating factor is the anonymous and altruistic nature
of incident reporting, as well as the specific ASRS FAA Compliance and Enforcement
Program incentive of eliminating noncriminal enforcement action for ASRS respondents
(FAA, 2011a). More pragmatically, there are few other sources for the required data, and
most alternatives also depend on voluntary reporting.
The crew response outcomes derived from both databases were subject to
confounding from uncontrolled external factors such as aircraft type, type of operation,
pilot experience, etc. For example, it could be posited that professional crews would be
more likely than private pilots to recognize anomalous indications from their stall
warning systems during icing encounters. Petty & Floyd (2004) used stratification by
type of operation (Part 91, 121, or 135) to minimize these effects, but this was impractical
for the current study because the BLR severely constrains the number of possible IVs for
a given sample size. Each new stratification variable requires an additional BLR model
coefficient to be estimated, and the BLR technique is very sensitive to the minimum
number of records in each of these bins. Hair et al. (2010, p. 333) specify that each BLR
group should have a minimum sample size of 10 times the number of estimated model
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coefficients (which correspond to the number of IVs). This would quickly become
problematic if an excessive number of stratification variables were introduced,
considering that the ASRS pre-test revealed just 115 total cases. The final data samples
were large enough to meet the minimum sample sizes required by the BLR with the
limited number of variables proposed in Chapter III. Stratification based on other
variables such as pilot experience would have been challenging because of the effect on
required group sample sizes, and because the data were not consistently available,
particularly in the self-reported ASRS database. Nevertheless, the proposed CVR/FDR
requirement tended to exclude the highly heterogeneous private pilot operations and
selected towards the more homogeneous professional crew operations, which should
reduce the need for stratification.
The impact of these delimitations on the study’s validity and reliability was
addressed in a number of ways. Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele encourage the use of
triangulation, which entails the application of different methods to explore a single
phenomenon in order to add depth of understanding and increase confidence in the
outcome of the study (2012, pp. 111 and 113). Triangulation was achieved in this study
through the use of combined data from two completely independent databases. Vogt et
al. also encourage a thick understanding that arises when a phenomenon is examined in
close conjunction with its natural context (2012, pp. 71-72). The SME review of the
accident narratives provided this level of detailed context-sensitive understanding that
should further bolster the construct validity of the study. A final mechanism for
improving the study’s reliability and validity was the adoption of the BLR multivariate
technique, which is robust and resistant to violations of the usual constraints that apply to
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most forms of inferential statistical analysis, such as data normality and
homoscedasticity. In summary, the proposed application of a mixed-method approach to
two large datasets should compensate for the limitations of the study and result in valid
and generalizable outcomes of value to future researchers.

Definitions of Terms
Angle of Attack (AoA)

The angle between the chord line (that joins the
airfoil’s leading and trailing edges) and the relative
airflow.

Commuter Category

“Multiengine airplanes that have a seating
configuration, excluding pilot seats, of 19 or less,
and a maximum certificated takeoff weight of
19,000 pounds or less” (CFR Title 14 §23.3(d)).

Conservative Icing
Response Bias (CIRB)

A model based on Signal Detection Theory and
Bayes’ Theorem that predicts that aircrew are
conditioned to exhibit a conservative bias response
to stall warnings during icing encounters. This bias
would be expected to lead to increase errors in the
face of stall warning Misses and reduced errors due
to False Alarms.
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Correct Crew Performance
Outcome

(1) Implementing appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall
prevention and / or recovery procedures subsequent
to a stall warning alarm or other indications of a
developing stall condition, such as: controllability
and performance issues; airframe buffeting; and
abnormal control forces and reactions; and (2)
taking no stall prevention or recovery action under
false-alarm conditions. Used interchangeably within
the manuscript with Correct Decision-Making and
Correct Crew Response outcome, dependent on the
context. Recorded as the Correct_Response
measure in the analysis.

Correct Rejection (CR)

An SDT term for the situation when a subject
correctly recognizes the absence of a signal during a
vigilance task.

Critical Angle of Attack

The angle of attack corresponding to the maximum
attainable lift coefficient (C Lmax ) of an airfoil.

Decision Criterion (d')

An SDT concept that defines an observer’s stimulus
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threshold, above which a perceived stimulus is
deemed to represent a target detection (i.e., a signal).
Below the decision criterion threshold, the perceived
stimulus is judged to be noise.

Equivalent Airspeed

Indicated Airspeed corrected for position and
instrument errors and compressibility effects.

False Alarm (FA)

An SDT term for the situation when a subject
incorrectly detects a signal when no signal is present
during a vigilance task.

Hit

An SDT term for the situation when a subject
correctly detects a signal that actually exists during a
vigilance task. Hit is capitalized throughout this
manuscript when used in the SDT context.

Miss

An SDT term for a subject failing to detect a signal
that existed during a vigilance task. Miss is
capitalized throughout this manuscript when used in
the SDT context.
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Signal Detection Theory
(SDT)

A human factors method for evaluating operator
responses to sensory stimuli during vigilance tasks,
where the signals of interest occur relatively
infrequently and have low amplitudes in relation to
the background noise level. These factors result in
Missed detections and False Alarms in addition to
the desired target detections (Hits) and correct
rejections (CR) of noise elements.

Stall

The phenomenon caused by airflow separation
beyond an airfoil’s critical Angle-of-Attack that
results in a loss of lift, increase in drag, and potential
stability and control issues for the aircraft. All
airfoils (wing, tail, fin) on a conventional aircraft are
susceptible to the stall phenomenon.

Stall Warning System

An aircraft system designed to alert the aircrew of
an impending aerodynamic stall. A combination of
visual, aural, and tactile cues may be employed.

Transport Category

Multi-engine airplanes with more than 19 seats or a
maximum takeoff weight greater than 19,000 lbs.
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List of Acronyms
14 CFR

Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations

α abs

Absolute Angle of Attack

αε

Effective Angle of Attack

αG

Geometric Angle of Attack

α ZL

Zero Lift Angle of Attack

AC

Advisory Circular

AD

Airworthiness Directive

ADREP

(ICAO) Accident and Incident Data-Reporting Database

AFM

Airplane Flight Manual

AIDS

FAA Accidents/Incidents Data System

AIM

Aeronautical Information Manual

AoA

Angle of Attack

APM

Aerodynamic Performance Monitoring

ASRS

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System
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ASTM

American Society for Testing and Materials

BEA

Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile

BLR

Binary Logistic Regression

CADORS

Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (Transport Canada)

CCR

Correct Crew Response

CFD

Computational Fluid Dynamics

CFIT

Controlled Flight into Terrain

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CIRB

Conservative Icing Response Bias (model)

CL

Lift Coefficient

C Lmax

Maximum Lift Coefficient

CR

Correct Rejection (Signal Detection Theory construct)

CVR

Cockpit Voice Recorder

df

Degrees of Freedom

DSS

Decision Support System

DV

Dependent Variable(s)
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ε

Induced Downwash

EAS

Equivalent Airspeed

Exp(B)

Exponentiated Logistic Coefficient(s)

FA

False Alarm (Signal Detection Theory construct)

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FAR

Federal Aviation Regulations

FDR

Flight Data Recorder

FOQA

Flight Operational Quality Assurance

GA

General Aviation

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ICTS

Ice-contaminated-tailplane-stall

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IV

Independent Variable(s)

LOC

Loss of Control

NACA

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
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NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NBAA

National Business Aircraft Association

NPRM

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NPV

Negative Predictive Value (for Binary Logistic Regression)

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

Part 23

14 CFR Part 23 (Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, Commuter Category
aircraft)

Part 25

14 CFR Part 25 (Transport Category aircraft)

Part 91

14 CFR Part 91 (General operating and flight rules)

Part 121

14 CFR Part 121 (Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations)

Part 125

4 CFR Part 125 (Airplanes that have a seating configuration of 20 or
more passengers or a maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or
more when common carriage is not involved)

Part 135

14 CFR Part 135 (Commuter and on-demand operating requirements)

PPV

Positive Predictive Value (for Binary Logistic Regression)

Pstall

Stall Probability

ROC

(SDT) Receiver Operating Characteristic
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SAFO

(FAA) Safety Alert for Operators

SDT

Signal Detection Theory

SE

Standard Error

SFAR

Special Federal Aviation Regulation

SLD

Supercooled Large Droplets

SME

Subject Matter Expert

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

Vref

Reference Landing Speed (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a,
§1.2)
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Chapter II

Review of the Relevant Literature

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of the stall warning
system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during hazardous airborne icing
encounters. A Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model of aircrew behavior
outcomes was proposed, based on an SDT framework and Bayes’ Theorem. The model
predicts that aircrew should be more error-prone when faced with stall warning Misses
and less error-prone in the face of False Alarms (FA), as compared to the baseline
condition of correct stall warning system behavior (Hits). Two hypotheses were used to
test the significance of Misses and FAs against the baseline crew performance in the face
of stall warning Hits.
The literature review begins with an overview of the aerodynamic effects of inflight icing on airfoils, aircraft, and their stall warning systems. Tail stalls are briefly
examined, followed by an overview of several operational factors that make commuter
aircraft more susceptible to icing effects than larger airliners. This introduction is
followed by a summation of prior archival research on icing accidents and incidents and
an examination of the evolution and current status of the applicable certification
regulations, including recent initiatives aimed at stemming the number of accidents that
have resulted from airborne icing encounters. The regulatory summary is followed by an
exploration of the relationship between airframe icing, stall warning systems, and aircrew
performance. The theory review concludes with an overview of the SDT framework and
the repercussions of Bayes’ Theorem in the context of aircrew vigilance tasks, such as
monitoring for potential stall situations.
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Icing Effects on Airfoils and Aircraft
Icing adversely affects an airfoil’s maximum lift coefficient and stall Angle of
Attack (AoA), which can cause severe performance losses and seriously degrade aircraft
stability and controllability. The impact of airframe icing is difficult to predict because
numerous factors influence the effect of icing contamination on airfoil performance, and
individual airfoils differ markedly in their sensitivity to icing. Thurber cites a Canadian
study that noted that an icing density equivalent to a salt-grain sized ice crystal per square
centimeter of the critical airfoil leading edge led to a 33% C Lmax reduction when out of
ground effect (2008). Veillette noted that heavy rain alone could cause an 18% reduction
in C Lmax and a 40% drag increase, characterized by Veillette as “an exceptionally difficult
process to understand” (2009, p. 26). Lynch & Khodadoust (2001, p. 760) observed the
same C Lmax reduction in their comprehensive archival study of experimental aerodynamic
research.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (2006) cited several studies noting
that the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) 23000 series airfoil used
in a very popular light utility aircraft “has been found to be very sensitive to leading edge
ice accretions. Compared to other general aviation airfoils, the NACA 23012 has the
most severe performance loss” (p. 15). Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) observed that the
popular NACA 23012 airfoil accounted for 25% of the events in the International Civil
Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) accident and incident data-reporting database (ADREP),
and cited Abbott and von Doenhoff’s findings that contamination greatly affects the lift
capability of the 230XX series airfoils (1959, p. 705). Broeren, Bragg, & Addy (2004)
performed tests at the Goodrich Icing Wind Tunnel of a representative NACA 23012

49
general aviation airfoil with simulated leading-edge ice shapes that were cast from actual
ice formations obtained during the ice-tunnel testing. The authors were interested in
evaluating the effects of residual intercycle ice that forms in-between the activation
cycles of leading-edge pneumatic deicing boots. The study revealed very severe
aerodynamic degradations from this relatively small icing accumulation, including a 60%
loss in maximum lift coefficient and an 8-degree drop in the airfoil’s stall AoA.

Icing Effects on Stall Warning Systems
It has long been recognized that AoA-based stall warning systems cannot
inherently adapt to the changing aerodynamic characteristics caused by icing. In 1944,
Klemin reported on the development of three new stall warning systems, two of which
would “function successfully under all flight conditions except when ice has accumulated
on the wings” (1944, p. 195). The third system described by Klemin was intended to
operate correctly even with contaminated airfoils because its diaphragm-operated sensor
was vented directly to the suction surface of the airfoil. Unfortunately, Klemin failed to
elaborate on the aerodynamic criteria for triggering such a system, and this promising
development appears to have stalled. Luers reviewed the airborne icing literature and
noted “dramatic decreases in maximum lift…lead(ing) to premature stall… destroy(ing)
the safety margin of an aircraft approaching stall” (1983, p. 54). Garvey cautioned that
there is no “rule of thumb” to estimate or quantify the performance impacts of airborne
icing, even though these can far exceed the customarily applied safety margins (2010).
The situation did not change appreciably over the next 40 years, and the provision of a
satisfactory stall warning solution in icing remained elusive. This situation would be
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exacerbated when another aspect of airfoil icing rose to the forefront with the dramatic
accidents that befell American Eagle 4184 (NTSB, 1996a) and Comair Flight 3272
(NTSB, 1998a): icing-induced roll upsets.

Roll Upsets
In addition to the loss of lift and increased drag, another undesirable effect of inflight icing is its potential to adversely influence control forces and moments on aircraft
with unpowered (reversible) flight controls, such as the ailerons and elevators. Airflow
degradation and flow separation bubbles caused by airfoil icing can drive a control
surface to a full deflection (Bragg, 1996), as experienced by American Eagle 4184
(NTSB, 1996a) and Comair Flight 3272 (NTSB, 1998a), which caused both aircraft to
rapidly roll to extreme attitudes following their icing encounters. The problem is
exacerbated following a sudden disconnect of the autopilot, which can occur when the
icing-induced control forces become excessive (Flight Safety Foundation, 1996; Flight
Safety Foundation, 2008; Manningham, 1997; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1998b). This
phenomenon can affect the pitch axis as well as the roll axis, and longitudinal stick forces
as high as 195 lbs. have been recorded during flight test investigations into icing-induced
tail stalls (B&CA Staff, 1997).

Icing and Tail-Plane Stalls
Unlike the main wing, conventional aft-mounted tail-planes operate as inverted
airfoils. Much of the following information on this phenomenon stems from a 4-year,
multi-disciplinary, flight-testing, and wind-tunnel study led by NASA Lewis, with
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participation from Ohio State University (Ratvasky et al., 1999). The flight trials were
performed using the Lewis de Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter turboprop.
Horizontal stabilizers generally produce a down-force to compensate for the nosedown pitching moment of the main wing, particularly at slow aircraft speeds. Large main
wing flap deflections move the center of pressure aft, which further increases the
aircraft’s nose-down pitching tendency that must be overcome by the tail. The main
wing flaps also increase the downwash impinging on the horizontal tail, increasing the
tail’s negative AoA and putting the stabilizer closer to a stall situation. Compounding
this effect, the horizontal stabilizer may be six times more susceptible to icing
accumulations than the main wing because the tail airfoil’s sharper leading-edge radius
makes it a more efficient ice collector (F. T. Lynch & Khodadoust, 2001, p. 760;
Manningham, 1997). All of these factors can lead to, or exacerbate, an ice-contaminatedtail-plane-stall (ICTS).
A tail stall recovery entails a reduction in power, pulling back on the control
column, and raising the flaps (Detwiler, 2015; North, 1998), which are the opposite
inputs from those required to recover from a wing stall. The recovery must be executed
under the extreme time pressure and stress of an imminent stall, and the choice of
technique depends on subtle cues, such as detecting control wheel vibration in the
absence of airframe buffet. The wrong decision has resulted in at least 16 crashes
(Carlisle, 2006; North, 1998) and at least 139 fatalities (B&CA Staff, 1997, p. 80).
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Commuter Aircraft Icing Exposure
The 1970s saw the start of the proliferation of commuter category turboprops and
small regional jets. These aircraft typically fly numerous short sectors at mid-altitudes
where icing is prevalent, which increases the icing exposure frequency, severity, and
duration for commuter types compared to larger transport category aircraft. Conversely,
larger airliners tend to spend most of their flight time at cruise altitudes well above the
freezing level, climbing and descending quickly through the freezing layer, which limits
their exposure to the icing environment. Commuter aircraft have therefore experienced a
disproportionate amount of icing accidents, and despite FAA efforts, the U.S. commuter
icing accident rate did not reduce appreciably during the 1982 to 2000 period studied by
Petty and Floyd (2004). A number of high-profile commuter aircraft icing accidents
prompted an intense research focus on airborne icing, as demonstrated by the emergence
of numerous archival studies of the icing phenomenon.

Icing Accident and Incident Archival Studies
The following discussion summarizes a number of archival studies of icingrelated accidents and incidents to the U.S. civil aircraft population in approximately
chronological order. Cole & Sand reviewed NTSB accident data from 1975 to 1988,
examining a number of variables, including type of operation, phase of flight, and
seasonal distribution, before concluding that airborne icing encounters can be “extremely
hazardous” and “a significant number of larger commercial aircraft…have been involved
in icing related accidents” (1991, pp. 9 and 10). Petty & Floyd (2004) explored NTSB
data from 1982 to 2000 and added a useful stratification by type of operation: 14 CFR
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Part 91 (general aviation (GA)), Part 121 (air carrier), Part 135 scheduled (commuter),
and Part 135 non-scheduled (air taxi). The authors noted that 39.8% of the icing-related
accidents and 50.6% of the fatalities occurred during the cruise phase of flight. Despite a
gradually declining icing accident rate throughout the period, icing still accounted for 819
deaths, and Petty & Floyd concluded their review by stating that airframe icing remained
a “serious aviation hazard.”
Green (2006) broadened the investigation by merging the FAA Accidents /
Incidents Data System (AIDS) with the NASA ASRS and NTSB accident data in a
comprehensive study of 5,604 reports covering the 1978 to 2002 period. Green reduced
the data to 693 “aerodynamically significant” events and noted that the prevalent
outcome from an icing encounter was a stall followed by a LOC event. Hard landings
caused by unexpected stalls were another leading contributor to the recorded accidents
and incidents. Green also highlighted instances of icing overwhelming pitot-static system
heaters, particularly on smaller GA aircraft, leading to a loss of cockpit airspeed
indications. This phenomenon would prove to be equally dangerous for much larger
aircraft, with the catastrophic loss of an Airbus 330 on June 1, 2009, just three years after
Green’s study (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
(BEA), 2012). Air France 447 experienced pitot-tube blockage due to icing that led to
the temporary failure of the aircraft’s air data systems. This led to a degradation of the
flight control laws that resulted in the loss of the sophisticated flight envelope and stall
protections normally provided to the crew. The aircraft was then unintentionally held
into a stall for several minutes, despite the aircraft’s aural stall warning sounding 75
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times during the fully stalled descent into the Atlantic Ocean, with the loss of all 228
aboard (BEA, 2012).
Veillette’s analysis of NTSB, FAA, and ASRS data between 1991 and 2010
revealed that LOC was the leading cause of fatalities in the large commercial jet and
business jet sectors (2012). Veillette reported that LOC accounted for 4,717 lives lost,
and 44% of all U.S. business aircraft accidents during the period. Of particular note,
Veillette’s data showed that icing caused 29% of these fatal LOC events. A worldwide
Boeing study of large (> 60,000 lbs.) jet aircraft accidents between 2005 and 2014
corroborated Veillette’s findings: LOC was the leading cause of fatal accidents,
accounting for 1,706 deaths – more than double the 804 fatalities resulting from CFIT,
the next leading cause (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2015). Although not specifically
broken out, the proportion of icing-induced LOC accidents in the Boeing data should
mirror the 29% observed by Veillette (2012), based on the very similar aircraft
classifications used in the two studies. In recognition of these trends, the NTSB added
LOC to its Most Wanted List (NTSB, 2016a), effectively absorbing and embracing the
icing issue that was removed as a stand-alone item in 2012.
Small aircraft have also been well represented in the icing accident statistics.
Aarons (1995) cites an internal NTSB study covering the period between 1986 and 1995,
which records 154 icing-related accidents experienced by 14 CFR Part 23 aircraft
operating under 14 CFR Parts 91 (private) and 135 (air taxi) operations. In a follow-on
study for the period 1989 to 1997, the NTSB noted that icing was a factor in 11% of
weather-related GA accidents, 6% of air taxi and commuter mishaps, and 2% of air
carrier accidents (National Aviation Weather Program Council, 1999, p. 7-1). FAA
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Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing analysts reviewed the NTSB accident
and incident databases for the period 2003 – 2007; of the 1,740 weather related accidents,
64 (3.7%) were related to icing encounters. Of the icing total, 57 pertained to 14 CFR
Part 91 (private) operations and the remainder to Part 135 (air taxi) operators (FAA,
2010f). No Part 121 carriers experienced any icing-related losses during the period,
although this respite would end in February 2009 with the high-profile loss of Colgan Air
Flight 3407 over Buffalo, NY (NTSB, 2010a).
Appiah-Kubi, Martos, Atuahene, & William (2013) examined NTSB and ASRS
data from 2006 to 2010 in a study that yielded 228 accidents and 30 incidents related to
aerodynamic events arising from airborne icing encounters. Similar to Petty and Floyd’s
(2004) study, Appiah et al. (2013) noted that the majority of the accidents (40%) occurred
following the first detection of icing during the cruise phase of flight. The majority of the
accidents (53%) also resulted from a stall and subsequent loss of control after such
encounters, with only two aircraft out of 40 successfully recovering from the resulting
stall. This finding was borne out by the previously cited National Business Aircraft
Association (NBAA) study of business aviation LOC accidents between 1991 and 2010
that found “no cause was nearly as prevalent as aerodynamic stalls” (NBAA, 2015, p. 1).
The NBAA noted that 9 of the 31 stall events (29%) were related to airspeed
management in icing conditions.
Aventin, Morency, & Nadeau (2015) examined data from the Transport Canada
Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) to evaluate the influence
of on-ground de-icing / anti-icing on icing accidents. The small size of the final sample
(19 events) limited the causal inferences that could be drawn, but the pattern was
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consistent with the earlier research: Small GA proved more vulnerable to icing than
larger aircraft, with turboprop aircraft accounting for 58% of the accidents in the study.
Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) researched the ICAO ADREP database that
comprises mandatory reports of aviation accidents to aircraft over 2,250 kg in accordance
with Annex 13, Chapter 7 of the Chicago Convention. The authors identified 323
airborne icing occurrences since the database’s inception in 1970. Once again, the cruise
phase of flight accounted for the largest percentage of these accidents (approximately
33%), closely followed by the approach phase (32%). A worldwide Boeing study of
commercial jet aircraft accidents between 1959 and 2014 noted that LOC accounted for
17 of 72 total accidents and 1,656 of the 3,946 total on-board fatalities, although icing
accidents were not broken out specifically (2015).
Lynch & Khodadoust (2001) performed a comprehensive review of publicdomain flight test and wind tunnel data pertaining to icing effects on airfoil surfaces of
fixed-wing aircraft. The authors considered four principal icing formations: (1) small
initial leading-edge ice accumulations; (2) runback icing, which is characteristic of
Supercooled Large Droplet (SLD) conditions; (3) large, irregular ice formations resulting
from extended exposures with inadequate or failed ice-protection capability; and (4)
ground frost on the upper wing surfaces, typically caused by chilled fuel in the wings
during a quick-turnaround following a cold-soak at altitude. Lynch & Khodadoust’s
findings corroborated many of the icing hazards already discussed, but the authors
grouped their conclusions into four insightful icing threat categories:
1. “Dangerous because of (the) possibility of being under-estimated and / or
misunderstood;”
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2. “Dangerous because of (the) potential for catastrophic reductions in aerodynamic
effectiveness;”
3. “Dangerous because (the) upper limits of potential aerodynamic consequences are not
really defined;” and
4. “Dangerous because of (the) portion of flight operation envelope involved” (F. T.
Lynch & Khodadoust, 2001, pp. 759, 760).
These four hazards of severe inflight icing were tragically and simultaneously
demonstrated by a LOC accident recounted by Telford (1988). Ironically, the crash
occurred to his organization’s B-26 atmospheric research aircraft in the course of an
investigation into SLD icing. The SLD phenomenon has been the subject of many
regulatory changes in recent years and remains a difficult challenge for the certification
and safe operation of contemporary aircraft. For example, the FAA issued
“Airworthiness Directive (AD) 96-09-25 requiring crews of de Havilland Model DHC-7
and DHC-8 Series Airplanes to avoid or exit SLD conditions as a matter of urgency”
(FAA, 1996a). In contrast, the Telford accident aircraft had deliberately been exposed to
SLD and accumulated substantial airframe ice. The accident sequence began during a
descent in clear air as the ice started to melt and run back on the wings and tail surfaces.
The resulting residual ice ridges apparently caused the inboard wing sections to stall,
which led to a loss of pitch and roll stability. The aircraft executed a series of unstable
pitch and roll excursions before entering into an inverted stall and diving into the ground
at a 60-degree angle. Telford conjectured that the tail was also fully stalled during the
final negative-g maneuver, precluding any possibility of recovery. This single accident,
to a fully-instrumented icing research aircraft, exhibited almost every characteristic of
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severe icing that has already been discussed, including: performance degradation;
premature stalling with a lack of stall warning indications; loss of pitch stability; violent
roll divergence; and, finally, an unrecoverable tail stall (Telford, 1988). Lynch &
Khodadoust observe that this type of accident could have been avoided if decades of
lessons learned had not been ignored or forgotten (2001, p. 761).
Aarons (1999) critiqued the historical certification approach to stall warnings in
icing conditions, which allowed approval based on a mixture of artificial and natural stall
cues (such as airframe buffeting). Veillette (2006) noted the flaws in this approach, as
exemplified by six premature stall events on a single commuter aircraft type that occurred
with little or no warning from the aircraft’s stall protection systems, and which failed to
alert the crews by other means. Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) also noted a number of
shortcomings in the icing certification regulations, ranging from problems with the icing
terminology to unrepresentativeness of the simulated ice shapes used for certification
flight-testing. These certification issues are central to the current investigation, so they
merit a dedicated discussion.

Operational Approvals for Known Icing Flight
Sections of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), popularly known
as the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), govern the approval for flight in known icing
conditions for all U.S. registered civilian aircraft. Known icing authorization has two
elements: airworthiness certification of the aircraft and its systems and operational
approval for flight in known icing, which is the subject of this section. The type of
operation dictates the applicable standards: 14 CFR Part 91 (General operating and flight
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rules); Part 135 (Commuter and on-demand operating requirements); Part 125 (airplanes
that have a seating configuration of 20 or more passengers or a maximum payload
capacity of 6,000 pounds or more when common carriage is not involved); and Part 121
(Domestic, flag, and supplemental operations). The broadest requirements are contained
in 14 CFR 91.527(c) operating in icing conditions that states:
Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet the
requirements in section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23, or
those for transport category airplane type certification, no pilot may fly an
airplane into known or forecast severe icing conditions. (FAA, 2009d)
This apparently clear-cut regulation has proved difficult to interpret and
implement. Jeck (2001) captured the evolution of the FARs related to operations in icing
conditions and notes the conflicts that have arisen because of the continued use of stale
terminology that has not kept pace with the changing regulations. The problem partially
stems from the definition of severe icing contained in the FAA Aeronautical Information
Manual (AIM), which defines the phraseology to be used for pilot reporting purposes:
“The rate of accumulation is such that deicing / anti-icing equipment fails to reduce or
control the hazard. Immediate flight diversion is necessary” (FAA, 2014a, p. 7-1-45).
Under the AIM definition, flight in severe icing should never be countenanced, regardless
of the installed aircraft equipment. This conflicts with the wording in 14 CFR 91.527(c)
that implies that a certain level of equipage should allow such operations. Zeppetelli &
Habashi (2012, p. 612) also clearly highlight this contradiction between theory and
practice.
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Airworthiness Approvals for Known Icing Flight
In addition to the operational approval for flight in known icing, 14 CFR also
contains standards for the airworthiness approvals of aircraft and equipment required for
flight in known icing conditions. 14 CFR Part 23 lists the airworthiness standards
applicable to normal, utility, aerobatic, and commuter category airplanes. These
standards generally apply to small aircraft with a maximum weight of 12,500 lbs., with
the exception of the commuter category that is limited to 19,000 lbs. and 19 passenger
seats. Large aircraft are governed by 14 CFR Part 25, which encompasses the Transport
Category airworthiness standards; these are generally more stringent than their Part 23
equivalents. Collectively, 14 CFR Parts 23 and 25 contain the regulations applicable to
aircraft stall behavior, stall warning systems, and anti-icing / de-icing equipment.
Appendix C to Part 25 also embodies a Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) that
defines the precipitation and icing envelopes for known icing certifications (FAA,
2009a). Pending the enactment of 2014 amendments to this SFAR discussed in a later
section, certain weather phenomena, such as SLD precipitation, were outside the
Appendix C envelope. As a result, SLD encounters have occasionally overwhelmed the
anti-icing or deicing capabilities of known-icing certified aircraft, leading to a number of
accidents (NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1996c; Taiwan Aviation Safety Council, 2005).
In addition to the SLD problem, the stall warning provisions of 14 CFR 25.207(e)
raise additional issues (the following paragraph numbering mirrors the regulation):
(e) In icing conditions, the stall warning margin in straight and turning flight must be
sufficient to allow the pilot to prevent stalling (as defined in §25.201(d)) when the
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pilot starts a recovery maneuver not less than three seconds after the onset of stall
warning. When demonstrating compliance with this paragraph, the pilot must
perform the recovery maneuver in the same way as for the airplane in non-icing
conditions. Compliance with this requirement must be demonstrated in flight with
the speed reduced at rates not exceeding one knot per second, with (1) The most critical of the takeoff ice and final takeoff ice accretions defined in
Appendices C and O of this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for
each configuration used in the takeoff phase of flight;
(2) The most critical of the en route ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the en route configuration;
(3) The most critical of the holding ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the holding
configuration(s);
(4) The most critical of the approach ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the approach
configuration(s); and
(5) The most critical of the landing ice accretion(s) defined in Appendices C and O of
this part, as applicable, in accordance with §25.21(g), for the landing and go-around
configuration(s).
(f) The stall warning margin must be sufficient in both non-icing and icing conditions to
allow the pilot to prevent stalling when the pilot starts a recovery maneuver not less
than one second after the onset of stall warning in slow-down turns with at least 1.5
g load factor normal to the flight path and airspeed deceleration rates of at least 2
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knots per second. When demonstrating compliance with this paragraph for icing
conditions, the pilot must perform the recovery maneuver in the same way as for the
airplane in non-icing conditions. (FAA, 2014e)
The problem with these apparently stringent requirements is that no existing stall
warning system can determine the correct stall speed under the multitude of icing
conditions that could be encountered. Bragg et al. (1998) proposed a sophisticated ice
management system that would use advanced sensors to predict the performance and
controllability effects of airborne icing, but such a system has yet to be certified.
Considerable research has been conducted into stall warning methods based on direct
airflow measurements (Catlin, 1992; Lerner, 1985; Maris, 1991; Maris, 1996; Pederson,
2003), but Bragg et al. note “no processed aircraft performance degradation information
is available to the pilot” (2002, p. 1). Instead, a common solution is to apply a fixed
safety increment to the stall warning margin when ice is detected via an on-board sensor
or via a pilot-selectable speed reference switch that changes the airspeed thresholds for
the activation of the stall warning and protection systems. The latter approach was
implemented in the Dash-8 aircraft that was involved in the Colgan Air icing accident
(NTSB, 2010a, p. 18). Neither solution can guarantee an adequate warning margin under
all flight conditions, and there may also be circumstances when the system provides too
much warning, particularly if the aircrew misinterpret or forget the position of the icing
reference switch, as was the case in the Colgan Air accident (NTSB, 2010a, p. 151). As a
result, the use of fixed or even dual stall warning sensitivity thresholds inevitably results

63
in some Missed stall warnings or False Alarms in icing conditions that have important
ramifications for this study.

The Evolution of Icing Legislation
The push for icing legislation reform goes back many years, but a watershed event
occurred in January 1997 when a commuter twin-turboprop experienced an uncommanded icing-induced roll excursion on approach to the Detroit Metropolitan /
Wayne County Airport (DTW). The aircraft dove steeply into the ground, partially
inverted, with no survivors (NTSB, 1998b). Reehorst, Chung, Potapczuk, & Choo (2000)
analyzed the accident scenario using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) techniques
and determined that as little as five minutes of ice accretion were sufficient to produce
the aerodynamic degradations that led to the complete loss of control. As a result of the
Detroit accident, the NTSB made 21 sweeping recommendations to the FAA, including a
reiteration of two of its previously issued safety recommendations to the Agency:
Revise the icing criteria published in 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 23 and
25, in light of both recent research into aircraft ice accretion under varying
conditions of liquid water content, drop size distribution and temperature, and
recent development in both the design and use of aircraft. Also, expand the
Part 25 Appendix C icing certification envelope to include freezing drizzle /
freezing rain and mixed water / ice crystal conditions as necessary (A-96-54).
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Revise the icing certification testing regulation to ensure that airplanes are
properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to operate, or are
otherwise shown to be capable of safe flight into such conditions. If safe
operations cannot be demonstrated by the manufacturer, operational limitations
should be imposed to prohibit flight in such conditions and flightcrews should be
provided with the means to positively determine when they are in icing conditions
that exceed the limits for aircraft certification (A-96-56). (NTSB, 1998b, p. 185)
The FAA had already begun to act in 1997 by publishing its Inflight Icing Plan,
overseen by the FAA Icing Steering Committee, which detailed the FAA’s intended
activities and milestones for improving flight safety in icing conditions. The plan
incorporated sweeping changes to the certification regulations, including an overhaul of
the Appendix C icing envelopes to address the SLD and ice crystal phenomena (FAA,
1997). In parallel, the FAA began publishing a long run of ADs targeting the vulnerable
commuter turboprop category, and imposing operational restrictions in certain types of
icing. In addition, the AD instructed aircrew on procedures for recognizing and escaping
from dangerous SLD ice (Flightglobal, 1996). Also in 1997, the NTSB decided to
incorporate the airframe icing issue into its Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements for
the first time. Airframe icing would remain on the list until 2011 (Weener, 2011). The
FAA responded in 1999 by proposing a sweeping series of ADs affecting the operation in
icing conditions of the “Beechjet 400-series, Cessna T303 Crusader, de Havilland Dash 6
Twin Otter, Embraer EMB-110 Bandeirante, Jetstream 31-series, and Nihon Aeroplane
YS11” (B&CA, 1997).
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Throughout this period, the FAA continued to update the ice protection
regulations applicable to Part 23 aircraft. Prior to 1993, the regulations required no flight
evaluations in real icing conditions for GA known-ice approvals. This changed when
Amendment 23-43 was issued in 1993, required these aircraft to meet the same
performance and flying quality criteria in icing as outside it, which was beyond the
capability of most applicants. The evolving regulations also required tail contamination
effects to be evaluated in flight for all GA known-icing approvals. Newton (2006)
observed that 13 years after the new rules came into effect, only one aircraft type, the
Extra 400, had been certified to Amendment 23-43. With this one exception, known
icing certification was not even being attempted for the most vulnerable segment of the
GA fleet.
The FAA also tried to address the icing issue for transport aircraft via a string of
regulatory amendments to the ice protection standard (14 CFR § 25.1419) in 1970, 1990,
2007, and 2009 (FAA, 2009b). Of note, the 2007 “Activation of Ice Protection” Notice
of Proposed Rule-making (NPRM), and the subsequent regulatory amendment,
introduced the concept of a “primary ice detection system that automatically activates or
alerts the flightcrew to activate the airframe ice protection system” (FAA, 2007). These
changes, along with the ever-growing list of ADs, were well intended but reactive
measures that did not constitute a long-term strategic solution to the icing problem. This
shortcoming was exemplified by the crash of a small business jet short of the runway at
Pueblo, CO, in 2005, where Fiorino noted “the (NTSB) board found the FAA’s failure to
establish adequate certification requirements for flight into icing conditions was a
contributing factor in the crash. It resulted in the failure of the aircraft’s stall warning
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system to provide an adequate warning margin” (2007, p. 47). Fiorino also cited the
NTSB’s recommendation to “modify the Cessna 560 stall warning system to require a
warning margin that takes into account the size, type, and distribution of ice” (2007, p.
47). The FAA had already published an Advisory Circular (AC) on Aircraft Ice
Protection (AC 20-73A) that addressed this issue and stated the need to “provide
acceptable stall warning margins and to prevent a stall during flight in icing conditions”
(FAA, 2006, p. 27). Unfortunately, like all ACs, AC 20-73A is not a regulation; it simply
describes “an acceptable means, but not the only means of showing compliance with the
…Regulations” (FAA, 2006, p. i).
On February 24, 2010, NTSB Chair Deborah Hersman, testifying to the House
Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, elected to
keep the icing issue on its Most Wanted List, due in part to more than 50 accidents and
200 associated deaths resulting from ice encounters (NTSB, 2010c). The same day, the
FAA issued a press release “Fact sheet – flying in icing conditions” that listed the
Agency’s historical and planned efforts at addressing the problem (FAA, 2010e).
Table 3 summarizes this fact sheet and includes updates to the FAA activities that
occurred after the press release was issued.
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Table 3
FAA Icing Activities 1996 - 2014

1996

FAA Action
AD 96-09-25

Descriptiona
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM)
revision to limit or prohibit the use
of various flight control devices
and provide flight crews with
recognition queues and procedures
for exiting from severe icing
conditions.

1999

AD 99-19-18

Mandated revisions to AFM to
advise flight crews to activate
airframe pneumatic de-icing boots
at the first sign of ice
accumulation. Applicable to
aircraft with history of icing issues.

Mar 29, 2006

Safety Alert for Operators
(SAFO) 06002

Ground deicing practices for
turbine airplanes in nonscheduled
Part 135 and Part 91 service.

Oct 6, 2006

SAFO 06014

Hazards posed by polished frost.

Nov 11, 2006

SAFO 06016

Aimed to increase awareness of inflight icing dangers for pilots flying
turbo-propeller powered airplanes.

Aug 8, 2007

Final rule: icing certification
standards.

New airworthiness standards for
the performance and handling
characteristics of transport
airplanes in icing conditions…
Harmonize(s) the U.S. and
European airworthiness standards
for flight in icing conditions.
Comprehensive set of
airworthiness requirements that
manufacturers must meet to receive
approval for flight in icing
conditions, including specific
performance and handling
qualities requirements, and the ice
accretion (size, shape, location,

Date
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Date

FAA Action

Descriptiona
and texture of ice) that must be
considered for each phase of flight.
These revisions will ensure that
minimum operating speeds
determined during the certification
of all future transport airplanes
will provide adequate maneuvering
capability in icing conditions for
all phases of flight.

Nov 30, 2007

SAFO 07009

Inform(s) owners, operators, and
FAA entities of training
requirements for pilots of CE-208
(Cessna Caravan 1) and CE-208B
(Cessna Grand Caravan) airplanes
for flight into icing conditions.

Dec 2007

AC 91-74A

Affect (sic) of ice crystals on
turbine engines.

May 8, 2008

NPRM: Polished frost

Remove(d) language from its
regulations that allowed some
operators – not commercial
airplanes – to operate with
polished frost. Unlike commercial
airplanes which must have a clean
wing, corporate aircraft were
permitted to fly with smooth or
“polished frost.” That practice
has been deemed unsafe.

May 20, 2008

SAFO 0812

Aircraft taxi operations during
snow and ice conditions.

Feb 11, 2009

SAFO 09004
SAFO 0812 elaborated

Emphasize preflight and in-flight
planning for winter airport
operations for taxi, takeoff, and
landing.

Aug 3, 2009

Final Rule: icing certification
standards for transport category
airplanes.

Rule requires either the automatic
activation of ice protection systems
or a method to tell pilots when they
should be activated. The rule
applies to new transport aircraft
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Date

FAA Action

Descriptiona
designs and significant changes to
current designs that affect the
safety of flight in icing conditions…
The standards further require that
after initial activation, the ice
protection system must operate
continuously, automatically turn on
and off, or alert the pilots when the
system should be cycled.

Nov 29, 2009

NPRM: ice detectors for air
carrier airplanes

Proposed rule would require either
the installation of ice detection
equipment or changes to the
procedures for activating the iceprotection system to ensure timely
activation of the ice-protection
system. This proposed rule would
apply to all current and future
airplanes in service with air
carriers whose maximum takeoff
weight is less than 60,000 pounds.

Mar 16, 2010

SAFO 10006

In-Flight Icing Operations and
Training Recommendations…
encouraging directors of safety and
directors of operations (part 121
and 135); and training managers
for all operators…to review and
amend, if required, flight
crewmember and dispatcher
training programs.

June 29, 2010

NPRM: SLD

The proposed rule would improve
safety by taking into account
supercooled large droplet (SLD)
icing conditions for transport
category airplanes most affected by
these icing conditions, mixed-phase
and ice-crystal conditions for all
transport category airplanes, and
supercooled large droplet, mixed
phase, and ice-crystal icing
conditions for all turbine engines.
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Date
Nov 4, 2014

FAA Action

Descriptiona

Final Rule: Part 25 and 33 icing
certification standards.

Appendix C icing envelope
expanded to accommodate SLD
and ice crystal icing. Added
performance and handling
requirements for transport aircraft
in SLD. New Part 25 icing
certification requirements for
airspeed and AoA indicating
systems.
Note. Adapted from FAA Fact Sheet “Flying in Icing Conditions” FAA (2010e),
retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsid=10398
a
Italicized text is quoted verbatim from the source document.

In June 2010, the FAA took the important step of codifying the mass of advisory
material into a broad NPRM that would add significant legislative weight to tackle the
SLD and aircraft systems problems in icing (FAA, 2010b). The NPRM was finally
enacted on November 4, 2014, and came into effect on January 5, 2015, as the “Airplane
and engine certification requirements in supercooled large drop, mixed phase, and ice
crystal icing conditions” (FAR, 2014d). The updated regulation addressed a number of
previous problem areas, notably including an update to the Appendix C icing envelope to
accommodate SLD and ice crystal icing, as well as adding performance and handling
requirements for transport aircraft operations in SLD. The new regulation also
introduced updated system requirements, including the need for AoA sensors and
airspeed indicators, “to perform in freezing rain, freezing drizzle, mixed phase, and ice
crystal conditions” (FAA, 2014g, p. 1). Two advisory circulars supported the revised
airworthiness standards. The first, AC 25-25A, addressed compliance demonstration
with the performance and handling requirements for the new Appendix C SLD regulation
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(FAA, 2014f). The second circular, AC 25-28, addressed the broad new certification
requirements for transport category aircraft operations in icing conditions (FAA, 2014c).
Unfortunately, it proved impractical to make the updated certification requirements
retroactive, so the more stringent standards only apply to certifications commencing after
January 5, 2015, when the new regulations came into force (FAA, 2014g).
In parallel with its legislative activities, the FAA and other groups were heavily
engaged with industry. The FAA hosted an international conference on aircraft icing in
1996 (FAA, 1996b), while SAE International addressed the icing issue with a pair of
working groups: the AC–9 Aircraft Icing Technology sub-committee and the G-12
committee, which was given the mission “to improve worldwide safety in matters related
to aircraft ground deicing” (SAE International, 2014, p. 1). In 1997, the University of
Illinois constituted an interdisciplinary research center for aircraft icing, which embarked
on the Smart Icing Systems Project in conjunction with the NASA Lewis Research
Center. The project team implemented a multidisciplinary combination of basic and
applied research to address the issue of icing safety (Bragg et al., 1998). As a result of
these ongoing efforts and an increasing awareness of the serious and unpredictable
consequences of airfoil ice contamination, certification authorities such as the FAA and
Transport Canada adopted the Clean Aircraft Concept that precludes attempted takeoffs
with any ice or frost adhering to the critical surfaces of the aircraft, including its wings,
propellers, and stabilizers (Transport Canada, 2004).
Icing was finally removed from the NTSB’s Most Wanted List in 2012, but the
problem was far from conquered. In March 2014, the FAA published a new AD (its
112th related to icing) that barred known icing operations by approximately 4,200 small
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GA aircraft, based on 52 mishaps and 36 fatalities attributed to in-flight icing within this
group in the past 30 years (FAA, 2014g; Lynch, 2014). Two years after the NTSB
removed icing from the Most Wanted List, an Embraer Phenom crashed following an
icing encounter because the pilot failed to activate the aircraft’s ice-protection systems.
As a result of this accident, the NTSB issued a recommendation to the FAA and the
General Aviation Manufacturer’s Association that a system be developed to
automatically alert pilots of certain aircraft when the ice protection systems should be
activated (NTSB, 2016b).
In parallel with the FAA and NTSB efforts, the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) convened Technical Committee F44 on general aviation aircraft, with
a primary mandate to streamline the Part 23 regulations for the certification of light
aircraft. As a result of the committee’s work, the FAA issued an NPRM “Revision of
Airworthiness Standards for Normal, Utility, Acrobatic, and Commuter Category
Airplanes” that included a major emphasis on LOC and icing, including SLD (FAA,
2016). In the interim, the FAA issued a revised policy to substantially ease the
certification burden of installing AoA systems in Part 23 aircraft “to provide precise
information to the pilot (that) could help avoid needless accidents” (FAA, 2014b).
Despite these efforts, the NTSB’s recommendation for improvements in cockpit
stall warning systems still remain unmet by the new regulations for icing scenarios, and
in the absence of such a capability, aircrew continue to experience FAs and Missed stall
warnings during severe airborne icing encounters. The following discussion examines
the issue of crew decision-making and the interaction between the aircrew and the
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aircraft’s stall warning system under sub-optimal conditions such as severe icing
encounters.

Aircrew Performance During Icing Encounters
Advani wryly observed “Aerodynamic Stall Can Prompt ‘Brain Stall.’” (2014, p.
58), and icing-induced stalls are no exception. According to Sarter and Schroeder (2001),
surprisingly few studies have been performed on the effectiveness of Decision Support
Systems (DSS), under a combination of time pressure and incorrect cueing from the DSS.
Sarter and Schroeder’s study used a scripted simulator exercise to examine the impact of
different levels of DSS cueing and reliability on pilot response times and error rates in a
multiple-task, highly dynamic (icing) environment (2001). The researchers observed a
positive correlation between the aircrew’s successful handling of the encounter and the
level of cueing provided to the pilots. They also noted that incorrect DSS command
information led to more stall recovery errors than systems that provided simple status
information, even when the latter were in error. Inaccurate command display information
was especially problematic in unfamiliar icing conditions (the authors’ term for tailplane
icing), and DSS errors compromised the operator’s ability to evaluate and respond to
other valid cues that were presented (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001, p. 8). As the literature
shows, contemporary stall warning systems, which can be characterized as DSS tools in
icing, sometimes experience Misses and FAs in icing conditions. This violates one of
Billings’ key principles for human-centered automated systems: machine processes must
be predictable if the automation is to help, rather than hinder, the human operator’s
situational awareness (1997).
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Green et al. observe that the majority of icing encounters are successfully
negotiated, but they also caution that “remarkably, (there is) little pragmatic
understanding of what made those few unsuccessful and how they might be avoided”
(1996, p. 2). The authors contrasted the state of icing management with thunderstorm
avoidance. They noted that thunderstorms are well understood meteorologically, and that
useful tools, such as airborne and ground weather radar, are available to manage
interactions with thunderstorms. In contrast, icing encounters tend to be very spatially
and temporally localized, which makes accurate forecasting difficult, even though the
potential value of such forecasts has been demonstrated experimentally by VigeantLanglois, & Hansman (2000). Green et al. also added their voices to the body of
critiques concerning the highly subjective and inconsistent nature of current icing
reporting terminology and recommended the adoption of an objective, quantitative,
graduated parametric (icing) severity index. In the absence of such a forecasting tool, the
authors observed that wing-mounted aerodynamic performance monitoring (APM)
technologies could give aircrew an “objective indication of the wing’s performance…
that would allow the pilot to make tactical decisions in a timely and informed matter”
(1996, p. 4). As the literature shows, contemporary AoA-based stall warning systems do
not monitor airfoil performance and therefore occasionally manifest stall-detection errors
in icing conditions. Under these literal Hit and Miss circumstances, Signal Detection
Theory provides a useful framework for evaluating the crew / stall warning interactions
during airborne icing encounters.
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Signal Detection Theory
Signal Detection Theory is widely used in the human factors field. The theory
was initially formulated by Peterson, Birdsall, and Fox (1954) and extended in important
works by Tanner and Swets (1954) and Green and Swets (1966). SDT provides a formal
framework for modeling the outcome of a binary (Yes / No) decision task when an
observer attempts to discriminate a signal from the background noise (Figure 4).

“Ideal” Observer’s
Decision Criterion

Observer’s Actual
Decision Criterion

| d’ = |

HIT Region

FA Region

Parameter Value of Interest (x)

Figure 4. Signal Detection Theory concepts.

The horizontal axis represents the value of the stimulus parameter or decision
variable (x), such as the target’s brightness on the radar display. The two curves
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represent the probability distributions of the noise and the combined (signal + noise)
stimuli. The noise is assumed to be random and normally distributed. For mathematical
convenience, this Gaussian distribution is usually re-expressed in non-dimensional terms,
with a mean of zero and a variance of one. The signal adds to the noise, so the combined
(signal + noise) stimulus is also assumed to have a Gaussian shape but shifted to the right
by a distance d' (‘d-prime’), which represents the mean value for the signal distribution
(recalling that the mean of the noise distribution is zero). The quantity d' is a measure of
the sensitivity of the system. In the commonest SDT models, the variances of the two
Gaussian distributions are assumed equal (Lee, 2008, p. 450), as shown by the two
identically shaped curves in Figure 4.
The observer must determine which curve a stimulus belongs to, based on its
perceived strength. The task is simple if the signal is strong relative to the noise, making
the curves widely separated (i.e., d' is large). The required discrimination is much more
difficult when the curves have a significant overlap, as shown in Figure 4. SDT
addresses the four possible outcome permutations under these circumstances: the
presence or absence of a signal, and the response or absence of response from the
operator. In SDT terms, these permutations are self-evidently labeled Hit, Miss, FA and
Correct Rejection (CR). The FA region is equivalent to a Type I error and alpha level in
statistical hypothesis testing, while a Miss corresponds to a Type II error and beta level.
SDT assumes that the operator discriminates between the signal and noise by
setting an internal decision criterion, above which the stimulus would be categorized as a
target (signal + noise), and below which the stimulus would be classified as noise. In
Figure 4, the selected decision criterion is x = 2, and the area of the shaded regions
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indicate the Hit and FA probabilities corresponding to this decision criterion. If the
threshold is increased, there is a reduction in FAs at the cost of increased Misses;
conversely, a reduced threshold would result in more Hits, at the cost of more FAs. By
convention, SDT defines an ideal observer as one who chooses a zero-bias decision
criterion threshold that exactly balances the probabilities of the undesirable Misses and
FAs. This occurs where the two curves intersect for the equal variance model shown in
Figure 4.
Non-ideal observers exhibit response bias that is deemed liberal when their
selected decision criterion is below the ideal observer’s and conservative when it is above
the ideal observer’s. The selected decision criterion and the corresponding response bias
are affected by the costs of making the wrong decision (Miss, FA) and the benefits (or
payoffs) of achieving a correct outcome (Hit, CR). For example, a radar operator trying
to avoid two aircraft colliding would set a relatively low (liberal) decision criterion,
resulting in high Hits and high FAs. This is because the consequences of an undetected
target and subsequent collision could be a major loss of life. Conversely, a radar operator
operating an anti-aircraft battery in peacetime would set a very high decision criterion in
order to avoid the risk of shooting down a non-threatening target. The reduction in FAs
would come at the risk of an elevated Miss probability against a real threat, but this
would be an acceptable compromise in peacetime. As these examples show, the ideal
observer is a theoretical construct for evaluating bias, not an individual person.
The preceding discussion applies SDT to model an observer’s reactions, based on
known signal and noise distribution parameters. SDT is more commonly applied in the
converse sense: to estimate the SDT parameters, such as system sensitivity and response
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bias, based on observed Hit and FA rates. The resulting data are often plotted on
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, which allow predictions of one
parameter (e.g., response bias) if the other two are known (e.g., Hit and FA rates).
Sheriden & Parasuraman (2000) investigated the use of SDT Miss and False Alarm rates
in this manner to determine the optimum balance between human operators and
automation. This research extends Sheriden & Parasuraman’s work by treating the crew
and stall warning as interacting SDT systems, in order to investigate the influence of the
degraded stall warning system operation under icing conditions on the eventual crew
performance outcomes.
For this study, archival icing accident and incident data were analyzed using the
SDT framework introduced in Table 2. Accidents and incidents were classified based on
the stall warning system performance and the resulting influence on the crew
performance outcomes. For example, in the case of the American Eagle 4184 accident
(NTSB, 1996b), the aircraft departed controlled flight with no prior stall warning - an
SDT Miss by the stall warning system, and an incorrect crew response because the
precipitating event was not avoided. Conversely, in the Colgan Air 3407 crash (NTSB,
2010a), a premature stall warning led to an incorrect crew response resembling a tail-stall
recovery, which led to a main-wing stall. The initial stall warning in the Colgan case
would therefore be characterized as an SDT False Alarm. An SDT Hit is exemplified by
the crash of Air Florida Flight 90, where the stick-shaker stall warning actuated
immediately after the aircraft became airborne and continued until impact into the
Potomac river 30 seconds later (NTSB, 1982). CRs represent the null case of nopending-stall or LOC and no stall warning.
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The classification of aircrew responses and the associated stall warning SDT
categories form the foundation of the CIRB model of the stall warning system’s impact
on aircrew performance during icing encounters. Unfortunately, the aircrew’s SDT
decision criterion cannot be directly measured or manipulated using archival data. The
analysis requires a new construct related to the available Hit and FA data. Bayes’
Theorem provides this missing link and yields two testable predictions.

Bayes’ Theorem
Bayes’ Theorem addresses the conditional probability of an event happening
subject to the occurrence of another event, as described in the rain and clouds example in
Chapter I. Lee (2008) cites numerous advantages of using Bayesian methods with SDT,
including their complete representation of uncertainty, but Bayes’ Theorem is also useful
for the evaluation of the crew / stall warning interactions because of its possible influence
on the SDT decision criterion, which is the observer’s threshold for identifying a stimulus
as a signal rather than noise.
Stalls and stall warnings are both rare occurrences during normal flight
operations. In the absence of any overriding factors, the likelihood of a stall increases
during icing encounters due to the reduced critical angle of attack with leading edge ice
contamination, as discussed in Chapter I. Bayes’ Theorem predicts the probability of a
stall, given that a stall warning event has occurred, as follows:

𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊) =

𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 | 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)
𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊)

(7)
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As equation 7 shows, the probability of a stall, given that a stall warning has
occurred, is directly proportional to the a priori probability of a stall occurring (P Stall ),
which increases with icing. The stall probability is also inversely related to the
probability of a stall warning occurring (P Stall Warning ). The latter is influenced by the
sensitivity and FA rates of the stall warning system that may or may not be influenced by
the icing. Bayes’ Theorem therefore predicts that the FA rate should increase as the a
priori probability of the precipitating event (an actual stall) decreases. In the extreme, the
FA rate could become unacceptable when the precipitating event is extremely unlikely
(Sheridan & Parasuraman, 2000). This phenomenon may condition aircrew to treat stall
warnings in cruise flight as nuisance FAs, even though their perception should change
drastically in icing conditions, where P Stall can increase markedly. Aircrew are unlikely
to be aware of these Bayesian consequences and are likely to use the decision criterion
that they established over many years of uneventful flying when assessing the risk of a
stall occurring in icing. During an icing encounter, when the Bayesian probability of a
stall increases, aircrew should lower their decision criterion because a given stimulus is
more likely to represent a true stall event and less likely to be a FA. This is easily
understood if taken to the extreme: There is some level of ice accretion that would
produce a 100% probability of a stall, so the crew should treat any signal under these
circumstances as a stall. Conversely, a clean aircraft in un-accelerated high-speed flight
is unlikely to stall, so a high decision criterion should be set to avoid excessive FAs under
these circumstances.
If aircrew fail to adjust their decision criterion and therefore treat all stall
warnings equally, then SDT predicts that incorrect crew responses arising from stall
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warning Misses would increase during icing encounters while FAs would lead to fewer
errors than the baseline non-icing condition (Figure 4). This phenomenon should be
more noticeable for vigilance tasks that are characterized by long periods of inactivity,
such as flight operations in the cruise segment, because the decision criterion would
likely be set at a higher threshold for such tasks. Operators perceive vigilance tasks as
fatiguing and stressful (Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008) and often fail to respond
appropriately when the stimulus appears. In the icing environment, these difficulties
could be compounded by the crew’s conservative decision criterion, which arises from
the conditioning that takes place during routine (non-icing) cruise operations. The
situation is exacerbated because stalls do not always present with consistent symptoms in
a well-defined sequence, particularly with contaminated airfoils, which makes stall
identification and warning interpretation even more difficult (NTSB, 2010a). Flottau
(2012) quotes the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
(BEA) report into the loss of Air France 447 following a temporary failure of the
aircraft’s stall protection features and primary air data indications: “the occurrence of the
failure in the context of flight in cruise completely surprised the crew of flight AF447....
The startle effect played a major role in the destabilization of the flight path and in the
two pilots’ understanding of the situation” (BEA, 2012, p. 209).
The failure of the crew to adjust their decision criterion in icing corresponds to a
conservative SDT response bias. The CIRB theory predicts an increase in incorrect crew
performances when exposed to stall warning Misses but reduced errors in the face of FAs
when compared to the stall warning Hit baseline. Unlike the theoretical SDT analysis
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discussed previously, Bayes’ Theorem allows this prediction to be tested using archival
data.

Summary
The literature shows that airborne icing has a clearly demonstrated potential to
cause serious and sometimes catastrophic degradations in aircraft performance, stability,
handling qualities, and system performance. Current aircraft stall warning systems are
unable to provide consistent and reliable warnings during icing encounters. This is
because no existing stall warning directly samples the airflow over the wing where the
flow separation occurs, so the stall warning margin provided to the crew is, at best, an
informed estimate. The NTSB accident reports and ASRS pre-test data contain numerous
instances of aircraft stalling before the receipt of any warning by the crew. In some
cases, this has happened during the flare, and the result has been a hard landing; in many
others, such as the loss of American Eagle Flight 4184 and Comair Flight 3272, the result
has been the tragic loss of the aircraft and all on board (NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 1998a).
Furthermore, no certified system monitors or warns against tail stalls, which significantly
increases the challenges faced by the crew when trying to differentiate between a wing or
tail stall. This is a critical shortcoming, as the recoveries for the two types of stall are
almost diametrically opposed. The application of an inappropriate recovery technique
undoubtedly exacerbates the situation and may be unrecoverable, as demonstrated by the
loss of Colgan Air Flight 3407 (NTSB, 2010a).
Airframe icing remained on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of transportation
safety improvements for small and large aircraft from 1997 to 2011 (NTSB 2012b).
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Airframe icing is a continuing problem, despite the FAA’s publication of more than 200
Airworthiness Directives (2010e) and multiple regulatory amendments affecting almost
every class of aircraft and type of operation. Aside from a small number of simulation
studies (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001), there has been very limited research into the
interaction between the aircraft’s wing-stall or tail-stall status, the operation of the stall
warning system, and the outcome of the aircrew’s decision-making process. As a result,
current efforts at addressing the loss of control problem in icing are reactive rather than
proactive, and the expensive, complex measures that have been adopted have not
prevented a number of major icing-related accidents.
The current research is based on a modification of the Signal Detection Theory
framework (Abdi, 2009) that treats the crew and the stall warning as two interacting SDT
systems that can be analyzed using classical SDT methods: The aircraft is either about to
experience a wing stall, a tail stall, or no stall at all. The aircraft’s stall warning attempts
to determine whether a warning should be issued, based on incomplete and possibly
erroneous sensor information. These factors result in four permutations of stall warning
behavior, self-evidently labeled Hits, Misses, False Alarms, and Correct Rejections in
SDT terms, which form the IVs for the CIRB model. In turn, the crew uses basic cues
from the aircraft (such as buffeting, vibration, and altered control responses) and its stall
warning system to determine the stall state of the vehicle. The crew response is either
correct or incorrect, and this simple binary measure is the dependent variable for the
analysis. The CIRB model suggests that aircrew establish a decision criterion for
reacting to a stall warning indication. The crew would treat the combined stimuli from
the aircraft’s behavior and stall warning system as an actual stall when total stimulus
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exceeds the decision criterion, and ignore stimuli below this threshold. Aircrew would
establish their individual stall warning decision criterion from extensive exposure to
event-free flight, characterized in SDT terms as a vigilance task, which would lead to a
very conservative setting in order to avoid overreactions to the relatively high number of
False Alarms that are characteristic of such low probability events (Sheridan &
Parasuraman, 2000).
Bayes’ Theorem indicates that conditional probabilities are directly affected by
the a priori event in question, and these conditional probabilities are not commutative
(Lee, 2008). This was demonstrated in Chapter I with the rain vs. cloud example.
Unfortunately, aircrew probably instinctively treat stall and stall warning probabilities as
commutative, so they may fail to adjust their decision criterion sufficiently when
encountering serious icing conditions. This results in a strong conservative SDT
decision-making bias, which should lead to increased incorrect aircrew responses in the
face of stall warning Misses, but reduced errors in the face of stall warning False Alarms.
For convenience, this model has been titled the Conservative Icing Decision Bias model.
The CIRB predications are testable under experimental conditions if the Hit and False
Alarm data could be generated for a range of decision criteria. Under these
circumstances, the system’s sensitivity and bias could also be determined. Alternatively,
if the SDT model parameters are known, any one of the SDT properties (Hit rate, False
Alarm rate, and operator sensitivity and bias) could be inferred from the others.
Two comprehensive archival databases were selected to test the conservative bias
decision criterion theory: NASA’s self-reported Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS) incident repository (NASA, 2014) and the NTSB online accident report database
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(NTSB, 2012a). Unfortunately, the decision criterion cannot be manipulated
experimentally using archival data, so an additional step was required in order to test the
hypotheses stemming from the CIRB theory. The solution lay in the application of the
Binary Logistic Regression to the archival data. The BLR is a powerful non-linear
multivariate method that is used to predict and explain binary categorical (Yes / No)
outcomes from a combination of metric or non-metric independent variables (Hair et al.,
2010, p. 317). The BLR is extremely resilient to violations of normality and to
heteroscedasticity, and its robustness is well suited to the proposed exploratory analysis.
The aircraft (wing-stall / tail-stall / no-stall) state and the stall warning SDT
classifications were the factors (IVs) evaluated with the BLR analysis. The single
dichotomous dependent variable was the Correct_Response measure of the crew’s initial
response to the stall warning (or lack of one). The BLR tied together the factors and
measures required to evaluate the two CIRB hypotheses derived from SDT and Bayes’
Theorem: CIRB predicts that icing encounters should lead to a significant reduction in
aircrew correct responses for the stall warning Miss cases compared to the stall warning
Hits. Conversely, the theory predicts that stall warning False Alarms should not result in
a significant increase in incorrect aircrew responses compared to the baseline Hit
condition. These predictions differ from an equilibrium situation where either error
would be expected to have the same influence on crew behavior outcomes. The next
chapter details the application of these concepts for analyzing the NASA ASRS and
NTSB database archives.
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Chapter III

Methodology

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Research Approach
This chapter describes the research approach, population and sampling methods,
data sources, and data treatment that were applied to test the predictions stemming from
the Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model. A nomothetic exploratory archival
analysis (Babbie, 2013, pp. 91-93; Vogt et al., 2012, pp. 86-95) was used to determine the
influence of stall warning system behavior on aircrew performance outcomes during
airborne icing encounters. Two research hypotheses were evaluated using a Binary
Logistic Regression (BLR) analysis of archival NTSB accident data (NTSB, 2012) and
NASA ASRS incident data (FAA, 2011a). Records from these two databases were
examined and encoded by two subject matter experts (SMEs) on flight operations and
certification processes, as discussed in the Delimitation section of Chapter I. The
following sections detail the population and sampling methods that were applied to the
ASRS and NTSB databases.

Population and Sample Overview
The population was comprised of the fleet of civilian U.S. (N-registered), nonamateur built, turbine-powered airplanes. The sample contained two subsets from the
population: (1) U.S. registered, non-amateur built, turbine-powered airplanes with icingrelated probable cause entries in the NTSB accident database, and (2) icing-related Loss
of Control (LOC) ASRS events obtained using the query syntax shown in Appendix A,
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which was developed in close cooperation with the ASRS database specialists. The
sample date range used for both the ASRS and NTSB queries was January 1, 1988, to
October 2, 2015, inclusive. Sub-samples were generated from the ASRS and NTSB
samples for which the aircraft stall-state, stall warning system performance, and crew
performance outcome could all be determined unambiguously, as described in the
following sections. To aid subsequent researchers, the NASA ASRS and NTSB records
included in the final sub-samples are tabulated at Appendix C2 and C3, respectively.

Data Encoding
A large amount of archival NTSB and NASA ASRS narrative data was processed
for the quantitative BLR evaluation. Two SMEs were employed for this activity. The
author drew upon substantial experience with icing stall research in making the
judgments necessary for the proposed research (FAA, 1996b; Lerner, 1985; Maris, 1996;
Maris, 2009). The literature identifies the benefit of using a second SME to provide
independence and quality assurance of the work of the Principal Investigator: Bazeley
advocates the use of an independent observer to validate researchers’ encoding decisions
and stresses the importance of a robust audit trail for achieving the sought-after reliability
(2013, p. 151). Babbie also advocates for “some verification” of the researcher’s
encoding decisions, but notes the overriding importance of “exhaustive and mutually
exclusive” code categories (2013, pp. 416, 417). This study adopted both of these
recommended safeguards. A highly structured encoding process was employed, using a
second SME to provide a quality assurance check on the author’s sample selection and
data encoding of the ASRS and NTSB databases. The appointed SME is a highly
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experienced pilot with 7,500 hours total flight time, and is a certified multi-engine and
instrument flight instructor with an FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate and type
ratings for the ATR42/72. In order to familiarize the SME with the protocols involved in
this study, the SME was briefed using the checklists and procedures included in
Appendix D, which also includes the data collection worksheet. The following sequence
was followed for the data sampling and encoding processes:
1. Both SMEs queried the on-line NTSB accident archive using the criteria shown in
Table 7. The NASA-provided custom ASRS extract already conformed to the
specifications shown in the table, without additional processing.
2. The SMEs compared their recorded ASRS and NTSB sample sizes and addressed any
discrepancies in order to achieve identical sample sets.
3. The SMEs examined the ASRS and NTSB samples and rejected records for which the
aircraft stall state, stall warning system performance, and crew performance outcomes
could not be unequivocally determined. Any discrepancies were addressed to ensure
that the resulting sub-sample sets from the two SMEs were identical.
4. The SMEs independently encoded the sub-samples regarding stall warning system
performance and aircrew performance outcomes using the criteria discussed in the
next section and summarized in Table 4. Discrepancies were discussed openly, and
each SME presented the reasoning behind their encoding to the other SME. Any
unresolved disagreement in these assessments resulted in the rejection of the entire
record, based on its failing to meet the overwhelming evidence threshold listed in the
table.
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5. The selected sub-samples were recorded in the Appendix D worksheet and
subsequently encoded into the software used for the BLR analysis and hypothesis
tests.
The preceding steps are described in more detail in the following paragraphs. The
stall warning status and aircraft stall state were both relatively unambiguous parameters:
They were either present in the record, leading to the record’s inclusion in the sample, or
they were absent, and the entire record was eliminated from the sample. An ASRS pretest (described below) comprising 18,214 records, resulted in a 115-case sample with no
ambiguities encountered that required a subjective assessment of the stall warning
operation and stall warning status. This lack of ambiguity does not imply that the
required information was present in all the records; it only indicates the availability of the
required data and that resultant treatment of the individual record was easy to determine
without guesswork.
The evaluation of the crew responses was a more subjective exercise because it
involved an assessment of the interplay between human behavior; a complex
environment; and a framework of rules, procedures, and industry norms. For these
reasons, a structured methodology was employed to add rigor to the process and to
minimize any subjective biases. The author and the independent SME each classified the
crew performance outcomes as correct or incorrect based on the sequential application of
the criteria shown in Table 4, as evinced by the crew’s initial reactions during the onset
of the stall, stall warning, or LOC event.
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Table 4
Crew Performance Outcome Evaluation Criteria
Incorrect Crew Performance
The NTSB probable cause or
contributing factor in a factual or final
report indicates that the crew’s initial
response was inappropriate (e.g. BEA,
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a).

Correct Crew Performance
The NTSB probable cause or
contributing factor in a factual or final
report indicates that the crew’s initial
response was appropriate (e.g. BEA,
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a).

2.

The ASRS submitter indicated that the
crew response was inappropriate.

The ASRS submitter indicated that the
crew response was appropriate.

3.

The crew first became aware of the
impending stall or loss of control after
their onset (i.e., the crew allowed the
situation to degrade to the point where
control was lost before recognizing this
fact).

The crew first became aware of the
impending stall or loss of control before
their onset and made positive efforts to
avoid the event, regardless of the
success of the outcome.

4.

An appropriate stall warning was not
acted upon in time to avoid a true
aerodynamic stall or loss of control.

An appropriate stall warning was acted
upon in a timely fashion, regardless of
the success of the outcome.

5.

The crew response was markedly
different from an accepted norm (i.e.,
adding power and firmly lowering the
nose to prevent a wing stall) (e.g.
NTSB, 2010a).

The crew response conformed to the
accepted norm, regardless of the
success of the outcome.

6.

The crew appeared to be unaware of the The crew appeared to be aware of the
stall-state of the aircraft or
stall-state of the aircraft.
misdiagnosed its state (e.g. BEA, 2012).

7.

There is overwhelming evidence from a
subjective review of the record that the
crew’s initial response was
inappropriate.

1.

There is overwhelming evidence from a
subjective review of the record that the
crew’s initial response was appropriate.
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Only the sixth criterion listed in Table 4 was subjective, and this was the reason
for the strict imposition of the overwhelming evidence threshold (criterion 7). If the crew
performance could not be determined using these criteria, or if the two SMEs differed on
the coding of a particular record, then the de-facto overwhelming evidence criterion was
not met, and the entire record was rejected, listwise. The heuristics in Table 4 were
evaluated and found usable in the NASA ASRS pre-test, which gave considerable
confidence for their application to the NTSB data. Nevertheless, the ASRS and NTSB
database sampling methods differed because ASRS data are always de-identified and do
not contain CVR or FDR data, but usually contain first-person narratives. Conversely,
the NTSB cases often contained CVR and FDR information that made the assessments
easier for these cases. The following sections address the individual sampling
approaches used for the ASRS and NTSB databases, after a short discussion regarding
inter-rater reliability between the two SMEs.

Inter-Rater Reliability
There are several precedents for the use of two raters in peer reviewed works and
dissertations. Joslin (2013) employed two SME raters in a comparative study of Runway
Incursion Models and cited numerous other works where two raters were used, including
two aerospace studies (Hendriksen & Holewijn, 1999; Zuschlag, 2005). Bazeley
mentioned the use of “a second person” to check coding reliability but notably did not
extrapolate the concept to greater numbers of coders (2013, p. 150). Instead, Bazeley
placed her main emphasis for improving reliability on “the strength of your argument and
clarity and comprehensiveness of your evidence” (2013, p. 151). For these reasons, and
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as a result of the procedural precautions taken for the data encoding process, two raters
were deemed appropriate for this study, one of whom was the author acting in the
capacity of an SME, while the second provided a quality assurance function. The two
raters interacted regularly to converge on a common outcome, so the second SME should
not be considered as an independent rater for statistical purposes.
Inter-rater reliability between the author and the second SME was not quantified
because the methodology required complete consensus on all retained records, yielding a
de-facto inter-rater reliability of 100%. More sophisticated measures, such as Cohen’s
kappa (k), could have been employed to contrast the observed agreements between raters
with chance outcomes (Cohen, 1960), but the kappa statistic can seriously underestimate
the inter-rater reliability when the contingency table is skewed by a prevalent response
(Feinstein & Cicchetti, 1990). Based on the ASRS and NTSB pilot studies, such skewing
was anticipated, so the use of the kappa statistic would have added little insight to the
inter-rater reliability, negating its usefulness.

ASRS Database, Sample, and Pre-test
The NASA ASRS sample was obtained via a customized data extract in XLSX
format for subsequent processing using a combination of MS® Excel™, MS® Access™,
IBM® SPSS™ Statistics and SAS® Enterprise Miner™ software applications. The search
query was developed via personal communications between the author and the ASRS
data specialist with the objective of being sufficiently broad to avoid the accidental
elimination of relevant cases. This conservative approach resulted in the inclusion of
superfluous records that had to be scrubbed before the BLR analysis. The final query
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syntax is listed in Appendix A. Important ASRS limitations are included in Appendix B,
and the ASRS imported data structure is shown in Appendix C1.
The ASRS data complemented the picture of the icing phenomenon provided by
the NTSB database because the accident data, unsurprisingly, yielded very few correct
crew responses to the stall warning cues. The ASRS cases of interest were expected to
contain a higher proportion of crews responding correctly to the icing exigencies, thereby
avoiding an appearance in the NTSB’s database.

ASRS pre-test. A pre-test was performed to validate this assumption and to
determine if the quality and quantity of available ASRS icing encounter data would
support the proposed BLR analysis. The sample was comprised of 115 ASRS records
from the inception of ASRS in January 1988 to October 2, 2015. ASRS data were
obtained via a customized extract in XLSX format from the publicly available database
of 182,214 records. The pre-test query string included in Appendix A was developed and
refined in the course of a number of personal communications between the author and the
ASRS database Project Manager. Only five CRs were observed in the resulting sample,
which is unsurprising as these represent the null case of no-pending-stall or LOC and no
stall warning. These cases were excluded from the analysis because an accepted
minimum bin size for a BLR is 10 observations per estimated parameter (Hair et al.,
2010, p. 322). Table 5 details the steps in the refinement of the sample used for the
ASRS pre-test.
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Table 5
ASRS Pre-test Population and Sample Summary
Group
ASRS sample date range

Size
January 1, 1988 - October 2, 2015

Full ASRS dataset, since inception

182,214 records at October 2, 2015

Initial sample, per tailored request #7212b

381 cases

Scrubbed sample for further analysis

200 cases

Final sample size for further analysis

115 casesa

Note. aAll five “Correct Rejection” (CR) cases were eliminated because of Logistic
Regression sample-size restrictions. bThe search string used to generate the 381 sample
cases from the complete 182,214 ASRS data record is included in Appendix A.

ASRS pre-test findings. Aircrew responded correctly to the icing encounter in
45% of the pre-test cases. The logistic regression model was statistically significant,
χ2(2) = 24.615, p < .0005. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically
significant (p = 1.0), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit despite the small
sample size, and no multivariate outliers were noted using a two-standard deviation
cutoff. The model explained 33.6% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in crew performance
outcomes and correctly classified 75.7% of the cases. Sensitivity was 54.0%, specificity
was 92.3 percent, positive predictive value was 15.6%, and negative predictive value was
72.3%. Of the three predictor SDT-state variables, two were statistically significant:
STD_MISS and STD_FALSE_ALARM. Compared to a missing stall warning, aircrew
had 16.54 times greater odds of performing correctly when faced with a stall warning
False Alarm. The BLR pre-test indicated that a significant proportion of successful crew
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performance outcomes could be predicted using the SDT model, paving the way for the
full study and its associated hypothesis tests. An unexpected finding from the pre-test
was the need for the inclusion of a new System_Issue variable to address incidents caused
by systems failures directly related to the icing conditions that were not initially related to
stalls or LOC. The loss of Air France 447 (BEA, 2012) due to a stall resulting from the
aircrew’s response to pitot icing exemplifies the need for this new variable.

NTSB Accident Database, Sample, and Pre-test
NTSB accident data were downloaded for the period January 1, 1988, to
October 2, 2015, inclusive, from the public on-line query page: http://www.ntsb.gov/_
layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx. The start date represents the first availability of full
NTSB docket data on-line and also corresponds to the start date of Green’s (2006) study
of U.S. inflight icing accidents that is discussed below. The October 2, 2015, cutoff
corresponded with the end-date of the NASA ASRS data extract used in the pre-test; it
also ensured the majority of the NTSB probable causes had been established in time for
the data reduction, based on a six-month buffer between the record retrieval date and the
time of the data processing.

NTSB accident archive processing. The NTSB archive was imported in
delimited text format directly into Excel™ and IBM® SPSS™, using the “ | ” (vertical
bar) symbol as the delimiter. Figure 5 shows the pre-test results of importing the NTSB
accident database into SPSS™; identical results were achieved with the Excel™ import.
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Figure 5. SPSS import of NTSB accident database variables.

NTSB accident archive sample. The sampling method was patterned after
Green’s (2006) comprehensive archival study of U.S. inflight icing accidents and
incidents between 1978 and 2002 using NTSB, FAA, and ASRS data. Green’s initial
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NTSB sample contained 11,174 cases, which was reduced by shortening the review
period and by careful selection of the Boolean search terms. Green also eliminated a
number of the retrieved reports relating to engine icing or icing system anomalies by
adjusting the search terms and by manual inspection. The final search string employed
by Green (“icing | freezing | rime | glaze | sleet | frost”) yielded a more manageable 2,212
cases, which were then manually reduced to a working sample of 693 accidents for
Green’s detailed analysis. Based on the similarity between the scope of the present study
and Green’s work, Green’s strategy and search string were reused for the current
research. This will facilitate meaningful comparisons with Green’s earlier findings. As
indicated in the delimitations section (Chapter I), the analysis required a level of
inference regarding icing-induced loss of control and stall events, which sometimes
presented solely as “uncontrolled descents” in the accident data (Green, 2006, p. 3). A
similar approach to Green’s was adopted to address this issue, although additional
formalized structure was imposed, as previously discussed.
The NTSB accident database is comprehensive because of the legal obligation to
report all accidents (NTSB, 2010b), so a large number of icing-related records were
anticipated, in line with Green’s findings. Unlike the ASRS database, many of the NTSB
cases related to accidents without survivors, making it impossible to determine the stall
warning performance and crew outcomes without access to a CVR or FDR. The NTSB
archive was therefore screened for aircraft that were likely to be equipped with CVR and
/ or FDR equipment in order to facilitate the extraction of the factors and measures
required for the BLR analysis. As the FDR and CVR requirements have evolved with
time and contain grandfather clauses, it was not possible to specify which records would
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meet the selection requirement before a detailed examination of the data. Based on the
current FARs at the time of publication, the following aircraft classes were expected to
have FDR and / or CVR equipment installed: U.S. civil registered, multiengine, turbinepowered airplane with 10 or more passenger seats (FAA, 2010d) and “U.S. civil
registered, multiengine, turbine-powered airplanes… (with) six passengers or more and
for which two pilots are required by type certification or operating rule” (FAA, 2010d).
In order to capture these classes of aircraft as simply as possible using the NTSB
database search criteria, the NTSB sampling frame was limited to non-amateur built
turbine (turbojet, turbofan, or turboprop) airplanes. The turbine limitation was not
strictly necessary for the ASRS data because the ASRS pre-test indicated that the sample
size would remain manageable, even without this filtering, and also because crew
narratives are almost always available in the ASRS records, which obviates the need for
CVR or FDR equipage. Nevertheless, the NTSB turbine-only limitation was also applied
to the ASRS data in order to maximize the similarities between the sample sets.
The filtered NTSB turbine aircraft accident Probable Cause synopses were
manually examined to select cases where an aerodynamic stall or loss of control were
encountered, with the remaining records discarded. The crew performance outcomes and
stall warning system behavior were then encoded for the retained records. For those
records where the crew and stall parameters could not be determined from the NTSB online synopses, the NTSB full narratives were consulted, where available, to determine the
missing parameters. If the NTSB full narratives were unavailable or failed to include the
required parameters, then the affected records were discarded. The full narratives for the
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remaining records were used to encode the stall warning and crew outcomes for the
subsequent BLR investigation.

NTSB pre-test. A pre-test was performed to evaluate the potential sample size of
the icing-related occurrences contained in the NTSB database. NTSB accident data for
the period January 1, 1978, to October 2, 2015, were downloaded in text format directly
from the publicly available archive via the on-line query page: http://www.ntsb.
gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx. The pre-test sample was obtained using Green’s
(2006) search string with the following syntax: "icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze"
or "sleet" or "frost." The sample was constrained to non-amateur built airplanes with
turbine engines (i.e., turboprop, turbofan, and turbojet classifications in the NTSB
database). An additional extract was performed with piston-powered aircraft in order to
gauge the size of this sub-group, in case it was required in order to achieve an adequate
overall sample size, but this subset was not used in the final analysis. For reference,
before the application of the keywords and engine-type delimiters, 5,110 records were
retrieved for the sample period, of which 855 met the search string criteria. The resulting
sampling frames were not examined further to determine the actual usable sample size,
but approximately 30% of the sample frame was expected to result in usable sample data,
based on the ASRS pre-test results (Table 5). The NTSB pre-test results and initial
estimates of the sample sizes for the BLR analysis are shown in Table 6.
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Table 6
NTSB Pre-test Sample Size Findings
Pre-test Sample Size
(records)
106

Estimated Final
Sample Size (records)a
32

Turbofan

42

14

Turbojet

13

4

Total Turbine Airplane Sample Size

161

50

Piston

694

208

Maximum Sample Size

855

258

Engine Type
Turboprop

Note. Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx based on
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations between January 1, 1978, and October 2, 2015,
with the following query syntax: "icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze" or "sleet" or
"frost." aEstimated sample size is 30% of sampling frame size, based on ASRS pre-test
findings.

Hair et al. (2010, p. 333) indicate that each BLR group should have a minimum
bin size of 10 times the number of estimated model coefficients. Based on the IV factors
under consideration (stall warning system state and aircraft stall state), a minimum
sample size of 20 was desired. The findings from the NTSB database pre-test indicated
that the BLR analysis should be viable using turbine-engine aircraft records alone,
although the option of including the piston-engine airplanes was retained, if needed to
achieve an acceptable sample size.
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Database Summary
The key characteristics of the ASRS and NTSB databases are summarized in
Table 7.

Table 7
Key Database Characteristics
Characteristic
Database source

ASRS Data
Custom extract provided by
ASRS data specialist

NTSB Data
Downloaded from NTSB
accident database websitea

Data format

MS XLSX file

Delimited TXT File

Extract start date

January 1, 1988

January 1, 1988

Extract end date

October 2, 2015

October 2, 2015

Primary Filter

Customized Boolean search
query (Appendix A)

Turbine Engine Type

AircraftCategory Filter

Airplane

Airplane

AmateurBuilt Filter

N/A

No

EngineType Filter

N/A

Turbine aircraft (turbojet,
turboprop, turbofan)

WeatherConditions Filter

N/A

All

Suitable Informationb Filter

SME evaluation

SME evaluation

Note. a Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx. bSuitable
information is defined as adequate to determine aircraft stall state, stall warning system
state, and crew response.
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Data Reliability
Field defines reliability as “the ability of a measure to produce consistent results
when the same entities are measured under different conditions” (2009, p. 792). Three
techniques were used to enhance the reliability of the analysis. The first entailed the
application of the Hosmer and Lemeshow test, which has specific application to the BLR
method. A model is deemed not to have a poor fit when the Hosmer and Lemeshow test
value does not achieve statistical significance at the desired level. The second method
attempted to take advantage of the two completely independent datasets used for the
analysis. The BLR was run independently on each of the ASRS and NTSB data samples,
with the objective of validating the results across the two analyses. Unfortunately,
sample size limitations precluded this approach, as discussed in Chapter IV, which
required the use of a merged database for the BLR. The reliability of the merged
database was therefore established by partitioning the sample into training and holdout
(validation) samples. This required the BLR to be run a number of times while varying
the relative training / holdout proportion in order to attain the best balance between the
model specification (which required a large training sample) while reducing variance in
the validation dataset (which required a large holdout sample). A satisfactory
compromise was achieved with a 50 – 50 split between the two partitions, as discussed in
Chapter IV.
A second important reliability consideration stemmed from the self-reporting
nature of the ASRS source data, which introduced the potential for significant bias.
Although there are definite benefits of filing an ASRS report, such as indemnification
from FAA prosecution for non-criminal violations (FAA, 2011a), this enticement could
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not completely overcome the self-selection bias inherent in the program. Appendix B
contains an excellent summary of the limitations of the ASRS data provided by the
program office. Another source of ASRS bias arises because a noteworthy event has
already occurred for a record to appear in the ASRS database, so every ASRS record
likely corresponds to a large number of uneventful icing encounters that would never
appear in the database. This is undoubtedly the reason for the relatively poor (45%)
aircrew correct response outcome rate observed in the ASRS pre-test. For many of these
records, the first indication reported by the crew in the ASRS data was often an LOC,
which automatically constituted an incorrect aircrew response based on the criteria in
Table 4. These incorrect crew response classifications were not intended to impute
blame, because there were several instances where no warning was given to the crew
before the LOC. The terminology should be understood simply as a category for the
dependent variable, with no blame attribution. Conversely, an event would be
categorized as an incorrect crew response if the crew’s initial responses were
inappropriate, even if the event did not result in an accident. Despite these shortcomings,
the ASRS data provided an important perspective that would have been missing had the
NTSB accident data been analyzed in isolation. In summary, the ASRS and NTSB
databases should offset each other’s weaknesses to some degree, thereby increasing the
reliability of the study.

Data Validity
Field defines validity as “evidence that a study allows correct inferences about the
question it was aimed to answer” (2009, p. 795). A number of validities were considered
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for this exploratory design, including ecological validity, content validity, face validity,
and external validity. Ecological validity relates to the absence of bias that could be
caused by the researcher’s presence (Field, 2009, p. 12). As there was no researcher
observing the targeted archived events as they unfolded, the ecological validity of the
research should be sound. Babbie defines content validity as the degree to which a
measure covers the range of meanings included within a concept (2013, p.152). The
factors and measures used in this study were robust and fully encompassing, either due to
their binary nature (for the IV and several of the DVs) or because their definition
comprehensively covered all the available outcomes (i.e., the SDT Hit, Miss, FA, and CR
permutations). For these reasons, the content validity should also be high. Babbie
describes face validity as the quality of an indicator that makes it seem to be a reasonable
measure of some variable (2013, p. 151). Once again, the characterization of the stall
warning system’s performance in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA, and C.) had high face
validity and very little subjectivity. The face validity of the Correct_Response measure is
much harder to establish because it can be very difficult to divine the crew’s thoughts as
they responded to icing challenges. As previously noted, anti-ice and deice systems have
occasionally been overwhelmed by severe icing resulting in the loss of the aircraft,
despite textbook crew responses. Conversely, some crews have survived unscathed,
despite their executing a series of ill-advised actions. The structured approach employed
for evaluating crew responses (Table 4) should mitigate bias from these characteristics,
thereby improving the external validity of the research.
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell define external validity as “…whether the causeeffect relationship holds over variation in persons, settings, treatment variables, and
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measurement variable” (2003, p. 38). External validity is strongly influenced by the
quality of the research design and by the robustness of the statistical tools used in the
analysis. Although it is difficult to control the validity of the archives used in any
exploratory research, a number of techniques were used to increase the validity of results
derived from them. These included triangulation (Vogt et al., 2012, p. 113), whereby
conclusions were drawn using independent paths and the development of a thick
understanding of the situation by examining the phenomena in the most representative
possible real environment (Vogt et al., 2012, pp. 71, 72). This study attempted to
implement both of these techniques by sampling from independent pools of highly
pertinent data. The large number of U.S. registered aircraft and their varied operations
should ensure sufficient randomization to produce meaningful results. The NTSB
accident data were comprehensive due to the mandatory nature of aircraft accident
reporting. In contrast, the ASRS reports were voluntary and subject to self-reporting and
response biases, but the NTSB accident data should mitigate these effects, as should the
anonymous and altruistic nature of ASRS reporting, with its associated incentive of
eliminating noncriminal event enforcement action. The robustness of the statistical tools
employed in the study is another major factor in the achievement of good external
validity: The BLR was selected primarily because of its inherent resilience to
heteroscedasticity and to violations of normality (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 317, 321). In
combination, these considerations should help achieve good external validity and the
consequent generalizability of the conclusions to be drawn from the research.
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Treatment of the Data
Data processing was accomplished using a phased approach with the application
of four software packages: Microsoft® Excel™, MS Access™, IBM® SPSS™ Statistics,
and SAS® Enterprise Miner™. These applications were used collectively to perform the
four data treatment activities: importation, scrubbing, variable encoding, and BLR
execution. The ASRS and NTSB data samples were initially imported into Excel™ and
SPSS™, where the two datasets were merged while retaining the identification of the
source database for stratification purposes. The combined record was manually scrubbed
for duplicates based on event dates, and records with missing values for any of the key
variables were rejected on a listwise basis. The scrubbed data were then manually
encoded for the selected BLR variables and imported into Access™ to facilitate review
and comparison between the two SMEs. These processes are described in the following
sections.

Data importation and scrubbing. The ASRS and NTSB pre-test findings
indicated that the proposed Boolean keyword searches would return a considerable
number of unwanted records that were unrelated to airframe icing, such as engine
compressor stalls and carburetor icing events. These confounding records were
eliminated by inspection of the imported data files using the Microsoft® Excel™ and MS
Access™ applications. Bazeley’s “describe, compare, and relate” (2013) strategy was
used for the selection, scrubbing, and encoding of candidate cases, and to facilitate the
manual filtering of these extraneous records. The scrubbed data were encoded for the
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factors and measures to be used in the subsequent BLR evaluation of the CIRB
hypothesis.

Variable encoding. The ASRS and NTSB databases did not contain several of
the factors and measures required for the BLR analysis, so these variables were manually
encoded into the data files. The data operationalization was accomplished by adding an
additional column into the Excel™ spreadsheet for each desired variable shown in Table
8. The SME hand-encoded the appropriate values for each new variable based on
scrutiny of the NTSB and ASRS narratives using the heuristics shown in Table 4.

Table 8
Primary BLR Variables
Variable Name
Correct_Response

Function
DV

Attribute
Binary Y/N

SDT_Class

IV

Categorical: Hit, Miss, FA, CR

Pending_Wing_Stall

IV

Binary Y/N

Tail_Stall

IV

Binary Y/N

Stall_Warning

IV

Binary Y/N

System_Issue

IV

Binary Y/N
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Missing data. The CIRB model postulates that the correct aircrew performance
outcome construct can be modeled through the application of Bayes’ Theorem to an SDT
theoretical structure. This relationship is pivotal, because the Conservative Icing
Response Bias at the heart of the CIRB model represents a cognitive shift that eludes
direct measurement, so the BLR analysis of the aircrew responses was a vital construct
for quantifying the intangible CIRB effect. For this reason, it was essential to avoid
extraneous assumptions about the data in order to avoid skewing the outcome.
Accordingly, the BLR required an unambiguous response to three questions in order for a
record to be included in the analysis. The first consideration was whether the crew’s
initial response to the incipient stall, loss of control, or FA could be determined,
regardless of a successful or failed outcome. A correct response entailed implementing
appropriate wing-stall or tail-stall prevention and / or recovery procedures subsequent to
a stall warning alarm or other indications of an incipient stall condition. A correct
response also required that no stall prevention or recovery action be undertaken under FA
conditions. The second consideration related to the SME’s ability to characterize the stall
warning system’s performance in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA, or CR). The final
consideration required the unambiguous determination of the aircraft’s actual stall status
(wing stall, tail stall, or no imminent stall). If any of these characteristics could not be
unambiguously determined, no imputation was attempted, and the entire record was
deleted from subsequent analysis (listwise, in SPSS™ terminology). This approach was
essential to avoid skewing the BLR analysis with erroneously categorized records, which
was an important consideration given the relatively small samples under consideration.
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Duplicate data. The ASRS and NTSB data records each carried unique
identifiers, so few, if any, duplicate records were anticipated within either dataset. It was,
however, anticipated that some ASRS reports could be filed for events that led to
accidents, in which case some duplication was to be expected. As ASRS data are fully
de-identified, automated methods could not be used that depend on unique identifiers,
such as the aircraft registration, for de-duplication. Accordingly, duplicate records were
manually screened, identified, and merged using a combination of unique field data, such
as occurrence date, aircraft class, etc. The BLR was executed once the data had been
properly scrubbed with suitable attention to duplicate records and missing values.

Binary Logistic Regression Overview
This section describes the mechanics of the BLR as outlined by Hair et al. (2010,
p. 317-344) and also addresses the specific application of the method for the testing of the
CIRB hypothesis. The BLR was the appropriate multivariate technique for the proposed
investigation based on decision-tree classification methodology developed by Hair et al.
(2010, pp. 12-13). Table 9 outlines the process and decision nodes used to arrive at the
BLR methodology.
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Table 9
Multivariate Method Selection Decision Tree
Decision Node
What type of relationship is being
examined?

ASRS Attribute
Dependence

How many variables are being predicted?

One dependent variable in a single
relationship (i.e., Correct_Response)

What is the measurement scale of the
dependent variable?

Nonmetric (i.e., binary)

Appropriate Multivariate Method

Linear Probability Model:
Binary Logistic Regression

Note. Adapted from “Multivariate data analysis” (7th ed.), by Hair, J. F., Black, W. C.,
Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E., (2010), Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, pp. 12
and 13.

The BLR is a subset of logistic regression methods “formulated to predict and
explain a binary (two-group) categorical variable” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 317). For the
present study, the binary dependent variable (DV) was the Correct_Response measure,
which categorizes initial aircrew responses to icing-induced stall, stall warning, or loss of
control events, as either correct or incorrect. Candidate independent variables for a BLR
can be any combination of nonmetric or metric independent variables (IV). The primary
IVs for this investigation were the four Signal Detection Theory (SDT) classifications of
the stall warning system response to wing or tail icing: Hit, Miss, FA, or CR. Indicator
Coding was used to convert the four levels of SDT IVs into dichotomous values through
the use of dummy variables. The SDT Hit IV was used as the reference variable for the
indicator coding, and was therefore excluded from the regression analysis. The BLR
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processed these IVs in a manner that maximized the discrimination between the two DV
states by using a logistic or logit curve shown in Figure 6 (Hair et al., 2010, pp. 321-323).
As the figure illustrates, the logit curve is a continuous sigmoid function that
asymptotically approaches the values zero and one, while represent the two possible
states of the binomial dependent variable. The figure highlights examples of correctly
classified and misclassified data, based on the logit model.

Figure 6. Sample binary logistic regression logit function. The figure shows the source
data and a sample logit model with correctly classified and misclassified data identified.
Derived from Hair (2010, p. 322).
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Hair et al. showed that the coefficients (b i ) for the variables (X i ) that define the
logistic curve can be calculated using the mathematically equivalent logit (Equation 8)
and exponentiated / Odds Ratio (Equation 9) formulae (2010, p. 326):

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = ln �
� = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝑋𝑋1 + ⋯ + 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛 𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 = �

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
� = 𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑏0 +𝑏𝑏1 𝑋𝑋1 +⋯+ 𝑏𝑏𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(8)

(9)

These equations highlight the inherently non-linear relationship between the IVs
and DV in a BLR, unlike the standard multiple regression techniques, which require a
linear relationship. Further, the error terms of the discrete BLR dependent variable are
binomially (i.e., not normally) distributed and the error variances are not constant across
the IV values (heteroscedasticity). Although these properties violate the statistical
requirements of linear regression methods, the BLR technique is not affected by such
violations.

BLR model fit. The distinctive nature of the logistic curve and its underlying
assumptions require a different approach to model fit from traditional regression
methods. BLR fit is evaluated using statistical measures that are unique to the BLR
technique. These tests evaluate overall model fit, differences between models, and the
significance of the parameters within a model. Overall fit is evaluated using maximum
likelihood estimation to derive the -2 log likelihood (- 2LL) value for the model, which is
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analogous to the sum of square errors obtained in regression analysis (Hair, et al., 2010,
p. 327). Lower likelihood values indicate a better model fit, and a perfect fit is indicated
by a zero -2LL value.
A second statistical measure of the overall BLR model fit is provided by the
Hosmer and Lemeshow test that evaluates the significance of differences between the
actual DV values and the expected values derived from the model. Smaller differences
are desired, and an acceptable model fit is indicated by a non-significant Hosmer and
Lemeshow result. Good model fit is not necessarily a measure of practical significance,
so the -2LL and Hosmer and Lemeshow tests are supplemented by the Pseudo R2 statistic
that is equivalent to the multiple regression coefficient of determination. Pseudo R2 is a
measure of the statistical difference between two models, evaluated using a chi-square
significance test of the difference between their respective –2LL values. Pseudo R2 is
interpreted in a similar manner to coefficients of determination and has a range of zero to
one, with one representing a perfect fit. The Cox and Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2 are
refinements to the pseudo R2 test and are assessed identically (Hair et al., 2010, p. 339).
The results of this study are presented in terms of the Nagelkerke R2. The basic pseudo
R2 statistic is calculated as follows (Equation 10):

where:

𝑅𝑅 2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 =

− 2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 − (−2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑙𝑙 )
− 2 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

R2 = pseudo R2
LL = Log Likelihood

(10)
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BLR classification accuracy. Once the BLR model overall fit and practical
significance are established using the preceding tests, the model’s practicality as a
predictive tool is assessed by means of a classification matrix, as shown in Table 11. The
classification matrix captures a number of key statistics from the BLR model, including
the Hit Ratio, which is the percentage of combined Hit and CR outcomes successfully
predicated by the model, as well as the model’s sensitivity and specificity that correspond
to the model’s individual SDT Hit and CR ratios, respectively.

BLR coefficient weights. BLR coefficients are equivalent to those for a multiple
regression, but the former are logarithmic when the DV is expressed using the logit
function. BLR logit coefficients represent the “change in the ratio of the probabilities
(the odds)” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 329) that reflect the relative weights of each IV. Logit
coefficients are real numbers, and a zero coefficient indicates an odds ratio of 1.0 and a
corresponding probability of 0.5. Negative logit coefficients indicate lower odds ratios
and corresponding probabilities less than 0.5. Positive logit coefficients indicate the
converse. The logit coefficients are useful in determining the strength of the coefficient
relationships with the DV.
Coefficient weights can be expressed using an alternative but equivalent format to
facilitate the interpretation of the direction of the relationship between the DV and IVs:
Exponentiated logistic coefficients are the antilogs of their equivalent logit coefficients.
These exponentiated coefficients are positive real numbers, where 1.0 corresponds to a
relationship with no direction, and values above and below zero reflect positive and
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negative directional relationships between the DV and the selected IV, respectively. The
exponentiated format is also useful for determining the relative weights of the
coefficients, as shown in Equation 11 (Hair et al., 2010, p. 331):

Percentage change in odds = (Exponentiated Coefficient i – 1.0) x 100

(11)
.

Categorical IVs, such as the SDT classifications used in this study, entailed the
use of dummy (indicator) variables. In such cases, the calculated percentage change in
odds is in relation to the reference category chosen for the analysis: SDT Hits for this
study. The odds ratios quantify the relative weights of Misses, FAs, and CRs on the crew
performance outcomes, in relation to the Hit baseline crew performance.

The Wald statistic. The Wald statistic is used to test the significance of the
coefficients derived in a BLR analysis. The statistic is applied and interpreted in the
identical manner to the t value significance test of multiple regression coefficients. The
preceding concepts are summarized in Table 10, which contrasts the BLR parameters
with their more familiar multiple regression equivalents.
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Table 10
Comparison of BLR and Multiple Regression Parameters
Multiple Regression
Property
Total sum of squares,
Error sum of squares

Equivalent
BLR Property
– 2LL of base model

BLR Parameter Range and
Interpretation
Smaller is better:
0 = perfect model fit.

Regression sum of
squares

Difference of – 2LL for
between models

The model with the smaller -2LL
value is the better fit.

F test of model fit

Chi-square test of
– 2LL difference

Standard Chi-square significance
test for each evaluated model.

F test of model fit

Hosmer and Lemeshow
Chi-square test fit test

Non-significant outcomes indicate
an acceptable model fit.

Coefficient of
determination (R2)

Pseudo R2
Nagelkerke R2

0 ≤ R2 ≤ 1.0

Coefficient significance
(t-value)

Wald statistic

Interpreted similarly to the F and t
values used in significance testing
of regression coefficients.

Coefficient weight

Logit coefficients

Real numbers. A zero coefficient
indicates an odds ratio of 1.0 and a
corresponding probability of 0.5.
Negative coefficients indicate
lower odds ratios and
corresponding probabilities less
than 0.5. Positive coefficients
indicate the converse.

Coefficient weight
(alternative formulation)

Exponentiated logistic
coefficient

Positive real numbers. An
exponentiated coefficient of 1.0
corresponds to a relationship with
no direction. Values < 1.0 indicate
a negative relationship direction,
while values > 1.0 indicate a
positive relationship direction.

Note. Adapted from Hair et al. (2010, p. 328).

117

BLR Execution
The BLR was initially performed on the sample data using IBM® SPSS™ and
SAS® Enterprise Miner™ statistical software, as detailed in the BLR and data treatment
sections. Each package has differing strengths and weaknesses, and the use of both in
parallel provided a useful cross-check of the outcomes. Enterprise Miner™ is a modular
application that provides a unified and expandable interface for conducting advanced
statistical analyses including linear and non-linear modeling. The program has flexible
import and export capabilities, including the import and export to the Excel™ XLSX
format that was used for the data scrubbing. The BLR was executed using the GLM
function in Enterprise Miner™ and the Analyze > Regression > Binary Logistic in
SPSS™, acting on the data exported and encoded from Excel™ during the data selection
and scrubbing phase. Both packages offered several alternative BLR methodologies that
are discussed in the next section.

BLR Models
Three CIRB BLR models, each with four variations, were constructed to perform
data mining, hypothesis testing, and validity and reliability evaluations. The models are
referenced as the basic, comprehensive, and validation CIRB models. In order to
compare the CIRB outcomes with raw stall warning data, the three CIRB models were
contrasted with a BLR baseline analysis based solely on the activation of the stall
warning system, as shown in Equation 12:
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Correct Crew Response (Y/N) = f (Stall Warning (Y/N) + error)

(12)

With the exception of the validity and reliability evaluations, each BLR model
was evaluated using the entire sample dataset in order to achieve the best fit. The CIRB
BLR models were evaluated using five alternative BLR methodologies: the baseline allin technique, with all variables retained as the model iterates, as well as forward,
backward, and stepwise methods, in which the variables were either added or eliminated
sequentially, based on defined criteria such as the Wald statistic. The ASRS pre-test
evinced very little difference among these alternate methods, but all four methods were
applied and contrasted using the Enterprise Miner™ to evaluate the BLR sensitivity to
the specific methodology. Figure 7 illustrates the structure developed in the Enterprise
Miner™ software for the evaluation of each of the BLR models described below.

Basic CIRB model. The basic CIRB model was comprised of a constant term
and the SDT stall warning performance outcome as the sole independent variables and
the aircrew performance outcome as the sole binomial dependent variable. When the
BLR incorporates nonmetric (dummy) variables, the resulting Odds Ratios are referenced
to a selected baseline category, which is subsequently excluded from the logistic
equation. For this study, SDT Hits were selected as the baseline category because Hits
reflect the intended functioning of the stall warning system. The remaining SDT
parameters (Miss, FA, and CR) were coded as dummy categorical variables, resulting in a
BLR relationship of the form shown in Equation 13:
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = ln �

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
� = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

(13)

where:
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome

Comprehensive CIRB model. The comprehensive model included the same
independent variables used in the basic model, with the addition of Wing Stall, Tail Stall,
and System Issue IVs (Equation 14):

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

= 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑏𝑏4 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 (14)
where:
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome

CIRB validation model. The CIRB validation model was identical to the
comprehensive model, except the sample was split into training and holdout (validation)
sub-samples to evaluate the BLR reliability.
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Figure 7. Enterprise Miner™ BLR model structure.

BLR Descriptive Statistics
The computed BLR outcomes were computed and presented using a
Classification Matrix (Table 11) and a BLR Outcome Matrix (Table 12). The
terminology used in these matrices is explained in Table 13.
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Table 11
Sample Binary Logistic Regression Classification Matrix

Incorrect response observed

Incorrect Crew
Response
Predicteda
AAb

Correct Crew
Response
Predicteda
BB

Percentage of
Correct
Predictions
Specificityc

Correct response observed

CC

DDb

Sensitivityd

NPV

PPV

Correctly Classifiede

Figures of Merit

Note. aCut value: .50. bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct model
predictions. cSpecificity = (AA / (AA + BB))% dSensitivity = (DD / (CC + DD))%
Positive predictive value (PPV) = (DD / (BB + DD))% ; Negative predictive value (NPV)
= (AA / (AA + CC))% .

Table 12
Sample Binary Logistic Regression Outcome Format

B

S.E.

.667

.563

1.406

1

.236

1.949

.647

5.872

SDT FA

2.806

.566

24.603

1

.000 16.537

5.458

50.112

Constant

-1.119

.288

15.109

1

.000

SDT_MISS
(Reference)
SDT HIT

Wald
df Sig.
24.615
2 .000

95% C.I. for EXP(B)
Exp(B) Lower
Upper

.327
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Table 13
Binary Logistic Regression Calculated Parameters
Statistic
Degrees of Freedom

Symbol
Meaninga
df
Degrees of Freedom

Exponentiated Logistic
Coefficient

Exp(B) An alternative expression of the Logistic
Coefficient. Always positive. Values > 1
indicate positive relationships; values < 1
indicate negative relationships between the
IVs and DV.

Hosmer and Lemeshow
significance

N/A

A test for BLR model fit. A good fit is
indicated when the Hosmer and Lemeshow
test is not statistically significant.

Logistic Coefficient (logit) and
95% confidence interval

B

Weighting factor for each IV in relation to
its discriminatory power. A zero indicates
50 / 50 odds. Negative numbers indicate
probabilities < 50%, positive numbers
indicate probabilities > 50%.

Nagelkerke R2

R2

A Pseudo R2 measure applicable to the BLR
technique that is analogous to the
coefficient of determination (R2) in a
multiple linear regression.

Negative Predictive Value

N/A

Percentage of incorrect crew performance
outcomes correctly predicted by the model
related to the total number of incorrect crew
performance outcomes predicated by the
model. 100% is ideal.

Percentage of Correct Aircrew
Responses

N/A

The number of correct crew performance
outcomes divided by the total number of
records, after scrubbing.
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Statistic
Percentage Correctly Classified
(Hit Ratio)

Symbol
Meaninga
N/A The percentage of crew performance
outcomes correctly classified by the BLR
model.

Positive Predictive Value

N/A

Percentage of correct crew performance
outcomes correctly predicted by the model
related to the total number of correct crew
performances predicated by the model.
100% is ideal.

Sensitivity

N/A

Percentage of correct crew performance
outcomes correctly predicted by the model
related to the total number of correct crew
performance outcomes (i.e., true positives).
100% is ideal.

Specificity

N/A

Percentage of incorrect crew performance
outcomes correctly predicted by the model
related to the total number of incorrect crew
performance outcomes (i.e., true negatives).
100% is ideal.

Standard Error

SE

Standard Error of the BLR coefficient.

Statistical Significance
(χ2 p value)

Sig.

Significance level corresponding to the
Wald statistic. Analogous to the t-test
significance level in a multiple regression.

Wald Statistic

Wald

Statistical significance of each BLR
coefficient. Analogous to the t value in a
multiple regression.

Note. aDefinitions from Hair et al. (2010, pp. 318, 319, 331). Quotation marks omitted
from embedded verbatim text for clarity.
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Reliability testing. BLR reliability was established by partitioning the combined
ASRS and NTSB database into training and holdout (validation) samples (Hair et al.,
2010, p. 341). The BLR was computed using the training partition, and the reliability
was established using the validation partition. The two samples were compared on the
basis of their misclassification rates and average squared error. The BLR was repeated
with differing training / holdout proportions in order to optimize the model definition in
the training sample while reducing the variance in the holdout sample. The selected
partition ratio is presented in Chapter IV.

Hypothesis testing. The purpose of the study was to determine the influence of
the stall warning system behavior in cueing aircrew to perform correctly during
hazardous airborne icing encounters, as evaluated by the following hypotheses:
1. H 0 1: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss.
2. H 0 2: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between a
valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm.
Although these hypotheses used 2-sided tests for significance, the BLR
methodology allows the direction of the relationship to be established. In each case, the
significance threshold for rejecting the null hypothesis was established as a Wald statistic
below .05 (p < .05).

Qualitative data. The qualitative analysis resulted from the manual examination
of the databases while classifying the action of the stall warning system in SDT terms
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(Hit, Miss, FA, or CR) and the Correct_Response outcomes, as defined in Chapter 1.
The purpose of the qualitative evaluation was primarily to perform these classification
functions and to note pertinent data for the BLR. No inferential statistical analyses were
performed on the qualitative data.

Summary
Two hypotheses derived from the Conservative Icing Response Bias theory were
evaluated using an archival study of NASA ASRS icing incident data and NTSB accident
data pertaining to non-amateur built turbine-powered aircraft. A Binary Logistic
Regression non-linear multivariate technique was used to test the CIRB predictions
concerning the stall warning system’s impact on the crew performance outcomes. In
particular, the combination of Bayes’ Theorem and SDT applied to the crew stall
monitoring vigilance task suggested that stall warning Misses would have a greater
impact in icing conditions, while the impact of False Alarms would be reduced, both
when evaluated against the baseline Hit condition. These predictions formed the basis of
the two hypotheses that were tested using the BLR.
Two SMEs, including the author, scrubbed, merged, and encoded the ASRS and
NTSB archives with the following information: aircraft icing state; wing or tail stall state;
the action of the stall warning system, icing related system issues, and the reaction of the
crew to the potential stall or loss of control situation. Aircrew responses were
categorized as either correct or incorrect, using a structured process, and this
classification was used as the dependent variable for the basic, comprehensive, and
validation BLR models. The independent variables for the basic CIRB model were the
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Signal Detection Theory classifications (Hit, Miss, False Alarm, and Correct Rejection)
of the stall warning system performance, as manually derived from each data record. The
comprehensive model included additional IVs including the wing and tail stall state and
the system issue variable. Key elements of the investigation are illustrated in Figure 8.

Pre-test

•INITIAL ARCHIVE EXPLORATION
•Evaluate the NASA ASRS and NTSB databases for parameter content and adequate sample
sizes
•Establish sampling frames

Phase I

•QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT PHASE - TWO INDEPENDENT SMEs
•Conduct manual archival review to refine sampling frame
•Select records for which the aircraft icing state, stall state, stall warning state, and aircrew
performance can be unambiguously determined

Phase 2

Phase 2

Phase 2

•DATA ENCODING - TWO INDEPENDENT SMEs
•Encode aircraft stall status as: wing stall, tail stall, no incipient stall
•Encode stall warning system status in SDT terms: Hit, Miss, False Alarm, Correct Rejection
•Encode crew response measure: correct/incorrect response?
•Encode selected stratification variables if required (e.g. type of operation, aircraft
category)
•BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSION (BLR)
•Determine logistic and exponentiated regression coefficients
•Determine coefficient significance (Wald statistic)
•Determine model fit (pseudo R-square, Hosmer and Lemeshow)
•Develop classification matrix and determine model’s predictive accuracy (Hit Ratio)
•Test hypotheses

•EVALUATE BLR RELIABILITY
•Repeat best-fit BLR for ASRS only, NTSB only, and merged data
•Repeat BLR for Wing Stall, Tail Stall and Combined Wing and Tail Stall data if sample sizes
prove adequate
•Evaluate differences between validation run outcomes for significance

Figure 8. Research activity flowchart.
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Chapter IV

Results

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The results of the analysis are presented incrementally, beginning with
generalized descriptive statistics and concluding with the hypothesis test results. The
first section summarizes the descriptive statistics for the ASRS, NTSB, and the combined
samples. This is followed by summary statistics for key parameters, such as: correct
crew response ratios; wing stall vs. tail stall vs. system issues; and the Signal Detection
Theory (SDT) stall warning classifications. The next section addresses the Binary
Logistic Regression (BLR) test outcomes and BLR model validity tests. The chapter
concludes with the outcomes of the two hypothesis tests that were postulated in
Chapter I.

Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 14 summarizes the ASRS and NTSB sampling outcomes based on the
criteria expounded in Chapter III. The table reflects the 2-phase scrubbing that was used
to identify candidate icing events. Records that lacked the required parameters for the
BLR were excluded listwise, with no imputation for missing values. Six duplicate NTSB
cases were identified and merged. In addition, three ambiguous cases were rejected in
the final down-sampling because of differing interpretations between the author and the
external Subject Matter Expert (SME) relating to the crew performance outcome or
Signal Detection Theory (SDT) classifications.
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Table 14
ASRS and NTSB Database Sample Summary
Sample
Group
Unfiltered database size at
October 2, 2015 cutoff

ASRS
Database
18,214

NTSB
Database
77,544

Combined
Databases
95,758 records

First-scrub sample size, per
tailored icing-event extractsa

381

3,039b

3,420 records

Second-scrub sample sizec
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108d

234 records

79

53

132 records

Final sample for BLR (without
imputation)d

Note. aThe first-scrub sample sets contained all eligible icing-related incidents or
accidents; the numbers are approximate because of the iterative nature of the downsampling process. bFiltered for non-amateur built airplanes. cThe second-scrub samples
excluded records with unknown crew performance outcomes; the numbers are
approximate because of the iterative nature of the down-sampling process. dNet of six
duplicate Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) / Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC) cases. dThe final sample excluded cases with indeterminate crew or
SDT outcomes.

Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the final subset of ASRS and NTSB icing
events by year, based on the event date. The figure approximates the relative incidence
of such events, but it should not be used to evaluate the absolute occurrence rates because
the table excludes legitimate records that were rejected from the study due to incomplete
data. In addition, the figure has not been normalized to account for annual flight hour
exposure, cyclical weather variations, or other confounding factors.
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Figure 9. Annual incidence of icing events in study, by event year.

Icing Event Summary Statistics
Table 15 summarizes key icing event statistics for each of the databases
independently and for the final combined ASRS / NTSB data sample of 132 records. As
expected, wing stalls accounted for most of the events, but tail stalls and system issues
collectively accounted for more than 37% of the sample, which required the inclusion of
these categories in the subsequent BLR analysis. Each of the event categories (wing stall,
tail stall, and system issue) exceeded the minimum desired count of 10 observations for
the combined dataset, but the NTSB data failed to achieve the minimum in three of the
four categories, and the ASRS dataset had only 14 tail stall records. As will be shown,
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these small sample counts for the identified IV categories had consequences on the BLR
execution. Note that the totals in Table 15 exceed 100% because of some overlap
between the icing event categories, such as a simultaneous occurrence of a stall warning
with a system issue.

Table 15
Icing Event Classification Frequencies
Icing Event Class
Wing Stall

ASRS
41 (51.9%)

NTSB
47 (88.7%)

Combined
88 (66.7%)

Tail Stall

14 (17.7%)

5 (9.4%)

19 (14.4%)

Stall Warning

30 (38.0%)

6 (11.3%)

36 (27.3%)

System Issue

23 (29.1%)

7 (13.2%)

30 (22.7%)

108a

Total

65a

173a

Note. aColumn totals exceed 100% because some of the icing event categories, such as
stall warning and system issues, can occur simultaneously and therefore overlap in the
statistics.

Tail Stall Identification
The SMEs identified tail stall events conservatively during the data-encoding
process. Tail stall events were never inferred; records were only encoded as tail stalls
when the NTSB or ASRS narratives specifically alluded to a tail stall event, as in the
following example. The abbreviations and text contractions are as they appear in the
source record (emphasis added):
We were noticing very light rime ice, but it was not accumulating on the
wings... Upon initiating the clb, the acft pitched down, buffeting. The PIC
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attempted to regain pitch ctl and the stall horn went off. At this point, the PIC
pushed up the pwr, and I contacted ctr to ask for the nearest arpt and advise that
we had a ‘vibration’ and were experiencing difficulty… Looking back, I believe
that, although the wings were relatively free from ice, there may have been an
accumulation on the tail. The acft was equipped with pneumatic boots, but there
was never enough ice present (that I observed, and I was watching) to cycle the
boots effectively. Somehow, the flow around the empennage was disturbed, and
the pitch up to initiate the clb to 13000 ft from 11000 ft must have stalled the
horiz stabilizer. There was no perceptible trim change to alert us to this
condition, and the subsequent events were very rapid. (NASA 2014, extract ACN
#265218)

Stall Warning System SDT Performance
As discussed in Chapter III, the CIRB model is comprised of two interacting SDT
systems that each produce a binary output based on incomplete input data. The first
system contains the aircraft’s stall warning system, which performs its function subject to
limited data available from the aircraft’s sensors and air data systems. Table 16
summarizes the SDT outcome measures of the stall warning system’s performance, as
determined from the final database sample. Correct stall warning behavior, represented
by the Hit and Correct Rejection entries in the table, totaled 21.2% of the sample. The
remaining 78.8% represent the undesirable SDT Miss and FA outcomes. These stall
warning system SDT outcomes were hypothesized to be critical inputs to the second
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CIRB SDT system: the crew decision-making element, which is discussed in the next
section.

Table 16
Stall Warning SDT Classification Frequencies
SDT Classification

NTSB

Combined

12 (15.2%)

5 (9.4%)

17 (12.9%)

8 (10.1%)

3 (5.7%)

11 ( 8.3%)

False Alarm

17 (21.5%)

1 (1.9%)

18 (13.6%)

Miss

42 (53.2%)

44 (83.0%)

86 (65.2%)

Total

79 (100%)

53 (100%)

132 (100%)

Hit
Correct Rejection

ASRS

Aircrew Performance Outcomes
As described in Chapter III, aircrew must process imperfect stall warning,
environmental, and aircraft cues to produce an aircrew performance outcome. The stall
warning SDT outputs shown in Table 16 were hypothesized to have a significant effect
on these aircrew performance outcomes. For the combined sample, correct crew
responses were observed in 35 of the 132 cases (26.5%), and incorrect responses were
recorded in the remaining 97 cases (73.5%), so the aircrew performance outcomes clearly
exhibited some of the Hit and Miss traits that characterize SDT systems, as discussed in
Chapter II. The BLR was used to evaluate two hypotheses that linked the crew decisionmaking outcomes to the SDT performance of the stall warning system.
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Binary Logistic Regression
As presented in Chapter III, the BLR technique was used to evaluate three CIRB
models: a basic CIRB model, a comprehensive model, and a validation model. These
models were compared to a baseline stall warning model that contained the stall warning
actuation as the sole IV. The binary aircrew response outcome was adopted as the sole
dependent variable for the three CIRB models and the baseline stall warning model. The
results are presented in order of increasing model complexity, beginning with the
baseline stall warning model and proceeding through the basic CIRB model to the
comprehensive CIRB model.

Baseline stall warning BLR. The stall warning BLR was used as the baseline
for evaluating the three subsequent CIRB models. Aside from the model constant, the
sole IV was the stall warning actuation (Y / N). Results from the baseline stall warning
model are shown in Table 17, which forms the basis for the subsequent comparison with
the CIRB models.

Table 17
Stall Warning Baseline Logistic Regression Outcomes
Incorrect Crew Correct Crew
Model
Response
Response
Classification
Predicted
Predicted
Accuracy
Incorrect Crew Response Observed
82
15
84.5% Specificity
Correct Crew Response Observed
14
21
60.0% Sensitivity
85.4%
58.3%
Model Predictive Values
78.0% Overall
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CIRB models. The basic and comprehensive CIRB models were run
independently for each of the ASRS and NTSB sample sets, with the objective of
comparing the results across the two databases as described in Chapter III.
Unfortunately, the individual databases did not meet the minimum BLR sample size
requirements of 10 observations per category, as indicated by the single-digit frequencies
in Tables 15 and 16, particularly for the NTSB data. This precluded the BLR from
converging to a solution for either database in isolation, even after 20 iterations using the
standard .50 cutoff value. In contrast, the BLR converged in only six iterations with the
combined dataset, with a parameter change of less than .001 at the last cycle. The
remainder of the analysis was therefore confined to the combined ASRS / NTSB dataset
of 132 samples, using the conventional test and holdout methodology to establish the
reliability and validity of the merged data.

Basic CIRB model. The basic CIRB model was of the form shown in
equation 15:

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝

𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = ln �1− 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
� = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

where:
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome

(15)
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Four variants of the BLR were examined to achieve the best model fit: the default
method, in which all BLR variables were retained as the model iterated, and three
alternatives (stepwise, forward, and backward), which used different criteria for
selectively excluding IVs as the model iterated. All four methods produced identical
results for the basic CIRB model. The BLR was statistically significant in every case:
(χ2(3) = 85.328 p < .0005). The model explained 69.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance
in crew performance outcomes and correctly classified 90.9% of the cases. Only 12 of
the 132 cases were misclassified by the model (three false positives and nine false
negatives). The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically significant for the basic
CIRB model (χ2(2) = 0.000 p = 1.000), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit.
Other parameters for the basic CIRB model are shown in the crew response classification
matrix (Table 18), and the corresponding BLR outcomes are shown in Table 19.

Table 18
Basic CIRB Model Crew Response Classification Matrix
Incorrect Crew Correct Crew
Model
Response
Response
Classification
Predicted
Predicted
Accuracy
Incorrect Crew Response Observed
94b
3
96.9% Specificity
Correct Crew Response Observed
Model Predictive Values

9
91.3%c

26b
89.7%d

74.3% Sensitivity
90.9%b

Overall

Note. an = 132, cut value = .50. bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct
model predictions. cNegative Predictive Value. dPositive Predictive Value.
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Table 19
Basic CIRB Model Outcomes

SDT Class

B

S.E. Wald

Hit (Reference)

df Sig.

41.821

3 .000

Exp(B)

95% C.I. for Exp(B)
Lower
Upper

Correct Rejection

2.909 1.165

6.232

1 .013

18.333

1.868

179.895

False Alarm

2.686

8.795

1 .003

14.667

2.486

86.529

.777 12.217

1 .000

.066

.014

.304

.508

1 .232

.545

Miss

-2.714

Constant

-.606

.906

1.426

Comprehensive model. The comprehensive CIRB model was of the form shown
in Equation 16:

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐

= 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝑏𝑏2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑏𝑏3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑏𝑏4 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑔𝑔𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏5 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝑏𝑏6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑚𝑚𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
where:
CCR = Correct Crew Response outcome
For the comprehensive CIRB model, the four BLR iteration alternatives produced
slightly different results, with the all-variables-included method producing a slightly
better fit, as shown in Table 20. Accordingly, the comprehensive BLR model analyses,
and the results that follow, are based on the all-in regression technique.

(16)
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Table 20
Comprehensive Model: BLR Method Comparison
Misclassification
Rate
0.083333

Squared
Error
0.067738

BLR_Forward

0.083333

0.068831

BLR_Stepwise

0.090909

0.071701

BLR_Backward

0.090909

0.071701

Model
BLR_All_Inputs (Default)a

Note. aThe selected model for the BLR, based on lowest misclassification rate and least
squared error criteria.

Comprehensive Model Outliers. Six multivariate outliers were noted using a
two-standard deviation cutoff. These outliers are listed in Table 21. As the table shows,
the outliers reflected diverse and random permutations of the independent and dependent
variables, so they were deemed unlikely to skew the analysis. Further, their elimination
reduced some of the sample counts, such as the tail stall category, below the minimum
group sizes required for the BLR execution. Accordingly, the outliers were retained in
the analysis.
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Table 21
Comprehensive CIRB Model Outliers

Case
24

Source
Source ID
NTSB CHI97FA047

Wing Tail Stall Correct System SDT
Stall? Stall? Warn? Responsea Issue? Class ZResid.b
Y
N
N
Y
N
M 6.464

48

NTSB NYC05MA083

N

N

N

N

Y

C

-4.533

50

NTSB NYC97FA045

N

N

Y

N

Y

F

-2.791

82

ASRS

389483

N

Y

N

Y

N

M

3.098

96

ASRS

456868

N

Y

N

Y

N

M

3.098

101
ASRS
495957
N
N
Y
N
Y
F
a
Note. All of the cases in the correct response column were misclassified by the
comprehensive BLR model. bOutlier threshold: 2 standard deviations.

-2.791

Comprehensive model statistics. The comprehensive model was statistically
significant (χ2(6) = 88.911 p < .0005). The model explained 71.5% (Nagelkerke R2) of
the variance in crew performance outcomes and correctly classified 91.7% of the cases.
The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically significant
(χ2(5) = 1.279 p = .937), indicating that the model was a satisfactory fit. Other
parameters for the comprehensive CIRB model are shown in the crew response
classification matrix (Table 22), the outcome matrix (Table 23) and the correlation matrix
(Table 24). Table 23 highlights an important outcome: The SDT Hit and Miss
parameters were the only significant IVs in the comprehensive SDT model. No other
parameter (i.e., Wing Stall, Tail Stall, and System Issues) approached statistical
significance. Also of note, the incidence of any of these three issues resulted in a
decreased chance of a correct crew performance outcome, as shown by the negative sign
of the B coefficients in Table 23.
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Table 22
Comprehensive CIRB Model Crew Response Classification Matrix
Incorrect Crew Correct Crew
Response
Response
Predicted
Predicted
Incorrect Crew Response Observed
93b
4
Correct Crew Response Observed

28b

7
93.0%c

Model Predictive Values

87.5%d

Model
Classification
Accuracy
95.9% Specificity
80.0% Sensitivity
91.7%b

Overall

Note. an = 132, cut value = .50. bLead-diagonal elements of matrix represent correct
model predictions. cNegative Predictive Value. dPositive Predictive Value.

Table 23
Comprehensive CIRB Model Outcomes
95% C.I. for Exp(B)
SDT Class
Hit (Reference)

B

S.E. Wald
15.938

df Sig.
3 .001

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Correct Rejection

2.339

1.275

3.364

1 .067

10.375

.852

126.367

False Alarm

1.449

1.505

.927

1 .336

4.258

.223

81.330

.911 10.040

1 .002

.056

.009

.332

Miss

-2.887

Wing Stall

-1.802

1.351

1.778

1 .182

.165

.012

2.332

Tail Stall

-.357

1.649

.047

1 .828

.699

.028

17.717

System Issue

-.358

1.057

.114

1 .735

.699

.088

5.555

.953

1.380

.478

1 .490

2.594

Constant

140
Table 24
Comprehensive CIRB Model Correlation Matrix

Constant

Constant
1.000

SDT
CR
-.288

SDT
FA
-.643

SDT
Miss
-.144

Wing
Stall
-.906

Tail
Stall
-.749

System
Issue
-.426

SDT_CR

-.288

1.000

.391

.174

.186

.136

-.197

SDT_FA

-.643

.391

1.000

.038

.639

.504

-.252

SDT_Miss

-.144

.174

.038

1.000

-.102

-.337

.147

Wing_Stall

-.906

.186

.639

-.102

1.000

.784

.298

Tail_Stall

-.749

.136

.504

-.337

.784

1.000

.285

System_Issue

-.426

-.197

-.252

.147

.298

.285

1.000

CIRB Model Comparison
Table 25 contrasts the basic and comprehensive CIRB models with the ASRS pretest outcomes and the baseline stall warning model. Both CIRB models were superior to
the pre-test model that was developed using a sub-sample of NASA ASRS data. This is
attributed to the larger overall sample size of the combined ASRS and NTSB databases
that reduced the model variance.
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Table 25
CIRB Model and Pre-Test Comparisons
Nagelkerke
R2

Correctly
Classified

PPVa
%

NPVb
%

92.3

15.6

72.3

84.5

58.3

85.4

96.9

89.7

91.3

95.9

87.5

93.0

Sensitivity Specificity
%
%

ASRS pre-test results
.336
75.7
54.0
Stall warning baseline
.243
78.0
60.0
model
.695
90.9
74.3
CIRB basic model
CIRB comprehensive
.715
91.7
80.0
model
Note. aPositive Predictive Value. bNegative Predictive Value.

The sensitivities of the basic and comprehensive CIRB models (74.3% and
80.0%, respectively) were also markedly better than the baseline stall warning model
(60.0% sensitivity). Overall, the CIRB basic and comprehensive models correctly
classified 90.9% and 91.7% of the sample cases, respectively, compared to 78% for the
baseline stall warning model. Although the comprehensive model was somewhat more
sensitive than the basic model, the latter performed almost as well in almost every
evaluated parameter, including model fit, Nagelkerke R2, cases correctly classified, and
specificity. This is an important finding because the basic CIRB model outcomes
indicate that a simple SDT analysis of stall warning system performance explains 69.5%
of the variance in aircrew decision-making outcomes, while correctly classifying 90.9%
of the cases in the final data sample. These findings must now be examined in the
context of the BLR reliability assessments.
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BLR Reliability
The reliability and validity of the BLR analysis were evaluated with several tests.
As a pre-requisite, the combined NTSB and ASRS database sample sizes were deemed
adequate for the successful application of the BLR method, as evinced by the rapid
convergence to a unique solution. The Hosmer and Lemeshow test was not statistically
significant for the basic CIRB model (χ2(2) = 0.000; p = 1.000) and for the
comprehensive model (χ2(5) = 1.279; p = .937), indicating that the fit of both models was
satisfactory. The close results achieved using the four differing BLR approaches with
both models also attested to their robustness and reliability.
The final test of model reliability entailed the partitioning of the combined data
sample into training and holdout (validation) sub-samples. The BLR was run several
times while varying the relative proportion of these two partitions. The objective was to
attain the best balance between the model specification (which required a large training
sample), while minimizing the variance in the validation dataset (which required a large
holdout sample). An even split (n = 66/66) between the two categories was eventually
selected that yielded a good balance between these competing influences. Table 26
compares the training and holdout (validation) misclassification rates and average square
errors.
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Table 26
Training Vs. Holdout Samples

Misclassification Rate

Training
Partitiona

Validation
Partitiona

Difference
(Percent)

0.075758

0.075758

0

Average Squared Error
0.059682
0.072321
Note. aBasis: n = 66 for both the training and holdout samples.

21.2

Figure 10 contrasts the SDT Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves
obtained for the training and holdout samples. The similar ROC curves confirm the
training / holdout reliability depicted in Table 26. The ROC curves also approached the
ideal forms for maximum sensitivity and specificity, which requires them to be
asymptotic to both axes, and convex towards the upper left quadrant. Collectively, these
outcomes indicate that the results of the BLR methodology should be reliable and valid
when applied to the target U.S. registered, turbine, non-amateur-built aircraft population
addressed in this study.
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Figure 10. Baseline BLR model crew response receiver operating characteristics.
Training and validation sample comparison.

Hypothesis Tests
Table 27 contains key statistics for the Hit, CR, Miss, and FA SDT predictor
variables for the basic and comprehensive CIRB models. The SDT Hit and Miss
variables and coefficients were significant and similar for both models, but the
significance of the FA predictor was notably different between them. This is due to the
strong negative correlation between FA and wing stalls (-.639) and between FA and tail
stalls (-.504), as shown in Table 24.
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Table 27
CIRB Model Comparison
SDT Class

B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

41.821

3

.000

Exp(B)

Basic CIRB Model
Hit (Reference)
Correct Rejection

2.909

1.165

6.232

1

.013

18.333

False Alarm

2.686

.906

8.795

1

.003

14.667

-2.714

.777

12.217

1

.000

.066

15.938

3

.001

Miss
Comprehensive Model
Hit (Reference)
Correct Rejection

2.339

1.275

3.364

1

.067

10.375

False Alarm

1.449

1.505

.927

1

.336

4.258

-2.887

.911

10.040

1

.002

.056

Miss

Based on the comprehensive CIRB model exponential coefficients in Table 27,
aircrew had approximately 4.3 times greater odds of performing correctly when faced
with a stall warning FA than with a stall warning Hit in icing conditions. The difference
in crew performance outcomes between stall warning Misses and Hits was statistically
significant (p < .0002). Conversely, a stall warning Miss was 17.9 times (1 / 0.056) more
likely to result in an incorrect response than a Hit. Although the Miss IV was not
significant in the comprehensive model (p < .336), the statistic was significant (p < .003)
in the basic model, which was based solely on the stall warning SDT categories.
Combining the Hit, Miss, and FA ratios, a Miss was 76.0 times more likely to lead to an
incorrect outcome than an FA with the comprehensive CIRB model. The Miss: FA ratio
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for the basic CIRB model was even greater (222.2:1). In the absence of the CIRB model,
these probabilities would be expected to be approximately equal. Accordingly:
H01: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between
a valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning Miss, therefore the hypothesis is
rejected.
H02: There is no significant difference in the crew performance outcome between
a valid system stall warning (HIT) and a stall warning False Alarm, therefore the
hypothesis is rejected.
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Chapter V

Discussion, Conclusions, & Recommendations

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussion
This research was predicated on the assumption that a previously unrecognized
link exists between the action of an aircraft’s stall warning system and the successful or
unsuccessful negotiation of an airborne icing encounter by the aircrew. Signal Detection
Theory (SDT) concepts were used to define two interacting SDT decision-making
systems under these circumstances: the aircraft’s stall warning system, operating with
incomplete sensor information, and the aircrew, also operating with incomplete and
conflicting stall cues, including those from the stall warning system. It was postulated
that the stall warning system performance, in terms of Hits (i.e., valid warnings), Misses
(required warnings that the system didn’t issue), False Alarms (FA), and Correctly
Rejected (CR) warnings could influence the aircrew SDT system in a unidirectional
relationship. The application of Bayes’ Theorem to these interacting SDT models led to
a predicted shift of the aircrew’s stall detection decision criterion in icing conditions that
has been termed the Conservative Icing Response Bias (CIRB) model in this study. The
CIRB led to testable relationships between stall warning Misses, FAs, and crew
performance outcomes. This relationship was evaluated by the application of a Binary
Logistic Regression (BLR) technique to an archival analysis of NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) incident data and National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) accident data. The discussion begins with an assessment of the summary

148
statistics obtained from the archival analysis and concludes with a discussion of the
implications of the CIRB hypothesis test outcomes.

Wing Stalls, Tail Stalls, and System Issues
Descriptive statistics were used to assess the proportion of different icing impacts
(wing / tail / system), the relative incidence of correct and incorrect crew response
outcomes, and the performance of the stall warning system in SDT terms (Hit, Miss, FA,
or CR). A total of 132 cases met the criteria for the application of the BLR technique.
Of these, the majority (66.7%) related to wing stalls, with tails stalls accounting for
14.4% of the cases. System issues, pertaining to the loss of air data capability due to the
freezing of the pitot-static systems or AoA probes, figured relatively prominently
(22.7%) in the final sample of 132 cases. The inclusion of the System Issue category was
not initially envisaged, but it was added as a new independent variable (IV) for the
comprehensive BLR analysis based on its prominence in the pilot study, coupled with the
severe consequences observed for this type of failure in the archives.
The relative incidence of tail stalls and system issues may have important
repercussions for flight operations, system design, and airworthiness certification
requirements. For example, despite an observed 14.4% incidence, none of the aircraft
appearing in the archives were equipped with any form of tail stall detection or
prevention system because current airworthiness certification requirements do not require
such a system. The qualitative review of the NTSB and Archives indicated that tail stalls
generally caught aircrew completely by surprise, with the expected undesirable outcomes.
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Similarly, icing-induced system failures such as frozen pitot-static ports and
angle-of-attack vanes represented 22.7% of the sampled events. These failures
sometimes severely degraded the primary flight instrument systems and compromised
important flight envelope protections and stall warning functionality. The archival
narratives even contained some instances of system issues giving rise to simultaneous
stall and over-speed warnings, and this combination of overwhelming and erroneous cues
clearly exacerbated the potential CIRB effect. Unfortunately, contemporary stall warning
systems are often rendered inoperable when these types of failures arise, disabling the
stall protections when they are most needed. Similarly, the literature has shown that
Angle-of-Attack (AoA)-based stall warning systems are incapable of differentiating
between wing stalls, tail stalls, and system issues, leaving the crew with an extremely
challenging analysis task under very difficult conditions. A simple, direct, indication of
the aircraft’s wing and tail stall margins would go a long way to mitigating the limitations
of AoA-based stall warning systems. An ideal system would also operate independently
from the aircraft’s highly integrated air data and AoA systems that have proven
vulnerable to failure during severe icing encounters. These stall warning system
shortcomings were clearly revealed in the SDT outcomes derived during the study, as
discussed next.

Stall Warning System Effectiveness
One of the two basic assumptions of the CIRB model was that aircraft stall
warning systems operate with incomplete sensor information, particularly in an airborne
icing context, and therefore perform imperfectly. In SDT terms, such systems can fail to
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function when they should operate (a Miss), or they can activate when they should not (a
False Alarm). The statistics confirmed this effect in a very significant manner for Missed
stall warnings. As noted in Table 23, the only IVs that achieved statistical significance in
the comprehensive CIRB model were the SDT Hit or Miss stall warning parameters. No
other parameter (Wing Stall, Tail Stall, or System Issues) approached statistical
significance. Counterintuitively, the actual wing-stall or tail-stall state did not approach
significance in relation to aircrew performance outcomes. These findings strongly
support the interacting crew / stall warning SDT system basis of the CIRB model, which
explains 70% of the observed variability in crew response outcomes to airborne icing
encounters. As predicted by CIRB, these outcomes were strongly and negatively biased
by poor stall warning system performance (Misses and FAs), whether the aircraft was in
a stalled condition or not.
In terms of overall stall warning system performance, correct operation (i.e., Hits
and CRs during non-stall conditions) accounted for only 21.2% of the final 132 cases.
False Alarms accounted for 13.6% of the cases, and Misses accounted for the majority
(65.2%) of the stall warning system SDT outcomes. These statistics reinforce the
shortcomings of conventional stall warning systems that cannot directly respond to the
aerodynamic degradations caused by icing or monitor for tail stalls, as discussed at length
in Chapter II. The repercussions of these findings are two-fold. First, the basic
assumptions of the CIRB model are validated. Second, stall warning systems need to be
developed with better Miss: FA ratios for both wing and tail stalls. The literature shows
that aerodynamic performance monitors, which direct measure the boundary-layer
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separation that is always associated with a stalled condition, could help achieve these
objectives.
It could be argued that the apparent failures of current stall warning systems are
simply the result of self-selection bias, such that the research sample was necessarily
derived from those cases that had already resulted in icing incidents and accidents.
Arguably, this process selected those very rare occurrences of poor stall warning system
behavior that led to poor outcomes, and which did not otherwise occur in the general
population. There are two counterarguments to this line of reasoning: First, and most
importantly, efforts to reduce accidents must focus on the unsuccessful outcomes and
their causes, so the selection bias is a strength, not a weakness of the study. For all safety
endeavors, it is the successful outcomes that form the baseline to which incremental
safety improvements must be added by addressing the failures.
The second counterargument is that the literature is replete with aerodynamic
explanations for poor stall warning performance, particularly Misses, in icing conditions.
It is therefore no more valid to assume that stall warnings perform properly in the
absence of an accident than it is to assume the inverse. In other words, it would be
equally valid to argue that several successfully negotiated icing encounters (that did not
result in entries into the NTSB or ASRS archives) resulted despite the erroneous
performance of the stall warning systems, not because of their excellent performance.
For these reasons, the conclusion stands that tangible safety benefits would be
achieved in icing operations if stall warning system design and certification addressed the
CIRB effect. This would be achieved by deploying warning systems that reduce the
incidence of stall warning Misses – that led to the poorest outcomes – even at the cost of
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some increase in FAs, to which crews proved to be relatively resilient. The data revealed
three principal causes of stall warning Misses during icing encounters: incorrect stall
warning trigger thresholds, tail stalls, and system issues. Incorrect stall warning trigger
thresholds resulted from the reduced critical angle of attack (AoA crit ) caused by icinginduced aerodynamic degradation. Contemporary stall warning systems cannot adjust for
the highly variable effects of ace accumulations in real-time, despite the stall-margin
allowances that are made to accommodate the ice shapes used for certification
demonstrations. In consequence, there will continue to be occasional icing encounters
that result in airfoil stalls before the activation of the aircraft’s stall warning system. Tail
stalls also led to Missed stall warnings, because no system currently monitors the
empennage to provide tail stall warning or alerting. Tails stalls therefore constitute stall
warning Misses, almost by definition, unless a simultaneous wing stall resulted in the
activation of the stall warning system when the tail stalled. The final category of stall
warning Misses related to icing-induced system failures that were observed to
compromise both the aircraft’s stall warning and envelope-protection functions. These
complex failures represented some of the most challenging stall warning scenarios, as
they sometimes resulted in near-simultaneous presentation of stall warning Hits, Misses,
and False Alarms to the crew.
Aerodynamic performance measurement (APM) systems address the three causes
of stall warning Misses identified above. APM systems directly sample and respond to
the degraded aerodynamics associated with airfoil icing, in contrast to current Angle-ofAttack based systems which tend to underestimate the stall threat in icing conditions, as
amply supported by the literature review and the findings from this study. APM systems
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can be used to monitor the empennage to provide appropriate warnings in the event of
impending tail stalls. Finally, APM systems operate completely independently from the
air data and AoA systems, which currently provide the stall protection functions. For
these reasons, APM-based stall warning systems would be less susceptible to the icinginduced sensor degradations that were observed in this study.

Crew Performance
The descriptive statistics obtained from the analysis of the NASA ASRS and
NTSB accident archives confirmed the findings from the literature review concerning the
previously unexplained variability of crew responses during icing encounters. For the
combined NASA ASRS and NTSB database archive, correct crew responses were
observed in only 35 of the 132 cases (26.5%), and incorrect responses were recorded in
the remaining 97 cases (73.5%). These statistics could be attributed to self-selection bias
causing the final sample to capture only those crews that performed incorrectly, while the
majority successfully negotiated their icing encounters.
The counterargument is the same as was raised for the stall warning discussion:
Even if the results stemmed from self-selection, these same cases would still need to be
addressed to improve the safety record. Further, it could be argued that many cases were
excluded from the final sample despite an incorrect performance outcome from the crew
because an accident was avoided (and hence went unreported). Several records that
might have further supported the CIRB hypothesis were also excluded because one or
more parameters of interest could not be explicitly determined using the overwhelming
evidence threshold set for this study. These considerations support the conclusion that
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aircrew performed imperfectly during icing encounters largely due to the influence of the
stall warning system, which is addressed in the following section.

Stall Warning System Influence on Crew Performance Outcomes
As predicted by the CIRB model, the BLR analysis indicated that Missed stall
warnings had a significant and adverse influence on the outcome of airborne icing
encounters for both the basic and comprehensive CIRB models. More surprisingly, the
actual stall state of the wing or tail did not prove statistically significant as a predictor of
crew performance outcomes. This implies that crews did react appropriately to stalls
when they were correctly identified by the stall warning system. Otherwise, statistically
significant degradations in correct crew response outcomes should have been observed in
the presence of actual stall conditions. Nevertheless, stalls and loss of control (LOC)
events were often accompanied by system issues and adverse environmental influences,
such as airframe vibration and buffeting, which undoubtedly added an increased noise
component to the aircrew’s stall-detection task, in SDT terms. If the aircrew did not
adjust their decision-making criterion appropriately, the increased SDT noise would
further complicate the task of detecting a stall. This SDT noise effect would compound
the overly-conservative SDT decision-making criterion bias predicted by the CIRB
model, which explains 70% of the variability in the crew performance outcomes. This
finding also supports Advani’s assertion, first noted in Chapter II, that “Aerodynamic
Stall Can Prompt ‘Brain Stall’” (2014, p. 58).
An incorrect assertion could be made that False Alarms caused fewer poor
outcomes because of their scarcity, but this view is not supported by the data. FAs
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accounted for 13.6% of the final data sample, second in prevalence only to Misses. More
importantly, the CIRB model predicts that the increased aircrew vulnerability to stall
warning Misses is a direct result of the Bayesian and SDT origins of the model. This
counterargument is further validated by the almost identical outcomes obtained with the
basic and comprehensive CIRB models. The basic model, which incorporated the stall
warning system SDT performance as the only IV, correctly classified 90.9% of cases,
with only 12 of 132 cases being misclassified by this relatively simple model. The
comprehensive SDT model, which added the wing stall, tail stall, and system issue IVs,
correctly classified only one additional case. The stall warning SDT was therefore the
dominant factor in determining the aircrew performance outcomes in this study.

Research Design Lessons Learned
The BLR technique was applied successfully to achieve the objectives of this
study, but several lessons-learned arose from the application of the method. As
anticipated, the BLR proved resilient to violations of traditional statistical requirements
related to normality and heteroscedasticity, but the tradeoff for these benefits was the
BLR’s requirement for a larger sample size than other multivariate techniques, such as
multiple linear regression. Successful BLR execution was highly dependent on minimum
sample size constraints being met for the overall sample, as well as for the number of
observations within each variable category grouping. As indicated in Chapter III, the
desired sample size for this analysis was 10 cases per estimated parameter or category,
but the NTSB data had less than 10 samples each for the Tail_Stall, Stall_Warning, and
System_Issue variables. The decision made at the outset of the research design to use a
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combination of ASRS data and NTSB archival data proved fortuitous. The BLR would
not run successfully with either archive in isolation due to one or more violations of the
minimum sample-size requirements.
Although the BLR executed properly using the combined ASRS / NTSB database,
the final sample of 132 cases was still near the lower acceptable group sample size
bounds for the successful execution of the BLR. This was evinced when the BLR
analysis was attempted with six identified outliers removed from the data sample: The
BLR failed to converge to a solution because the lower sample size limits had been
violated. This sensitivity of the BLR to the overall sample size and the sample sizes
within each independent variable group should be considered carefully if the technique is
to be reattempted because it is unlikely that the BLR would run successfully with a
sample any smaller than was used for this study. Similarly, the addition of more
independent variables would significantly raise the minimum sample size that would also
likely preclude the successful execution of the BLR. Future researchers contemplating
the application of this method should therefore carefully consider the tradeoff between
minimum required sample size and the number of variables during the early stages of
their experimental design because other analytical methods might prove more suitable
than the BLR if these constraints cannot be met.
A second research-design lesson-learned relates to the importance of making a
very clear distinction between crew performance outcomes and adverse or satisfactory
event outcomes. Extensive efforts were made to isolate the crew responses from the
event outcomes when viewed in an icing / stall context. This is because False Alarms are
inherently associated with nonthreatening (no stall) situations, while Misses correspond
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to threatening stall or LOC conditions. An incorrect response to an FA would therefore
likely correspond to a benign outcome, despite a crew error, whereas a correct crew
response to a Miss might still result in an accident. If proper account were not taken of
this phenomenon, the data would simply correlate with the potential seriousness of a stall
in icing, rather than the intended SDT independent variables. Efforts to replicate this
study should therefore take similar precautions to properly isolate the SDT phenomenon
of interest to avoid seriously confounding the analysis.
A third lesson-learned related to the relative usefulness of the ASRS and NTSB
databases. It was anticipated that the NTSB accident archives would yield a higher
percentage of usable records than the ASRS incident data because of the presumed
availability of flight data recorders (FDR) and cockpit voice recorders (CVR) in the
tailored sample of turbine aircraft that normally carry this equipment. This did not turn
out to be the case. It proved difficult to determine the exact crew responses and stall
warning system status from the NTSB accident data because most of the aircraft in the
sample frame lacked an FDR. Conversely, many of the ASRS records contained detailed
and useful pilot narratives, often with explicit declarations concerning the items of
interest. This unexpected windfall proved the value, once again, of using two different
archival sources, as planned from the inception of the research design.
The final lesson-learned related to the benefits of building on prior research,
particularly with the regard to the generation of appropriate search strings. For example,
the use of Green’s (2006) search string, and some of Green’s associated methodology,
significantly streamlined the processing and down-sampling of the massive ASRS data
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archive. As an added benefit, this standardization should facilitate future research
synthesis and meta-analyses related to the topic.

Conclusions
This study applied the Binary Logistic Regression technique to a hypothesized
Conservative Icing Response Bias model of aircrew performance outcomes during
airborne icing encounters. The evaluation of the CIRB hypothesis resulted in a
convergent BLR solution with adequate combined sample sizes and positive analytical
measures of reliability and validity. Accordingly, the following conclusions should be
generalizable to the target population of U.S. registered, non-amateur-built, turbine
aircraft, as intended.
The research demonstrated a significant adverse effect of Missed stall warnings
(that accounted for 65.2% of the events studied) on aircrew performance outcomes during
airborne icing encounters. Conversely, aircrew proved far less susceptible to FAs, as
predicted by the CIRB hypothesis. The fundamental CIRB assumptions concerning two
interacting Signal Detection Theory Systems were therefore validated.
CIRB provides a much-needed theoretical model that explains the apparently
heterogeneous aircrew reactions to icing encounters. The model uses only four SDT
parameters (Hit, Miss, FA, and CR) related to the aircraft’s stall warning system’s
performance to predict the aircrew performance outcomes during airborne icing
encounters. CIRB produces quantitative predictions, so it can be formally applied and
tested with any dataset that meets the sample size requirements for a BLR analysis. By
extension, these results highlight the potential application of SDT to a much broader
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context than airborne icing encounters. Although the current study was predicated on the
SDT modelling of crew response outcomes, these binary outcomes are manifestations of
a higher-level Situational Awareness construct, which could be termed stall awareness.
This extension of SDT methodology beyond simple perceptual tasks associated with
physical stimuli into higher-level abstract or metaphorical signals was mentioned in the
introduction (Abdi, 2009, p. 2). This potential was realized in the findings from the
current study, where the crew decision-making outcomes were the result of complex
interactions between physical stimuli, the environment, training, workload,
aerodynamics, and numerous other factors. The application of the combined SDT / BLR
method reduced these numerous and sometimes unknown or unquantifiable factors to the
four basic binary elements of SDT: Hits, Misses, FAs, and CRs. Despite this significant
simplification, the resulting model yielded impressive sensitivity, specificity, and correct
classification statistics. If the methods of this study can be successfully replicated, then
the reductionism achieved by combining the SDT method and the BLR technique has
important ramifications for the modelling of other complex human-in-the loop processes.
Previously intractable problems can be reframed in SDT terms, with the dependent
variable representing the output of a high-level construct such as stall awareness. The
resulting models could then be quantitatively evaluated for statistical and practical
significance using the SDT / BLR technique, as applied in this study. Once successfully
modeled, the same methods would allow the quantitative evaluation of the effects of
changed parameters on the model output. In the case of the current study, the CIRB
SDT / BLR model could be applied to the development and evaluation of aircraft stall
warning systems and their associated certification regulations. Ongoing data mining

160
methods could then be applied to determine if the anticipated benefits of APM systems or
revised aircrew training are being realized as expected.

Recommendations
This section addresses three broad topic areas: stall warning system design and
certification, aircrew training, and future research directions. The following
recommendations are intended to explicitly address the problem statement developed in
Chapter I, and repeated below:
The literature shows that the majority of airborne icing accidents result
from aircraft stalls, yet there is no theoretical model that ties the success or failure
of the crew decision-making in icing to the performance of the stall warning
system. This knowledge gap imposes reactionary and untargeted regulatory
responses that have failed to fully resolve the icing issue, despite decades of
effort.

Stall warning system design. The CIRB phenomenon has shown that it would
be advantageous to modify stall warning system certification regulations (e.g., 14 CFR
§23.207 and §25.207 Stall Warning) to achieve systems with improved Miss: FA ratios.
This could be accomplished in several ways: Stall warning systems should be developed
that maintain the correct warning margins in the face of airfoil icing. Warning systems
should also monitor for tail stalls, which accounted for 14.4% of the sampled events and
which often led to stall warning Misses with unfavorable consequences. Finally, stall
warning systems should be developed and certified that continue to function
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independently and correctly in the face of icing-induced system issues, such as frozen
pitot-static ports and angle-of-attack vanes, which represented 22.7% of the sampled
events. The literature has shown that aerodynamic performance monitors have promise
in fulfilling all three of these requirements.

Aircrew training. Aircrew training programs for airborne icing operations
should explicitly address the response-bias phenomenon and its attendant dangers. The
CIRB phenomenon stems from the failure of aircrew to adjust their SDT decision
criterion appropriately to the more conservative value required during airborne icing
encounters. This response bias is a direct consequence of Bayes’ Theorem, which
predisposes aircrew to underestimate the possibility of a stall or loss of control during
icing encounters, based on stall expectations derived during extensive exposure to nonicing flight. The incorporation of specific training objectives to familiarize aircrew with
the CIRB effect would strongly complement the current emphasis on the meteorological
and technical aspects of airframe icing. For example, crews should be conditioned to
respond to all performance and flying quality degradations in icing as aerodynamic stalls,
unless proven otherwise by overwhelming evidence. Although this recommendation
seems self-evident, there were numerous cases in the archives and literature where the
crew failed to make the connection between their control difficulties and impending
icing-induced aerodynamic stalls. In some cases, the crew forced the aircraft into a stall,
and then maintained inappropriate control inputs, sometimes for several minutes, which
precluded any chance of recovery. Conflicting cues, an unfamiliar environment, and high
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stress levels undoubtedly contributed to these unfortunate outcomes, and better training to
recognize and address such situations would be a very important mitigation.
In addition to the preceding training recommendations, the CIRB / BLR
methodology could be applied to Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) data
obtained during routine operations and from simulator training data. The application of
comprehensive data mining techniques, using the same variables examined in this study
as a baseline, would yield important benefits. Most importantly, data mining would
generate a much larger sample than was achieved by this archival study, because FOQA
data are routinely collected during every flight, not just the operations that resulted in
incidents or accidents, as was the case in this study. The larger sample size would allow
additional stratification variables to be incorporated in the CIRB model, which was not
possible with this research because of the minimum sample size limitations of the BLR.
FOQA and simulator data would also capture all the successful crew performance
outcomes, which would minimize the self-selection bias towards unsuccessful outcomes
inherent in accident and incident archival database research. Finally, the application of
the CIRB / BLR method to FOQA and simulator data would facilitate the objective
quantitative evaluation of the benefits achieved from updated training practices or
improvements in aircraft equipage.
Future research directions. The CIRB model should be further validated and
extended using databases that were not incorporated into this study. Domestic examples
include the FAA Accidents/Incidents Data System (AIDS), airline Flight Operational
Quality Assurance (FOQA) data, and ASRS / NTSB icing data for reciprocating engine
aircraft that were excluded from the BLR analysis. The model could also be further
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validated and expanded using non-U.S. data sources such as the ICAO Accident and
Incident Data-Reporting Database (ADREP). ADREP contains mandatory reports of all
aviation accidents to aircraft over 2,250 kg, in accordance with Annex 13, Chapter 7 of
the Chicago Convention. Zeppetelli & Habashi (2012) identified 323 relevant airborne
icing occurrences since the ADREP’s inception in 1970. Incorporation of ADREP data
would therefore substantially expand the sample size that could be evaluated using the
techniques presented in this study. Transport Canada operates the Civil Aviation Daily
Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) which could further supplement the sample
size, particularly in light of the prevalence of icing encounters in Canadian airspace due
to the country’s climate and geography.
There is also a wealth of proprietary untapped data that is not in the public
domain to which the model could be applied and tested. The CIRB / BLR methodology
should be considered for applications outside the narrowly defined scope of this study.
Examples include evaluations of the factors leading to non-icing related loss of control,
runway incursions, or even applications in unrelated industries, such as nuclear power
plant operational safety.
Future researchers are encouraged to duplicate the use of dissimilar database
archives, as was done for this study. This beneficially increases the overall sample size
to meet the demands of the BLR, and should also help to ensure that minimum group
membership levels are achieved when the number of variable categories is increased.
There is a risk of the BLR analysis failing to converge if these measures are not taken.
Future research could be performed using additional stratification variables, such as crew
qualifications, type of flight, etc., that could not be evaluated with the sample size
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available for this study. The use of dissimilar databases also increases the triangulation
that can be achieved, with beneficial consequences to the reliability and external validity
of the research.
Given the analytically demonstrated validity and reliability of the basic and
comprehensive CIRB models, the BLR coefficients derived in this study could be used
for predictive purposes, and the preceding conclusions and recommendations should be
valid and generalizable to the target population of U.S. turbine-powered, non-amateurbuilt aircraft. In a broader context, the SDT/BLR model can be generalized and applied
to other human-in-the loop tasks, where its potential to simplify complex relationships
would allow quantitative evaluations to be performed on otherwise intractable behavioral
constructs, such as judgment and decision-making. Collectively, the successful
implementation of these recommendations should achieve the ultimate and overriding
objective stated in the first chapter of this treatise: to save lives.
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APPENDIX A
ASRS QUERY STRING
SELECT DISTINCT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1,
QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT
AL4 WHERE (AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID
AND AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID) AND (CONTAINS(AL2.TEXT,'STALL%')>0
AND AL3.ATTRIBUTE='Weather Elements / Visibility' AND AL3.VALUE='Icing')
UNION SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1,
QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2, QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT
AL4 WHERE (AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID
AND AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID) AND (CONTAINS(AL2.TEXT,'STALL%')>0
AND CONTAINS(AL4.TEXT,'ICE OR ICING OR ICED OR RIME OR RHIME OR
FROZE OR FREEZ%')>0) UNION SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID FROM
QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2,
QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL4 WHERE
(AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND
AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID) AND (AL1.ENTITY='Component' AND
AL1.ATTRIBUTE='Aircraft Component' AND AL1.VALUE IN ('Stall Barrier System',
'Stall Protection System', 'Stall Warning System') AND AL3.ATTRIBUTE='Weather
Elements / Visibility' AND AL3.VALUE='Icing') UNION SELECT AL1.ITEM_ID
FROM QWPUBLIC.ALL_ITEMS AL1, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL2,
QWPUBLIC.ENVIRONMENT AL3, QWPUBLIC.TEXT AL4 WHERE
(AL2.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND AL3.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID AND
AL4.ITEM_ID=AL1.ITEM_ID) AND (AL1.ENTITY='Component' AND
AL1.ATTRIBUTE='Aircraft Component' AND AL1.VALUE IN ('Stall Barrier System',
'Stall Protection System', 'Stall Warning System') AND CONTAINS(AL4.TEXT,'ICE
OR ICING OR ICED OR RIME OR RHIME OR FROZE OR FREEZ%')>0)

Figure 11. ASRS Query String.

182
B.

ASRS Limitations

APPENDIX B
ASRS LIMITATIONS
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ASRS Data Structure

C2

NASA ASRS Final Sample Case Listing

C3

NTSB Final Sample Case Listing
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Table C1
ASRS Data Structure
ASRS Variable

ASRS Variable (cont.)

1. ACN

2. Date

3. Local Time Of Day

4. Locale Reference

5. State Reference

6. Relative Position.Angle.Radial

7. Relative Position.Distance.Nautical
Miles

8. Altitude.AGL.Single Value

9. Altitude.MSL.Single Value

10. Flight Conditions

11. Weather Elements / Visibility

12. Work Environment Factor

13. Light

14. Ceiling

15. RVR.Single Value

16. ATC / Advisory

17. Aircraft Operator

18. Make Model Name

19. Propulsion

20. Aircraft Zone

21. Crew Size

22. Operating Under FAR Part

23. Flight Plan

24. Mission

25. Nav In Use

26. Flight Phase

27. Route In Use

28. Airspace

29. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Deferred

30. Maintenance Status.Records
Complete

31. Maintenance Status.Released For
Service

32. Maintenance Status.Required /
Correct Doc On Board

33. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Type

34. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Items Involved

35. Cabin Lighting

36. Number Of Seats.Number

37. Passengers On Board.Number

38. Crew Size Flight Attendant.Number
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ASRS Variable

ASRS Variable (cont.)
Of Crew

39. Aircraft Component

40. Manufacturer

41. Aircraft Reference

42. Problem

43. ATC / Advisory

44. Aircraft Operator

45. Make Model Name

46. Aircraft Zone

47. Crew Size

48. Operating Under FAR Part

49. Flight Plan

50. Mission

51. Nav In Use

52. Flight Phase

53. Route In Use

54. Airspace

55. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Deferred

56. Maintenance Status.Records
Complete

57. Maintenance Status.Released For
Service

58. Maintenance Status.Required /
Correct Doc On Board

59. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Type

60. Maintenance Status.Maintenance
Items Involved

61. Cabin Lighting

62. Number Of Seats.Number

63. Passengers On Board.Number

64. Crew Size Flight Attendant.Number
Of Crew

65. Location Of Person

66. Location In Aircraft

67. Reporter Organization

68. Function

69. Qualification

70. Experience

71. Cabin Activity

72. Human Factors

73. Communication Breakdown

74. ASRS Report Number.Accession
Number

75. Location Of Person

76. Location In Aircraft

77. Reporter Organization

78. Function
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ASRS Variable
79. Qualification

ASRS Variable (cont.)
80. Experience

81. Cabin Activity

82. Human Factors

83. Communication Breakdown

84. ASRS Report Number.Accession
Number

85. Anomaly

86. Miss Distance

87. Were Passengers Involved In Event

88. Detector

89. When Detected

90. Result

91. Contributing Factors / Situations

92. Primary Problem

93. Narrative

94. Callback

95. Narrative

96. Callback

97. Synopsys

98. –
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Table C2
NASA ASRS Final Sample Case Listing
ASRS ACN
100792
104442
115422
189745
191028
200004
202249
211430
225830
231194
235939
250881
260890
264355
265218
268036
282950
286127
326726
327563
327661
327877
330391
357096
357245
366589
376201

Event Year
1988
1989
1989
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1994
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1997
1997
1997

ASRS ACN
386766
389483
390641
391550
393189
393446
395823
403299
418260
419839
423056
423333
425239
441448
452162
456868
463853
470303
476789
479942
495957
519723
522830
541639
565131
589618
601072

Event Year
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
1999
1999
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003

ASRS ACN
642483
643904
665350
682246
684037
692028
714794
760888
765665
765691
774091
832021
845030
849667
852531
881246
881955
924002
925811
1090560
1128912
1147583
1152737
1168045
1227048

Event Year
2005
2004
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2008
2009
2009
2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2011
2013
2013
2014
2014
2014
2014
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Table C3
NTSB Final Sample Case Listing
NTSB #
ANC00LA017
ANC02FA020
ANC05CA040
ANC08LA027
ANC10LA019
ANC11TA031
ANC98LA018
ANC98MA008
CEN09MA142
CEN10LA090
CEN11FA144
CEN12LA095
CEN12LA153
CEN15LA091
CHI02IA151
CHI04IA056
CHI06IA127
CHI06LA058
CHI07LA059
CHI89IA034
CHI89MA057
CHI90IA106
CHI93MA061
CHI97FA047
CHI98LA084
DCA01MA031
DCA09IA064

Event Year
1999
2002
2005
2007
2010
2011
1998
1997
2009
2010
2011
2011
2012
2014
2002
2004
2006
2006
2007
1988
1989
1990
1993
1996
1998
2001
2009

NTSB #
DCA09MA027
DCA15MA029
DCA90MA011
DCA91MA019
DCA92MA025
DCA93IA027
DCA95MA001
DCA97MA017
ERA11LA344
FTW03FA089
FTW93MA143
FTW95FA094
FTW95FA129
LAX02FA108
LAX02LA030
LAX06IA076
LAX95IA128
MIA98LA061
NYC04LA044
NYC04LA050
NYC05MA083
NYC07LA081
NYC97FA045
NYC98LA028
SEA08FA042
SEA95LA059

Event Year
2009
2014
1989
1991
1992
1993
1994
1997
2011
2003
1993
1995
1995
2002
2001
2006
1995
1998
2003
2003
2005
2007
1997
1997
2007
1995
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D.

SME Data Encoding Checklist

APPENDIX D
SME DATA ENCODING CHECKLIST

Introduction
You have graciously agreed to participate in a doctoral dissertation research study
that examines the effect of stall warning system performance on crew behavioral
outcomes during airborne icing encounters. Airborne icing has been a major cause of
aircraft accidents and loss of life since the earliest days of aviation and continues to cause
aircraft accidents and incidents. Airframe icing has been featured in the National
Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) Most Wanted List of transportation safety
improvements for 14 years (NTSB, 2012b). The objective of this research program is to
help increase the understanding of the complex interactions between aircrew, the icing
environment, aircraft dynamics, and the aircraft systems during icing encounters. The
findings should result in improved guidelines for the design, certification, and operation
of stall protection systems, with the overall objective of reducing accidents and saving
lives.
The research entails the selection and encoding of icing-encounter cases that meet
strict criteria from the NTSB Aviation Accident database and the NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) database. This activity addresses both the selection and the
encoding of the candidate cases for further study. For a case to be included in the study,
the record must contain unambiguous information about a number of critical variables.
These include: the aircraft’s wing and / or tail stall state; the activation state of stall
warning and / or stall prevention equipment (e.g. aural stall alerts, stick shaker, and stick
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pusher systems); and whether the initial crew response was correct, according to specific
criteria defined for the study. The correct response criterion is used in a very specific
manner in the study: It does not relate to the success or failure of the crew interventions
nor is it intended to judge the competency of the crew. In order for the study to be valid
and reliable, very detailed procedures and criteria must be applied to ensure that the
appropriate records are selected and that they are consistently encoded without
introducing observer bias. Any inclination to assess the accident or incident situations
subjectively must be studiously avoided. The next sections address the two principal
archive processing activities: record selection and data encoding.

Record Selection
The ASRS records to be analyzed are contained in a tailored extract of 381 cases
provided by NASA ASRS analysts, and the sample is ready for encoding as presented.
The NTSB sample records must be downloaded from the NTSB on-line query page:
http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx using the criteria shown in
Table D1. Unlisted parameters must be left at their default values. A separate extract
will be required for each of the turbojet, turboprop, and turbofan engine types.
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Table D1
NTSB Database Search Criteria
Characteristic
Event start date

Value
January 1, 1988

Event end date

October 2, 2015

AircraftCategory Filter

Airplane

AmateurBuilt Filter

No

EngineType Filter

Turbine aircraft (turbojet, turboprop,
turbofan). Separate extracts will be
required for each of these.

WeatherConditions Filter

All

Word search string

"icing" or "freezing" or "rime" or "glaze"
or "sleet" or "frost"

Archive Encoding
The ASRS and NTSB extracts must be evaluated for records containing the
required aircraft, stall warning, and crew response information. The resulting subsamples of conforming records must then be encoded for these variables. Both processes
are accomplished using the procedure shown in Table D2.
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Table D2
NTSB and ASRS Database Encoding Checklist
Step
1

Action
Record Initial ASRS and NTSB sample sizes:

Record

1a

Initial ASRS sample size

381 Cases

1b

Initial NTSB turbojet sample size

____Cases

1c

Initial NTSB turboprop sample size

____Cases

1d

Initial NTSB turbofan sample size

____Cases

2

Perform ASRS and NTSB sub-sampling:
Reject all records that were not related to airframe icing (e.g.
engine issues related to ice crystal ingestion, runway overruns
due to landing surface contamination, etc.).
Reject all records for which the aircraft stall-state, stall warning
system performance, and crew performance outcomesa cannot
be unequivocally determined.
Knowledge of the stall warning system state entails explicit
evidence of aural stall warnings, stick-shaker, or stick pusher
activation, with one exception: if a detailed crew narrative of
the accident or incident is available and no indication or
mention is made of a stall warning actuation, then the stall
warning system state will be encoded None.

2a

Record ASRS sub-sample size

____Cases

2b

Record NTSB turbojet sub-sample size

____Cases

2c

Record NTSB turboprop sub-sample size

____Cases

2d

Record NTSB turbofan sub-sample size

____Cases
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Step

Action
For each remaining sub-sample:

3

Encode the aircraft stall state (no stall, imminent or actual wing
stall, imminent or actual tail stall, or system issueb).

4

Encode the crew response outcome using the criteria in
Table D3.

5

Encode the stall warning system outcome into one of four
states: Hit, Miss, False Alarm, or Correct Rejection using the
criteria in Table D4.

6

Record encoded cases in worksheet for further processing in the
ASRS and NTSB Sample Data Entry Worksheet. Duplicate and
use as many sheets as necessary to record all of the sub-sample
data. Number each of the sheets and record your name at the
bottom of each completed sheet. Cross out and initial any
incorrect entries and any unused rows on the last sheet.

Record

Complete
Table D5

Note. aCrew performance outcomes are defined using the criteria in Table D3. bA
system issue is one that resulted in an icing stall event that was not caused by airframe
icing. An example would be loss of primary airspeed information due to a frozen pitotstatic system.
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Table D3
Crew Performance Outcome Evaluation Criteria for SME
Incorrect Crew Performance
The NTSB probable cause or
contributing factor in a factual or final
report indicates that the crew’s initial
response was inappropriate (e.g. BEA,
2012; NTSB, 1996b; NTSB, 2010a).

Correct Crew Performance
The NTSB probable cause or
contributing factor in a factual or final
report indicates that the crew’s initial
response was appropriate.

2.

The ASRS submitter indicated that the
crew response was inappropriate.

The ASRS submitter indicated that the
crew response was appropriate.

3.

The crew first became aware of the
impending stall or loss of control after
their onset (i.e., the crew allowed the
situation to degrade to the point where
control was lost before recognizing this
fact).

The crew first became aware of the
impending stall or loss of control before
their onset and made positive efforts to
avoid the event, regardless of the
success of the outcome.

4.

An appropriate stall warning was not
acted upon in time to avoid a true
aerodynamic stall or loss of control.

An appropriate stall warning was acted
upon in a timely fashion, regardless of
the success of the outcome.

5.

The crew response was markedly
different from an accepted norm (i.e.,
adding power and firmly lowering the
nose to prevent a wing stall) (e.g.
NTSB, 2010a).

The crew response conformed to the
accepted norm, regardless of the
success of the outcome.

6.

The crew appeared to be unaware of the The crew appeared to be aware of the
stall-state of the aircraft or
stall-state of the aircraft.
misdiagnosed its state (e.g. BEA, 2012).

7.

There is overwhelming evidence from a
subjective review of the record that the
crew’s initial response was
inappropriate.

1.

There is overwhelming evidence from a
subjective review of the record that the
crew’s initial response was appropriate.
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Table D4
Stall Warning System State Encoding
Aircraft Wing or Tail
Stall State

SDTa
Classification

Stall Warning System
State preceding the
aircraft event
None

Correct Rejection (CR)

No imminent or actual wing or
tail stall

Alert

False Alarm (FA)

Imminent or actual wing stall

None

Miss (M)

Imminent or actual wing stall

Alert

Hit (H)

Imminent or actual tail stall

None

Miss (M)

Imminent or actual tail stall

Alertb

Hit (H)

No imminent or actual wing or
tail stallb

Note. aSignal Detection Theory. bImminent or actual stall can be inferred from airframe
buffeting or vibration, wing or nose drop, marked control difficulties, or an inability to
stop a descent, such as uncontrolled sink in the landing flare. cThere are currently no
artificial stall warning systems capable of detecting a tail stall, so this is a placeholder
category only.
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Table D5
ASRS and NTSB Sample Data Entry Worksheet
1. Duplicate and use as many sheets as necessary to record all of the sub-sample data.
2. Number each of the sheets and record your name at the bottom of each completed sheet.
3. Cross out and initial any incorrect entries and any unused rows on the last sheet.
ASRS
ACN or
NTSB ID
#

e.g.:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

12345

Event
Date
YYYYMM

200112

SHEET ____ of ____

Pending
Wing
Stall
(Y/N)

Pending
Tail
Stall
(Y/N)

Stall
Warning

System
Issue

(Y/N)

Correct
Crew
Response
(Y/N)

(Y/N)

SDT
Class
(H, M,
FA, CR)

Y

N

N

N

N

M

SME Name:_________________________________

